fair and just hearing in Pennsylvania

2019The Court explained that “the presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added).

2017Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow,” id., at 106-107 , 54 S.Ct. at 332 , due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present “to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,” id., at 108 , 54 S.Ct. at 333 .

2018Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A). -4- J-A16006-18 Under the constitutional standard, the right to be present at trial “is not guaranteed ‘when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.’ Due process only requires the defendant’s presence ‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1272 , 1281–82 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff'd, 9 A.3d 613 (Pa. 2010).

2018Under the constitutional standard, the right to be present at trial "is not guaranteed 'when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' Due process only requires the defendant's presence 'to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.' " Commonwealth v. Williams , 959 A.2d 1272 , 1281-82 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff'd , 607 Pa. 597 , 9 A.3d 613 (Pa. 2010).

2023See Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2023See Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191 .

2021See Commonwealth v. Blango, 150 A.3d 45,48 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that once adefendant has entered a guilty plea, he may not satisfy the fair and just standard if his asserted innocence contradicts statements he made in prior hearings when the guilty plea was entered).

2021See Commonwealth v. Blango, 150 A.3d 45,48 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that once adefendant has entered a guilty plea, he may not satisfy the fair and just standard if his asserted innocence contradicts statements he made in prior hearings when the guilty plea was entered).

2021The appellate ruling and reasoning announced in Commonwealth v. Blango, 150 A. 3d 45, 48 (Pa. Super. 2016) is instructive.

2019The Supreme Court explained that the defendant’s presence at a jury view is not among those constitutional rights “conferred so explicitly as to leave no room for an inquiry whether prejudice to a defendant has been wrought through their denial.” Id. at 116 ; cf. United States v. Walls, 443 F.2d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1971) (finding “reversible error for the court to deny appellant and his attorney the opportunity to attend the view to insure against the intrusion of prejudicial error” (emphasis added), but basing its decision upon its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal ju

2015Because Katonka did not consider which test should apply under the circumstances of that test, it is not precedential on that point. 3 See Prendes, 97 A.3d at 353 (“When . . . a defendant attempts to withdraw a guilty plea entered after presentation of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, prejudice to the Commonwealth although difficult to prove, may be a very real possibility.” (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted)). - 10 - J-S31045-15 the precise contours of the only sentence he can receive.