employer violation in California

2025The parties agree the word “may” implies a measure of discretion, but disagree about whether the statute grants the exercise of that discretion to the party prosecuting the action or to the court. “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 .) “ ‘ “ ‘We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[W]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes

2022Plaintiffs assert the term “may” is granting prosecutorial discretion, rather than judicial discretion. “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [“ ‘[t]h

2015(Iskanian, at pp. 361-362.) On grant of review, the California Supreme Court held that Concepcion abrogated Gentry and that California’s public policy against the enforcement of class action waivers in employment agreements is preempted by the FAA. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 362-366.) The court also held that class action waivers in employment agreements do not violate the NLRA (id. at pp. 366-374), and that the employer did not waiver its right to compel arbitration (id. at pp. 374-378). 1 In Iskanian, the arbitration agreement expressly provided that the plaintiff could “‘not asser

2015(Iskanian, at pp. 361-362.) On grant of review, the California Supreme Court held that Concepcion abrogated Gentry and that California’s public policy against the enforcement of class action waivers in employment agreements is preempted by the FAA. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 362-366.) The court also held that class action waivers in employment agreements do not violate the NLRA (id. at pp. 366-374), and that the employer did not waiver its right to compel arbitration (id. at pp. 374-378). 1 In Iskanian, the arbitration agreement expressly provided that the plaintiff could “‘not asser

2026Section 558.1 provides: “Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation.” (§ 558.1, subd. (a).) The statute defines “ ‘other person acting on behalf of an employer’ ” as “a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer, and the term ‘managing agent

2022Governing law Effective January 1, 2016, section 558.1 provides: “(a) Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation. [¶] (b) For purposes of this section, the term ‘other person acting on behalf of an employer’ is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or manag

2024In Wiseman v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 570 , a California banker was in New York on a business trip.

2024In Wiseman v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 570 , a California banker was in New York on a business trip.

2022(Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 214 ; Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1013 .) The first is “to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct,” recognizing that imposing vicarious liability “ ‘ “creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position ‘to guard substantially against the evil to be prevented.’ ” ’ ” (Farmers, at p. 1013.) The second policy objective is “to give greater assurance of compensation to the victim.” (Id. at p. 1016.) The third is to “ensure that the victim’s losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury.” (I

2022(Mary M., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 214 ; Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1013 .) The first is “to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct,” recognizing that imposing vicarious liability “ ‘ “creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position ‘to guard substantially against the evil to be prevented.’ ” ’ ” (Farmers, at p. 1013.) The second policy objective is “to give greater assurance of compensation to the victim.” (Id. at p. 1016.) The third is to “ensure that the victim’s losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury.” (I

2022(Id. at p. 868.) The Labor Commissioner asserted in part that “ ‘toll[ing] the statute of limitations’ upon the initial presentation of the claim—i.e., to calculate backpay from that date—would be unfair to the employer because it would compel the commissioner to notify the employer of the claim immediately, which in turn would compel the employer to incur legal expenses in preparing a defense 7 before the commissioner has determined through his [or her] investigation that he [or she] does have jurisdiction and that the claim is facially valid.” (Ibid.) The court rejected this argument, conclu

2022(Id. at p. 868.) The Labor Commissioner asserted in part that “ ‘toll[ing] the statute of limitations’ upon the initial presentation of the claim—i.e., to calculate backpay from that date—would be unfair to the employer because it would compel the commissioner to notify the employer of the claim immediately, which in turn would compel the employer to incur legal expenses in preparing a defense 7 before the commissioner has determined through his [or her] investigation that he [or she] does have jurisdiction and that the claim is facially valid.” (Ibid.) The court rejected this argument, conclu

2022(Bailey v. Filco, Inc., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1559 .) “If an employee’s tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 140 .) “ ‘[E]mployees do not act within the scope of employment when they abuse job-created authority over others 8 for purely personal reasons.’ ” (M.P. v. City of Sacramento (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 121, 132

2013Entertainment, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 427, 435 .) “[I]n the development of the respondeat superior doctrine, courts have occasionally looked toward workers‟ compensation cases for guidance. [Citations.]” (Bailey v. Filco, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1562 .) “Although the test under the workmen‟s compensation law of “arising out of and in the course of the employment” [citation], is not identical with the test of “scope of employment” under the respondeat superior doctrine [citation], . . . the two tests are closely related [citation].” (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec.

2022Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay . . . .” ( Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1040-1041.) “A missed meal break does not constitute a violation if the employee waived the meal break, or otherwise voluntarily shortened or postponed it.” (Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 832, 851 .) “State law [also] obligates employers to afford their nonexempt

2021Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay . . . .” ( Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1040-1041.) “A missed meal break does not constitute a violation if the employee waived the meal break, or otherwise voluntarily shortened or postponed it.” (Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 832, 851 .) “State law [also] obligates employers to afford their nonexempt

2020(Wysinger, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 .) Wysinger rejected the employer’s argument that the resulting verdict was internally inconsistent, holding as follows: “Here the verdicts on the reasonable accommodation issue and the interactive process claim are not inconsistent.

2008(Wysinger, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 424 .) The employer in Wysinger argued that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent because in order to prevail on a section 12940(n) claim the employee also had to prove a violation of section 12940(m).

