9 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1948–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Watkins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025RCr 8.28(1) states that a “defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every critical stage of the trial . . . .” “The United States Supreme Court has explained that a defendant has a right to be present ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge . . . [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” Watkins v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 449, 452-53 (Ky. 2003) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 54 S. Ct 2013The United States Supreme Court has explained that a defendant has a right to be present “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge ... [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” 105 S.W.3d 449, 452-53 (Ky.2003) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , | 2 | 3 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2025RCr 8.28(1) states that a “defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every critical stage of the trial . . . .” “The United States Supreme Court has explained that a defendant has a right to be present ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge . . . [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” Watkins v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 449, 452-53 (Ky. 2003) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 54 S. Ct 2025RCr 8.28(1) states that a “defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every critical stage of the trial . . . .” “The United States Supreme Court has explained that a defendant has a right to be present ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge . . . [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” Watkins v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 449, 452-53 (Ky. 2003) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 54 S. Ct | 1 | 7 |
Anderson v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2013Assuming, without deciding, that re-watching a witness’s videotaped statement during deliberations is a “critical stage of the trial,” we conclude that failing to secure Appellant’s presence constitutes harmless error at worst. 16 That is, there is “no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 689 n. 1 (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Ky.2007)) (recognizing the “no reasonable possibility” test as the “harmless-error standard applicable to constitutional errors”). | 1 | 1 |
See v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004See also See v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 401, 402-03 (1988) (exclusion of defendant from witness competency hearing did not violate rights under Kentucky Constitution). 2004See also See v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 401, 402-03 (1988) (exclusion of defendant from witness competency hearing did not violate rights under Kentucky Constitution). | 1 | 1 |
Carver v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (“[o]ne of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), (“the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence”); Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W 2000Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) ("[o]ne of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), ("the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence"); Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Allengreen2 sentences2000Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (“[o]ne of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), (“the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence”); Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W 2000Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (“[o]ne of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), (“the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence”); Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Malloy v. Hogan
green
2 sentences2013The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant has a right to be present “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge ... [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). 2013The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant has a right to be present “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge ... [and it] is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-08 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). | 4 | 2000–2013 |
Winstead v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2013Assuming, without deciding, that re-watching a witness’s videotaped statement during deliberations is a “critical stage of the trial,” we conclude that failing to secure Appellant’s presence constitutes harmless error at worst. 16 That is, there is “no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 689 n. 1 (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Ky.2007)) (recognizing the “no reasonable possibility” test as the “harmless-error standard applicable to constitutional errors”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Byrd v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2004However, Appellant did not object to his exclusion, Watkins, supra, at 453 ; Byrd, supra, at 274 , and does not suggest how a fair and just hearing on this issue was thwarted by his absence. 2004However, Appellant did not object to his exclusion, Watkins, supra, at 453 ; Byrd, supra, at 274 , and does not suggest how a fair and just hearing on this issue was thwarted by his absence. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Gagnon
green
1 sentence2004There is “a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge .... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’ ” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 108 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 332-33 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cotner v. Warren
green
1 sentence1965On the contrary, we have reached the conclusion that the only fair and just rule is to hold that the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is for an unreasonable time. ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ >t Oklahoma adopted this rule as announced in Lamb v. Vansyckle, supra, considering it' to be the soundest and most equitable, in Cotner v. Warren, Okl., 330 P.2d 217 (1958). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Gasaway v. Pendergrass
green
1 sentence1965In Gasaway v. Pendergrass, Ky., 350 S. W.2d 460, 463 , the real issue was antici *477 pated. “ * * * Had the well been a producer, thus keeping the lease in force, and had thereafter declined to a point at which waterflooding was resorted to as a secondary recovery method, we should then have been faced with the question of how long a lessee’s unsuccessful experiments can keep a lease alive in th'e absence of production; * * The issue of what is an unreasonable time must be determined by the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. City of Louisville
neutral
2 sentences1948Rep. 367 , which holds that a tax of two per' cent of the gross receipts of a foreign association was constitutionally proper as being for the valuable privilege of doing business in this state, the basis of receipts being, as it is said, “only the adoption of a fair and just standard.” And an ordinance imposing a tax of $2.00 on every one hundred dollars of premiums received on business done within the city of Louisville was held to be valid in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. City of Louisville, 106 Ky. 207 , 50 S. W. 35 , 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1785 . 1948Rep. 367 , which holds that a tax of two per' cent of the gross receipts of a foreign association was constitutionally proper as being for the valuable privilege of doing business in this state, the basis of receipts being, as it is said, “only the adoption of a fair and just standard.” And an ordinance imposing a tax of $2.00 on every one hundred dollars of premiums received on business done within the city of Louisville was held to be valid in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. City of Louisville, 106 Ky. 207 , 50 S. W. 35 , 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1785 . | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.