fair and just hearing in Georgia

2019See also Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 770 ( 740 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (explaining that the right to be present exists where “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2019See also Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 770 ( 740 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (explaining that the right to be present exists where “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2015See Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 322-325 ( 565 SE2d 447 ) (2002) (“right to he present exists where there is a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of opportunity to defend against the charge and to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence”); Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 596 ( 737 SE2d 700 ) (2013) (defendant’s presence during housekeeping or legal discussions would not have been useful to the resolution of any matter).

2015See Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 322-325 ( 565 SE2d 447 ) (2002) (“right to he present exists where there is a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of opportunity to defend against the charge and to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence”); Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 596 ( 737 SE2d 700 ) (2013) (defendant’s presence during housekeeping or legal discussions would not have been useful to the resolution of any matter).

2019The United States Supreme Court has explained, however, that "[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [her] absence, and to that extent only." United States v. Gagnon , 470 U.S. 522 , 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97 , 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 LE 674 (1934) ).

2019The United States Supreme Court has explained, however, that "[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [her] absence, and to that extent only." United States v. Gagnon , 470 U.S. 522 , 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97 , 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 LE 674 (1934) ).

2007Our Supreme Court, quoting the United States Supreme Court in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (54 SC 330, 78 LE 674) (1934), has held that “the presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” (Punctuation omitted.) Fowler v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 84, 91 (3) ( 31 SE2d 174 ) (1944).

2007Our Supreme Court, quoting the United States Supreme Court in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (54 SC 330, 78 LE 674) (1934), has held that “the presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” (Punctuation omitted.) Fowler v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 84, 91 (3) ( 31 SE2d 174 ) (1944).

2019The United States Supreme Court has explained, however, that "[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [her] absence, and to that extent only." United States v. Gagnon , 470 U.S. 522 , 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97 , 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 LE 674 (1934) ).

2019The United States Supreme Court has explained, however, that "[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [her] absence, and to that extent only." United States v. Gagnon , 470 U.S. 522 , 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97 , 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 LE 674 (1934) ).

2017Thus, a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding is defined as “one in which the defendant’s rights maybe lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or one in which the outcome of the case is substantially affected in some other way.” Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 458 (1) ( 532 SE2d 102 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); accord Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 770 (4) ( 740 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (right to be present exists where “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence”).

2017Thus, a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding is defined as “one in which the defendant’s rights maybe lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or one in which the outcome of the case is substantially affected in some other way.” Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 458 (1) ( 532 SE2d 102 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); accord Campbell v. State, 292 Ga. 766, 770 (4) ( 740 SE2d 115 ) (2013) (right to be present exists where “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence”).

2015See Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 322-325 ( 565 SE2d 447 ) (2002) (“right to he present exists where there is a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of opportunity to defend against the charge and to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence”); Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 596 ( 737 SE2d 700 ) (2013) (defendant’s presence during housekeeping or legal discussions would not have been useful to the resolution of any matter).

2015See Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 322-325 ( 565 SE2d 447 ) (2002) (“right to he present exists where there is a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of opportunity to defend against the charge and to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s absence”); Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 596 ( 737 SE2d 700 ) (2013) (defendant’s presence during housekeeping or legal discussions would not have been useful to the resolution of any matter).

2024Rather, federal due process “requires that a defendant be allowed to be present to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,” such that “a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024Rather, federal due process “requires that a defendant be allowed to be present to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,” such that “a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017The trial court ordered that the GAL sit down with counsel for both parties and go over the contents of the file that may be relevant to the case. 8 The trial court clarified that if there was any dispute as to the relevance of anything in the file, the parties could address the issue with the trial court. 9 Duncan argues that his absence from this hearing violated his right to be present under the Georgia Constitution 10 because he could not assist his counsel “with issues relating to this [mjotion hearing, including the review of [the GAL’s] file.” The right to be present “exists where there

2017The trial court ordered that the GAL sit down with counsel for both parties and go over the contents of the file that may be relevant to the case. 8 The trial court clarified that if there was any dispute as to the relevance of anything in the file, the parties could address the issue with the trial court. 9 Duncan argues that his absence from this hearing violated his right to be present under the Georgia Constitution 10 because he could not assist his counsel “with issues relating to this [mjotion hearing, including the review of [the GAL’s] file.” The right to be present “exists where there

1991Unlike the situation in Seay v. State, 111 Ga. App. 22, 25 (3) ( 140 SE2d 283 ) (1965), the transcript in the case sub judice discloses that the jury's deliberations were not disturbed and no communication was had with the jury during appellant's absence on account of the objection posed by appellant's counsel. "`[T]he presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.' [Cit.]" Fowler, supra at 91 (3).

1991Unlike the situation in Seay v. State, 111 Ga. App. 22, 25 (3) ( 140 SE2d 283 ) (1965), the transcript in the case sub judice discloses that the jury's deliberations were not disturbed and no communication was had with the jury during appellant's absence on account of the objection posed by appellant's counsel. "`[T]he presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.' [Cit.]" Fowler, supra at 91 (3).

1991Applying the precepts set forth in Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 428, 429-430 (2) ( 300 SE2d 331 ) (1983), in which we found no reversible error due to the nature of the communication between trial court and jury in the absence of the defendant *228 and her counsel, I do not find the communication here between trial court and appellant's counsel was so material to appellant's case as to require his presence or of a character to have been prejudicial to him so as to render his absence during the communication reversible error.

1991Applying the precepts set forth in Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 428, 429-430 (2) ( 300 SE2d 331 ) (1983), in which we found no reversible error due to the nature of the communication between trial court and jury in the absence of the defendant *228 and her counsel, I do not find the communication here between trial court and appellant's counsel was so material to appellant's case as to require his presence or of a character to have been prejudicial to him so as to render his absence during the communication reversible error.