25 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2024The due process right to presence is not absolute; rather, the “presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). 2024The due process right to presence is not absolute; rather, the “presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). | 6 | 20 |
Adanandus v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The Due Process Clause requires the defendant’s presence at proceedings against him “to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence and to that extent only.” Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 219 (Tex. Crim. 2023“A defendant has a due process right to be present ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.’” Id. (quoting Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 ). “[T]he presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 219 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 6 |
Routier v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Proc. art. 33.03 (providing that defendant “must be personally present at the trial” in all felony prosecutions); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 107-08 (1934) (noting that “in a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge” and stating that “presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that 2021See Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 576 (noting that record was silent as to why defendant was not present, that record showed defendant’s attorneys waived her presence, and that defendant failed to show trial court’s error in accepting her attorneys’ waiver of her presence), 577 (concluding that defendant “failed to show that a fair and just hearing was thwarted by her absence, especially since her attorneys were present and waived her right to be present” and that without “a showing that the waiver was erroneous, we cannot say that the trial court violated the [defendant]’s federal due process right | 5 | 6 |
United States v. Gagnongreen2 sentences2024Accordingly, a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105–06, 107–08); Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496 , 510 (Tex. Crim. 2024“The presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 . | 3 | 5 |
United States v. Rosariogreen2 sentences2020Ed. 674 , 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934) (Cardozo, J.); United States v. Rosario, 111 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1997). 2006It requires a criminal defendant's presence "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." Snyder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97, 108 , 78 L.Ed. 674 , 54 S.Ct. 330 (1934) (Cardozo, J.); United States v. Rosario , 111 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1997). | 2 | 2 |
Malcom v. State of Texasgreen1 sentence2023App. 1979) (Article 28.01 violated because neither defendant nor counsel were present during hearing on motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and language in order indicated trial court considered evidence before ruling on defendant’s motions), with Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Riggall v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107–08 (“[P]resence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”); compare Riggall v. State, 590 S.W.2d 460 , 461–62 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Mares v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Cooper v. State, 631 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Mares v. State, 571 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). 7 This “reasonably substantial relationship” rule derives from the standard recognized as satisfying due process by the United States Supreme Court: We assume in aid of the petitioner that in a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge. * * * * * * So far as the Fourteenth Am | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Cooper v. State, 631 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Mares v. State, 571 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). 7 This “reasonably substantial relationship” rule derives from the standard recognized as satisfying due process by the United States Supreme Court: We assume in aid of the petitioner that in a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge. * * * * * * So far as the Fourteenth Am | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Malloy v. Hogan
green
2 sentences2023App. 1993) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 107–08 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)). –8– Because trial counsel and the court did not discuss the substance of any pending motions before the court and the court did not make any rulings, there was nothing appellant could have provided to counsel during such discussions to further his defense. 2021Proc. art. 33.03 (providing that defendant “must be personally present at the trial” in all felony prosecutions); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 107-08 (1934) (noting that “in a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge” and stating that “presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that | 3 | 1993–2023 |
People v. . Adelphi Club
neutral
2 sentences1911The general words of the law, however, make the sale of liquor without license illegal everywhere in the commonwealth; and whether this be a sale is now a judicial and not a legislative question.” This same fair and just rule of construction is thus stated in People v. Adelphi Club, 149 N. Y., 5 , 43 N. E., 410 , 31 L. 1911The general words of the law, however, make the sale of liquor without license illegal everywhere in the commonwealth; and whether this be a sale is now a judicial and not a legislative question.” This same fair and just rule of construction is thus stated in People v. Adelphi Club, 149 N. Y., 5 , 43 N. E., 410 , 31 L. | 2 | 1911–1911 |
United States v. Jones
green
1 sentence2006United States v. Jones , 381 F.3d 114 , 121–22 (2d Cir. 2004). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Davis
green
1 sentence1941The lien asserted by appellant was for purchase money, if the transaction was genuine, and appellees are estopped, as against appellant, from proving that it was otherwise.” That our courts have kept this fair and just rule of law in mind is forcefully demonstrated in National Bond & Mortgage Corporation v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 429 -434, where Judge Sharp, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: “The courts of this state zealously guard homestead rights guaranteed under the Constitution and laws and will not permit those rights to be invaded by others seeking to establish invalid claims or liens aga | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.