diminished capacity defense in West Virginia

2024Va. 590, 600 , 309 S.E.2d 89, 99 (1983) (holding that “[t]he existence of a mental illness is not alone sufficient to trigger a diminished capacity defense.

2024Va. 590, 600 , 309 S.E.2d 89, 99 (1983) (holding that “[t]he existence of a mental illness is not alone sufficient to trigger a diminished capacity defense.

2022The court ordered the examination requested by the State, and the evaluator determined that Mr. Delorenzo was unable to assert a diminished capacity or lack of criminal responsibility defense. 2 In West Virginia, a diminished capacity defense allows “a defendant to introduce expert testimony regarding a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant incapable, at the time the crime was committed, of forming a mental state that is an element of the crime charged,” although it is usually asserted “when the offense charged is a crime for which there is a lesser included offense.” Syl. pt. 3

2018Va. 525 , 590 S.E.2d 718 (2003), in which we held as follows: The diminished capacity defense is available in West Virginia to permit a defendant to introduce expert testimony regarding a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant incapable, at the time the crime was committed, of forming a mental state that is an element of the crime charged.

2022Va. at 632 , 363 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 7 The emphasis is that of the circuit court, not the expert. 8 “The diminished capacity defense is available in West Virginia to permit a defendant to introduce expert testimony regarding a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant incapable, at the time the crime was committed, of forming a mental state 6 through Dr. Marshall’s testimony; indeed, he admitted that he knew right from wrong.

2022Va. 631, 632 , 363 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1987). 6 Although the State argues, and the majority accepts, various rationales for the circuit court’s decision to exclude Dr. Marshall’s testimony, it is clear from the appendix record that the court seized on one sentence from one of the expert’s reports, which stated that because of the petitioner’s Asperger’s Syndrome Disorder (“ASD”) and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”) he would tend to “hyper-focus on a topic he is motivated to investigate . . . with a lack of appreciating whether something is right or wrong[,]” 7 as indicating that the petition

2022Va. at 632 , 363 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 7 The emphasis is that of the circuit court, not the expert. 8 “The diminished capacity defense is available in West Virginia to permit a defendant to introduce expert testimony regarding a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant incapable, at the time the crime was committed, of forming a mental state 6 through Dr. Marshall’s testimony; indeed, he admitted that he knew right from wrong.

2020This is especially true when considering that “if it is reasonable in the circumstances not to conduct a particular investigation, [a] lawyer’s failure to do so will not establish ineffective representation.” Lloyd, 2018 WL 1319187 , at *7 (quoting Earl v. Israel, 765 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 951 (1985)).

2015Accord State v. Skeens, 233 W.Va. 232, 239-40 , 757 S.E.2d 762, 769-70 (2014). 15 .In our review of the record, it appears that the trial court rejected the instruction on voluntary manslaughter specifically because of the absence of any evidence of provocation.

2015Accord State v. Skeens, 233 W.Va. 232, 239-40 , 757 S.E.2d 762, 769-70 (2014). 15 .In our review of the record, it appears that the trial court rejected the instruction on voluntary manslaughter specifically because of the absence of any evidence of provocation.

2008Applying the newly-announced syllabus point to the testimony of Dr. Solomon, this Court noted, in the context of first-degree murder, that “ ‘[a] defendant who raises a diminished capacity defense ... challenges his capacity to premeditate and deliberate at the time of the criminal act’ ” Joseph at 533 , 590 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 396 Pa.Super. 171, 181-82 , 578 A.2d 461, 466 (1990)).

2008Applying the newly-announced syllabus point to the testimony of Dr. Solomon, this Court noted, in the context of first-degree murder, that “ ‘[a] defendant who raises a diminished capacity defense ... challenges his capacity to premeditate and deliberate at the time of the criminal act’ ” Joseph at 533 , 590 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 396 Pa.Super. 171, 181-82 , 578 A.2d 461, 466 (1990)).

2003The defendant’s right to present a defense to one of those elements generally includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence .... [A] rule barring evidence on the issue of mens rea may be unconstitutional so long as we determine criminal liability in part through subjective states of mind.” (footnote omitted)); People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 242-43 , 627 N.W.2d 276, 286 (2001) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of the diminished capacity defense and commenting that “[ajlthough an accused has no absolute right to present evi

2003The defendant’s right to present a defense to one of those elements generally includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence .... [A] rule barring evidence on the issue of mens rea may be unconstitutional so long as we determine criminal liability in part through subjective states of mind.” (footnote omitted)); People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 242-43 , 627 N.W.2d 276, 286 (2001) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of the diminished capacity defense and commenting that “[ajlthough an accused has no absolute right to present evi

2003See also New Jersey v. Nataluk, 316 N.J.Super. 336, 343 , 720 A.2d 401, 405 (App.Div.1998) (“ ‘diminished capacity is a “failure of proof’ defense: evidence of defendant’s mental illness or defect serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime.’ ” (quoting State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 354 , 658 A.2d 1218, 1223 (1995))); State v. Warden, 133 Wash.2d 559, 564 , 947 P.2d 708, 711 (1997) (“Diminished capacity is a mental condition not amounting to insanity which prevents the defendant from possessing the requisite mental state necessary to commit the crime charged.” (citation omitted)).

