fair and just hearing in District of Columbia

2015Factors which the trial judge must consider when evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the fair and just standard include (1) “whether the defendant has asserted his or her legal innocence”; (2) “the length of the delay between entry of the guilty plea and the desire to withdraw it”; and (3) “whether the accused has had the full benefit of competent counsel at all relevant times.” Gooding, 529 A.2d at 306-07 .

2015“Prior to sentencing, leave to withdraw guilty pleas under the fair and just standard should be freely allowed.” Id. at 311 .

2011In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 ] (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. at 105-106, 108 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 ]; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975)

2011In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 ] (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. at 105-106, 108 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 ]; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975)

2017Withdrawal in the Interest of Justice “Under the fair and just standard [for withdrawal from a guilty plea], the court is to consider a number of factors cumulatively; no single factor is controlling.” Pierce v. United States, 705 A.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. 1997).

2015“Nevertheless, we will reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Pierce v. United States, 705 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C.1997); see also Byrd v. United States, 801 A.2d 28, 32 (D.C.2002) (citing authority that where no Rule 11 error occurred, appellate court will be “extremely reluctant” to find abuse of discretion in trial court’s denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea, and that appellant must meet “extremely heavy burden” to prevail).

2015However, even though the prosecutor argued at length that appellant had no cognizable claim of self-defense, the court never addressed whether appellant had made a valid assertion of “legal innocence.” Gooding, 529 A.2d at 306 . “[A]n assertion [of legal innocence] standing alone does not, of course, require that [a motion to withdraw a guilty plea] be granted[,]” id. at 306 , but “a claim of innocence is an important ... factor to be weighed by the trial judge in deciding whether, in the exercise of discretion, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, under the fair and just standard should be gra

1999Under the fair and just standard, the factors a trial court must consider when evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea include: (1) “whether the defendant has asserted his or her legal innocence;” (2) “the length of the delay between entry of the guilty plea and the desire to withdraw it;” and (3) “whether the accused has had the full benefit of competent counsel at all relevant times.” Springs, supra, 614 A.2d at 4 (citations omitted). “ ‘[Njone of these factors is controlling and the trial court must consider them cumulatively in the context of the individual case.’ ” Id. (citation omi

2007Following Supreme Court precedent, we have stated that “a defendant is constitutionally ‘guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his [or her] presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure,’ ” Kimes, 569 A.2d at 108 (alteration in original) (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 ), but “the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence....” Frye, 926 A.2d at 1103 (quoting Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 )

2005The defendant has no right to be present “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); Kimes, supra, 569 A.2d at 108 (summarizing a defendant’s right to be present at criminal proceeding “critical to its outcome if his [or her] presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure”) (quoting Stincer, supra, 482 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 (in turn quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06 , 54 S.Ct. 3

1999See also Binion, supra, 658 A.2d at 191 (delay of three days between plea and expression of desire to withdraw it weighs in appellant’s favor).

1997The merger of the delay and prejudice factors also appear to have prevented a fair consideration of each. 3 ‘Whether the defendant has met the fair and just’ standard for withdrawing the guilty plea is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Binion v. United States, 658 A.2d 187, 191 (D.C.1995) (citing Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735, 737 (D.C.1976)).

1987Durante v. United States, 309 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C. 1973); United States v. Morgan, 185 U.S. App.D.C. 372, 386, 567 F.2d 479, 493 (1977); Poole, supra, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 75 , 250 F.2d at 400 .

1987Durante v. United States, 309 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C. 1973); United States v. Morgan, 185 U.S. App.D.C. 372, 386, 567 F.2d 479, 493 (1977); Poole, supra, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 75 , 250 F.2d at 400 .

1987Durante v. United States, 309 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C. 1973); United States v. Morgan, 185 U.S. App.D.C. 372, 386, 567 F.2d 479, 493 (1977); Poole, supra, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 75 , 250 F.2d at 400 .

1987Durante v. United States, 309 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C. 1973); United States v. Morgan, 185 U.S. App.D.C. 372, 386, 567 F.2d 479, 493 (1977); Poole, supra, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 75 , 250 F.2d at 400 .

