fair and just hearing in Indiana

2001Even if the Confrontation Clause is not violated, the right to be present may be guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the defendant the right to be present in his own person "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [TJhe presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (qu

2001Even if the Confrontation Clause is not violated, the right to be present may be guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the defendant the right to be present in his own person "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [TJhe presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (qu

2025The Supreme Court’s test for identifying a critical stage is “‘whether the defendant is confronted with the intricacies of the law or the advocacy of the public prosecutor or prosecuting authorities.’” Id. (quoting Dullen v. State, 721 N.E.2d 241, 242 (Ind. 1999)). [28] In addition to his argument under the Sixth Amendment, Minor contends that under the Fourteenth Amendment: “A defendant’s presence ‘is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 22 (quoting U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)).

2016We do not agree with Martinez that his absence amounts to a denial of due process, much less fundamental error that should have been raised on appeal.3 See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (clarifying that “the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”) [22] Additionally, Martinez contends that his appellate counsel should have claimed that the admission of Sladovnik’s deposition deprived Martinez of his right of confrontation.

2025However, immediately prior to that quote, the United States Supreme Court said, “a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-895 | February 25, 2025 Page 11 of 21 ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the [fullness] of his opportunity to defend against the charge.’” Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)). [29] As for Indiana constitutional claims, the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of “‘state constitutional protection for a defendant’s right to b

2025The Supreme Court’s test for identifying a critical stage is “‘whether the defendant is confronted with the intricacies of the law or the advocacy of the public prosecutor or prosecuting authorities.’” Id. (quoting Dullen v. State, 721 N.E.2d 241, 242 (Ind. 1999)). [28] In addition to his argument under the Sixth Amendment, Minor contends that under the Fourteenth Amendment: “A defendant’s presence ‘is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 22 (quoting U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)).