2018Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer's obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay ...." ( Id . at pp. 1040-1041, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 273 P.3d 513 .) However, "if the employer knows that meal breaks are missed, shortened, or unduly delayed because the employer has instructed the employee to work, or has otherwise impeded the taking of breaks, [the employer's] duty is contravened, absent a suitable waiver or agreement by th

2018Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer's obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay ...." ( Id . at pp. 1040-1041, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 273 P.3d 513 .) However, "if the employer knows that meal breaks are missed, shortened, or unduly delayed because the employer has instructed the employee to work, or has otherwise impeded the taking of breaks, [the employer's] duty is contravened, absent a suitable waiver or agreement by th

2016(See, e.g, Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 776 .) Employer's motion did address every specifically pleaded misrepresentation, and a party moving for summary judgment need not address issues not 29 framed by the complaint.

2016(See, e.g, Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 776 .) Employer's motion did address every specifically pleaded misrepresentation, and a party moving for summary judgment need not address issues not 29 framed by the complaint.

2016“If an employer requires an employee to furnish a vehicle as an express or implied condition of employment, the employee will be in the scope of his employment while commuting to and from the place of his employment.” (Felix, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 932 , italics added.) The portion of CACI No. 3725 addressing an employer requirement states: “[I]f an employer requires an employee to drive to and from the workplace so that the vehicle is available for the employer’s business, then the drive to and from work is within the scope of employment.

2016“If an employer requires an employee to furnish a vehicle as an express or implied condition of employment, the employee will be in the scope of his employment while commuting to and from the place of his employment.” (Felix, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 932 , italics added.) The portion of CACI No. 3725 addressing an employer requirement states: “[I]f an employer requires an employee to drive to and from the workplace so that the vehicle is available for the employer’s business, then the drive to and from work is within the scope of employment.

2016(Sprague, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050 ; United States v. Dunkel, supra, 927 F.2d at p. 956 .) As stated in Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 , although we review de novo an order granting summary judgment, "this de novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.

2016(Sprague, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050 ; United States v. Dunkel, supra, 927 F.2d at p. 956 .) As stated in Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 , although we review de novo an order granting summary judgment, "this de novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.

2016(See, e.g., Apollo Capital Fund LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 .) On appeal, Ingrande reargues that summary adjudication is improper when the defendant does not refute the entire cause of action, and therefore summary adjudication was improper because Employer's motion did not address the misrepresentations contained in the employee handbook Ingrande incorporated by reference.

2016(See, e.g., Apollo Capital Fund LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 .) On appeal, Ingrande reargues that summary adjudication is improper when the defendant does not refute the entire cause of action, and therefore summary adjudication was improper because Employer's motion did not address the misrepresentations contained in the employee handbook Ingrande incorporated by reference.

2016(Sprague, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050 ; United States v. Dunkel, supra, 927 F.2d at p. 956 .) As stated in Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 , although we review de novo an order granting summary judgment, "this de novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.

2016(Sprague, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050 ; United States v. Dunkel, supra, 927 F.2d at p. 956 .) As stated in Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 , although we review de novo an order granting summary judgment, "this de novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.

2016(Sprague, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050 ; United States v. Dunkel, supra, 927 F.2d at p. 956 .) As stated in Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 , although we review de novo an order granting summary judgment, "this de novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.

2016(Sprague, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050 ; United States v. Dunkel, supra, 927 F.2d at p. 956 .) As stated in Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 , although we review de novo an order granting summary judgment, "this de novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues.

1995As explained above, “[i]f an employee’s tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Alma W., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 140 ; see Monty v. Orlandi, supra, 169 Cal.App.2d at p. 623 ; cf. John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438 .) On this point, Farmers does not dispute that Nelson’s repeated requests for sexual favors and his inappropriate touchings were motivated for strictly personal reasons unrelated

1995As explained above, "[i]f an employee's tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior." ( Alma W., supra, 123 Cal. App.3d at p. 140 ; see Monty v. Orlandi, supra, 169 Cal. App.2d at p. 623 ; cf. John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438 .) On this point, Farmers does not dispute that Nelson's repeated requests for sexual favors and his inappropriate touchings were motivated for strictly personal reasons unrela

2016Employer argued the undisputed facts showed Employer could only be vicariously liable for the statements of the individual defendants and, because summary adjudication of the claims against the individual defendants was warranted, Employer was also entitled to summary adjudication insofar as Ingrande's alleged defamation claims against Employer derived from the statements of the individual defendants. 8 Because Ingrande challenges most of the court's rulings in this appeal, we separately detail the showings below on each cause of action, and rulings thereon, when evaluating Ingrande's appellat

2016Employer argued the undisputed facts showed Employer could only be vicariously liable for the statements of the individual defendants and, because summary adjudication of the claims against the individual defendants was warranted, Employer was also entitled to summary adjudication insofar as Ingrande's alleged defamation claims against Employer derived from the statements of the individual defendants. 8 Because Ingrande challenges most of the court's rulings in this appeal, we separately detail the showings below on each cause of action, and rulings thereon, when evaluating Ingrande's appellat