2019We ruled that the judge's ex parte response was error but applied the Kotteakos standard because we could not "say that at the time the trial court received the second deadlock note from the jury ... 'the presence of [Mr. Van Dyke was] a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would [have] be[en] thwarted by his absence.' " 66 A.3d at 1007 (quoting Van Dyke, 27 A.3d at 1125 -26 (quoting United States v. Gagnon , 470 U.S. 522 , 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) )).

2013In United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that the “right to presence” is rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, as well as the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, both of which require the defendant’s presence, and the presence of counsel, to protect the defendant’s rights at stages of the trial where “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” Id. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 (citation omitted); see also Van Dyke v. United States, 27 A.3d 1114, 1123 (D.C.2011).

2011In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 ] (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. at 105-106, 108 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 ]; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975)

2011In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 ] (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. at 105-106, 108 [ 54 S.Ct. 330 ]; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15 [ 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1975)

1997The merger of the delay and prejudice factors also appear to have prevented a fair consideration of each. 3 ‘Whether the defendant has met the fair and just’ standard for withdrawing the guilty plea is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Binion v. United States, 658 A.2d 187, 191 (D.C.1995) (citing Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735, 737 (D.C.1976)).

1995Morton v. United States, 620 A.2d 1338, 1340 (D.C.1993); Jordan, supra, 350 A.2d at 737 .

2015“Nevertheless, we will reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Pierce v. United States, 705 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C.1997); see also Byrd v. United States, 801 A.2d 28, 32 (D.C.2002) (citing authority that where no Rule 11 error occurred, appellate court will be “extremely reluctant” to find abuse of discretion in trial court’s denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea, and that appellant must meet “extremely heavy burden” to prevail).

1999See McKoy, supra, 207 U.S.App.D.C. at 114 , 645 F.2d at 1039 (defendant’s lack of “tenable explanation” for his failure to raise possibility of insanity defense prior to plea withdrawal hearing weighs against him in consideration of assertion of innocence factor).

1999See McKoy, supra, 207 U.S.App.D.C. at 114 , 645 F.2d at 1039 (defendant’s lack of “tenable explanation” for his failure to raise possibility of insanity defense prior to plea withdrawal hearing weighs against him in consideration of assertion of innocence factor).

1999In short, as Austin unequivocally holds, in evaluating Bennett's claim of innocence under the fair and just standard, the trial court was free to discredit Bennett's later testimony that he did not participate in the murder and was not present at the crime scene, in the face of Bennett's admissions at the plea hearing that he in fact took part in the commission of the offense. *168 Our holding in Austin , which permits the trial judge to disbelieve a claim of innocence, would appear to be at odds with language in other opinions to the effect that the trial court "should not attempt to decide t

1999Our holding in Austin , which permits the trial judge to disbelieve a claim of innocence, would appear to be at odds with language in other opinions to the effect that the trial court “should not attempt to decide the merits of the proffered defense, thus determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270 , 273, 272 F.2d 499, 502 (1959). 30 We think that in these circumstances — where the proffered defense was so sketchy — there is no real conflict between the two principles, but even if there is conflict, the rule of Austin governs.

1995Morton v. United States, 620 A.2d 1338, 1340 (D.C.1993); Jordan, supra, 350 A.2d at 737 .

1989As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Commonwealth v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596, 601, 603 , 70 A.2d 625, 628, 629 (1950) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 769, 771 (1879)), noting the concurrence of all 36 States that had ruled on the issue: “The presence of the accused [at the verdict] is not a mere form.

1989As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Commonwealth v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596, 601, 603 , 70 A.2d 625, 628, 629 (1950) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 769, 771 (1879)), noting the concurrence of all 36 States that had ruled on the issue: “The presence of the accused [at the verdict] is not a mere form.

1989As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Commonwealth v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596, 601, 603 , 70 A.2d 625, 628, 629 (1950) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 769, 771 (1879)), noting the concurrence of all 36 States that had ruled on the issue: “The presence of the accused [at the verdict] is not a mere form.

1989As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Commonwealth v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596, 601, 603 , 70 A.2d 625, 628, 629 (1950) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 769, 771 (1879)), noting the concurrence of all 36 States that had ruled on the issue: "The presence of the accused [at the verdict] is not a mere form.