27 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Irbygreen2 sentences2025The right is not “absolute,” and due process requires the defendant’s presence only “‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Irby, 170 Wn.2d at 881 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. 2021RIGHT TO BE PRESENT “[T]he due process right to be present is not absolute.” State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 881 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011). “‘[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , L. | 5 | 15 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2025The right is not “absolute,” and due process requires the defendant’s presence only “‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Irby, 170 Wn.2d at 881 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. 2025The right is not “absolute,” and due process requires the defendant’s presence only “‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Irby, 170 Wn.2d at 881 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. | 3 | 20 |
State v. Irbygreen2 sentences2021RIGHT TO BE PRESENT “[T]he due process right to be present is not absolute.” State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 881 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011). “‘[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , L. 2021RIGHT TO BE PRESENT “[T]he due process right to be present is not absolute.” State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 881 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011). “‘[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , L. | 2 | 5 |
Matter of Personal Restraint of Lordgreen2 sentences2024First, whether the subject of the hearing related to a purely legal matter and, second, if so, whether the absence of the defendant affected the opportunity to defend against the charge, “or whether a fair and just hearing was thwarted by his absence.” Id. 2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 ; Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 306 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that “ ‘mere speculation and bare allegations’ ” are insufficient to make out a due process violation (quoting United States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir. 1992))), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 (2000). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Pruittgreen2 sentences2021Indeed, “ ‘[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’ ” Pruitt, 145 Wn. 2021Indeed, “ ‘[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’ ” Pruitt, 145 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Kenrickgreen2 sentences2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 ; Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 306 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that “ ‘mere speculation and bare allegations’ ” are insufficient to make out a due process violation (quoting United States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir. 1992))), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 (2000). 2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 ; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 306, 868 P.2d 835 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that "[m]ere speculation and bare allegations" are insufficient to make out a due process violation), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 , 121 S.Ct. 387 , 148 L.Ed.2d 299 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Kenrick v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 ; Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 306 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that “ ‘mere speculation and bare allegations’ ” are insufficient to make out a due process violation (quoting United States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir. 1992))), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 (2000). 2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 ; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 306, 868 P.2d 835 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that "[m]ere speculation and bare allegations" are insufficient to make out a due process violation), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 , 121 S.Ct. 387 , 148 L.Ed.2d 299 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Juan M. Gordon, (Two Cases)green2 sentences2007This right extends to jury voir dire, though the defendant’s presence at this stage is only required because it is substantially related to the defense and allows the defendant “to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106 ; United States v. Gordon, 264 U.S. App. D.C. 334 , 829 F.2d 119, 124 (1987). “[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08 . 2007This right extends to jury voir dire, though the defendant’s presence at this stage is only required because it is substantially related to the defense and allows the defendant “to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106 ; United States v. Gordon, 264 U.S. App. D.C. 334 , 829 F.2d 119, 124 (1987). “[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08 . | 2 | 2 |
Chun Hua Mui v. Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employeesgreen1 sentence2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 ; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 306, 868 P.2d 835 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that "[m]ere speculation and bare allegations" are insufficient to make out a due process violation), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 , 121 S.Ct. 387 , 148 L.Ed.2d 299 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James W. McCoygreen1 sentence2007Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-08 ; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 ; Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 306 ; see also United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir.) (stating that “ ‘mere speculation and bare allegations’ ” are insufficient to make out a due process violation (quoting United States v. McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir. 1992))), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 961 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Gagnon
green
2 sentences2007“The exclusion of a defendant from a . . . proceeding should be considered in light of the whole record.” Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526-27 . ¶14 The focus of our inquiry, then, is on whether Mr. Wilson has demonstrated that his presence at the in-chambers conference bore a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge, or whether a fair and just hearing was thwarted by his absence. 2007"The exclusion of a defendant from a . . . proceeding should be considered in light of the whole record." Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526-27 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 . ¶ 14 The focus of our inquiry, then, is on whether Mr. Wilson has demonstrated that his presence at the in-chambers conference bore a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge, or whether a fair and just hearing was thwarted by his absence. | 3 | 1997–2007 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2021App. at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Wilson, 141 Wn. 2021App. at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Wilson, 141 Wn. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Taylor v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2011As to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]he States are free to grant exemptions from jury service to individuals in case of special hardships or incapacity and to those who engage in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the community’s welfare.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 , 95 S. Ct. 692 , 42 L. 2011As to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]he States are free to grant exemptions from jury service to individuals in case of special hardships or incapacity and to those who engage in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the community’s welfare.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 , 95 S. Ct. 692 , 42 L. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Kentucky v. Stincer
green
2 sentences2011The right to be present rests on the principle that the defendant's presence "would contribute to the fairness of the procedure," Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 (emphasis added), and the defendant's presence is required only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 . 2011The right to be present rests on the principle that the defendant’s presence “would contribute to the fairness of the procedure,” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 , and the defendant’s presence is required only “to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence” (emphasis added), Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Berrysmith
green
2 sentences2005First, whether the subject of the hearing related to a purely legal matter; and second, if so, whether the absence of the defendant affected the opportunity to defend against the charge, “or whether a fair and just hearing was thwarted by his absence.” Berrysmith, 87 Wn. 2005First, whether the subject of the hearing related to a purely legal matter; and second, if so, whether the absence of the defendant affected the opportunity to defend against the charge, "or whether a fair and just hearing was thwarted by his absence." Berrysmith, 87 Wash.App. at 273-74 , 944 P.2d 397 . ¶ 26 Under RPC 1.7(b): A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation wi | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Rice
green
1 sentence2013As we have already explained, these excusáis by the bailiff were consistent with the trial court’s broad discretion under RCW 2.36.100(1) to delegate to court personnel the authority to excuse prospective jurors administratively for “undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, public necessity, or any reason deemed sufficient by the court.” RCW 2.36.100(1); Rice, 120 Wn.2d at 560-62 . ¶35 Furthermore, Wilson has not shown that his presence for these administrative excusáis bore any “ ‘relation, reasonably substantial, to the ful [1] ness of his opportunity to defend against the charge’ ” or “ ‘that | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
1 sentence2011Thus, it is fair to say that the due process right to be present is not absolute; rather “the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” Id. at 107-08 . ¶10 The State asserts here that the “e-mail exchange between the [trial] court and counsel [for the State and Irby] regarding excusing potential jurors” was not a “critical stage [ ]” of the trial because it was not substantially related to Irby’s “opportunity to defend against the charge.” Suppl. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Eriks v. Denver
green
2 sentences2005When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved. ¶ 27 RPC 1.15(a)(1) requires withdrawal if "[t]he representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law." [8] "[T]he question of whether an attorney's conduct violates the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct is a question of law." Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash.2d 451, 457-58 , 824 P.2d 1207 (1992). ¶ 28 Here, the Certification of the SCRAP supervisor and the 2005When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved. ¶ 27 RPC 1.15(a)(1) requires withdrawal if "[t]he representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law." [8] "[T]he question of whether an attorney's conduct violates the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct is a question of law." Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash.2d 451, 457-58 , 824 P.2d 1207 (1992). ¶ 28 Here, the Certification of the SCRAP supervisor and the | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.