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18 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Holbrookgreen2 sentences2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Culvergreen2 sentences2013Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 , 909 A.2d 962 (2006); State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 431-32 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Galarzagreen2 sentences2013Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 , 909 A.2d 962 (2006); State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 431-32 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Brunettigreen2 sentences2010As a result, we cannot determine the extent to which a fair and just hearing would have been thwarted by the defendant’s absence or whether his presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the criminal charges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 492-93 ; see also State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 63 , 901 A.2d 1 (2006) (“Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . 2010As a result, we cannot determine the extent to which a fair and just hearing would have been thwarted by the defendant’s absence or whether his presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the criminal charges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 492-93 ; see also State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 63 , 901 A.2d 1 (2006) (“Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . | 2 | 2 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences1988B The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a defendant’s right, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, “to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, 105-106 . “[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id., 107-108 ; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 819 n.15, 1988B The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a defendant’s right, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, “to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, 105-106 . “[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id., 107-108 ; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 819 n.15, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2018In judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant's prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant's] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez , 271 Conn. 724 , 732, 859 A.2d 898 (2004). 2018In judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant's prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant's] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez , 271 Conn. 724 , 732, 859 A.2d 898 (2004). | 1 | 7 |
Luciani v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc.green2 sentences2013Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 , 909 A.2d 962 (2006); State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 431-32 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 | 1 | 3 |
State v. Mendezgreen2 sentences2013Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 , 909 A.2d 962 (2006); State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 431-32 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988). 2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 | 1 | 3 |
State v. McNellisgreen2 sentences2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 2008In State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), our Supreme Court stated that “[i]n judging whether a particular segment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evaluated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 732 ; see also State v. Holbrook, 97 Conn. App. 490, 494-95 , 906 A.2d 4 , cert. denied, 280 Conn. 935 | 1 | 3 |
State v. Bonnergreen2 sentences2013As our Supreme Court explained in Chambers , as the result of the failure of the defendant to supply us with a factual record establishing any or some of the foregoing possible scenarios, “we cannot determine the extent to which a fair and just hearing would have been thwarted by the defendant’s absence or whether his presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the criminal charges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 413 ; see also State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 492-93 , 964 A.2d 73 (2008) (claim inadequate for review where defend 2013As our Supreme Court explained in Chambers , as the result of the failure of the defendant to supply us with a factual record establishing any or some of the foregoing possible scenarios, “we cannot determine the extent to which a fair and just hearing would have been thwarted by the defendant’s absence or whether his presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the criminal charges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 413 ; see also State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 492-93 , 964 A.2d 73 (2008) (claim inadequate for review where defend | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2016It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn.App. 751 , 767, 804 A.2d 877 (2002), aff'd, 268 Conn. 239 , 842 A.2d 1086 (2004) ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673 , 688, 535 A.2d 345 (1987) (criminal defendant has federal and state constitutional rights, under confrontation and due process clauses, to be present at all critical stages of trial). 2016It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn.App. 751 , 767, 804 A.2d 877 (2002), aff'd, 268 Conn. 239 , 842 A.2d 1086 (2004) ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673 , 688, 535 A.2d 345 (1987) (criminal defendant has federal and state constitutional rights, under confrontation and due process clauses, to be present at all critical stages of trial). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Martin Fontanezgreen1 sentence2002It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” (Citations omitted.) United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kentucky v. Stincer
green
2 sentences2015Ed. 2d 486 (1985). ‘‘The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the [c]onfronta- tion [c]lause of the [s]ixth [a]mendment . . . but . . . [that] right is protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.’’ (Cita- tion omitted.) Id. ‘‘In judging whether a particular seg- ment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evalu- ated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whe 2015Ed. 2d 486 (1985). ‘‘The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the [c]onfronta- tion [c]lause of the [s]ixth [a]mendment . . . but . . . [that] right is protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.’’ (Cita- tion omitted.) Id. ‘‘In judging whether a particular seg- ment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evalu- ated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whe | 7 | 2004–2015 |
State v. Vines
neutral
2 sentences2016It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn.App. 751 , 767, 804 A.2d 877 (2002), aff'd, 268 Conn. 239 , 842 A.2d 1086 (2004) ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673 , 688, 535 A.2d 345 (1987) (criminal defendant has federal and state constitutional rights, under confrontation and due process clauses, to be present at all critical stages of trial). 2016It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn.App. 751 , 767, 804 A.2d 877 (2002), aff'd, 268 Conn. 239 , 842 A.2d 1086 (2004) ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673 , 688, 535 A.2d 345 (1987) (criminal defendant has federal and state constitutional rights, under confrontation and due process clauses, to be present at all critical stages of trial). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Vines
neutral
2 sentences2016It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn.App. 751 , 767, 804 A.2d 877 (2002), aff'd, 268 Conn. 239 , 842 A.2d 1086 (2004) ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673 , 688, 535 A.2d 345 (1987) (criminal defendant has federal and state constitutional rights, under confrontation and due process clauses, to be present at all critical stages of trial). 2016It is also well settled that under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments a defendant must be allowed to be present at his trial to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vines, 71 Conn.App. 751 , 767, 804 A.2d 877 (2002), aff'd, 268 Conn. 239 , 842 A.2d 1086 (2004) ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673 , 688, 535 A.2d 345 (1987) (criminal defendant has federal and state constitutional rights, under confrontation and due process clauses, to be present at all critical stages of trial). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. GILBERTO L.
green
2 sentences2016(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gilberto L ., 292 Conn. 226 , 237, 972 A.2d 205 (2009). 2016(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gilberto L ., 292 Conn. 226 , 237, 972 A.2d 205 (2009). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Gagnon
green
1 sentence2015Ed. 2d 486 (1985). ‘‘The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the [c]onfronta- tion [c]lause of the [s]ixth [a]mendment . . . but . . . [that] right is protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.’’ (Cita- tion omitted.) Id. ‘‘In judging whether a particular seg- ment of a criminal proceeding constitutes a critical stage of a defendant’s prosecution, courts have evalu- ated the extent to which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the defendant’s] absence or whe | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Chambers
green
1 sentence2013As our Supreme Court explained in Chambers , as the result of the failure of the defendant to supply us with a factual record establishing any or some of the foregoing possible scenarios, “we cannot determine the extent to which a fair and just hearing would have been thwarted by the defendant’s absence or whether his presence has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the criminal charges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 413 ; see also State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 492-93 , 964 A.2d 73 (2008) (claim inadequate for review where defend | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Snyder v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2010Id. [105-106, 108]; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , [819 and n.15] 95 S. Ct. 2525 , 45 L. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Brunetti v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2010Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be entirely speculative.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S. Ct. 1328 , 167 L. 2010Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be entirely speculative.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212 , 127 S. Ct. 1328 , 167 L. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.