2003See also New Jersey v. Nataluk, 316 N.J.Super. 336, 343 , 720 A.2d 401, 405 (App.Div.1998) (“ ‘diminished capacity is a “failure of proof’ defense: evidence of defendant’s mental illness or defect serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime.’ ” (quoting State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 354 , 658 A.2d 1218, 1223 (1995))); State v. Warden, 133 Wash.2d 559, 564 , 947 P.2d 708, 711 (1997) (“Diminished capacity is a mental condition not amounting to insanity which prevents the defendant from possessing the requisite mental state necessary to commit the crime charged.” (citation omitted)).

2003See also New Jersey v. Nataluk, 316 N.J.Super. 336, 343 , 720 A.2d 401, 405 (App.Div.1998) (“ ‘diminished capacity is a “failure of proof’ defense: evidence of defendant’s mental illness or defect serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime.’ ” (quoting State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 354 , 658 A.2d 1218, 1223 (1995))); State v. Warden, 133 Wash.2d 559, 564 , 947 P.2d 708, 711 (1997) (“Diminished capacity is a mental condition not amounting to insanity which prevents the defendant from possessing the requisite mental state necessary to commit the crime charged.” (citation omitted)).

2003See also New Jersey v. Nataluk, 316 N.J.Super. 336, 343 , 720 A.2d 401, 405 (App.Div.1998) (“ ‘diminished capacity is a “failure of proof’ defense: evidence of defendant’s mental illness or defect serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime.’ ” (quoting State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 354 , 658 A.2d 1218, 1223 (1995))); State v. Warden, 133 Wash.2d 559, 564 , 947 P.2d 708, 711 (1997) (“Diminished capacity is a mental condition not amounting to insanity which prevents the defendant from possessing the requisite mental state necessary to commit the crime charged.” (citation omitted)).

2003See also New Jersey v. Nataluk, 316 N.J.Super. 336, 343 , 720 A.2d 401, 405 (App.Div.1998) (“ ‘diminished capacity is a “failure of proof’ defense: evidence of defendant’s mental illness or defect serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime.’ ” (quoting State v. Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 354 , 658 A.2d 1218, 1223 (1995))); State v. Warden, 133 Wash.2d 559, 564 , 947 P.2d 708, 711 (1997) (“Diminished capacity is a mental condition not amounting to insanity which prevents the defendant from possessing the requisite mental state necessary to commit the crime charged.” (citation omitted)).

2003The defendant’s right to present a defense to one of those elements generally includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence .... [A] rule barring evidence on the issue of mens rea may be unconstitutional so long as we determine criminal liability in part through subjective states of mind.” (footnote omitted)); People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 242-43 , 627 N.W.2d 276, 286 (2001) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of the diminished capacity defense and commenting that “[ajlthough an accused has no absolute right to present evi

2003The defendant’s right to present a defense to one of those elements generally includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence .... [A] rule barring evidence on the issue of mens rea may be unconstitutional so long as we determine criminal liability in part through subjective states of mind.” (footnote omitted)); People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 242-43 , 627 N.W.2d 276, 286 (2001) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of the diminished capacity defense and commenting that “[ajlthough an accused has no absolute right to present evi

1996See id.

1996See Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W.Va. 345, 347 , 452 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1994) (holding that “[i]n cases where expert testimony is uncontradicted and the jury rejects it, there must be ample other testimony reasonably supporting the jury’s verdict”) In *274 contrast, the State maintains that the jury was not bound to accept Dr. Whelan’s opinion in support of the Appellant’s diminished capacity defense in light of the evidence it presented that undermined the basis of that opinion.

1996See Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W.Va. 345, 347 , 452 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1994) (holding that “[i]n cases where expert testimony is uncontradicted and the jury rejects it, there must be ample other testimony reasonably supporting the jury’s verdict”) In *274 contrast, the State maintains that the jury was not bound to accept Dr. Whelan’s opinion in support of the Appellant’s diminished capacity defense in light of the evidence it presented that undermined the basis of that opinion.

1983Customarily, it is utilized to negate the elements of premeditation and deliberate intent in first-degree murder or malice aforethought in second-degree murder. 16 E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 (D.C.App.1972) (en banc); Hensel v. State, 604 P.2d 222, 232 (Alaska 1979); State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 471 , 210 A.2d 193, 203 (1965); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 217 , 360 A.2d 914, 917 (1976); W.

1983Customarily, it is utilized to negate the elements of premeditation and deliberate intent in first-degree murder or malice aforethought in second-degree murder. 16 E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 (D.C.App.1972) (en banc); Hensel v. State, 604 P.2d 222, 232 (Alaska 1979); State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 471 , 210 A.2d 193, 203 (1965); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 217 , 360 A.2d 914, 917 (1976); W.

1983Customarily, it is utilized to negate the elements of premeditation and deliberate intent in first-degree murder or malice aforethought in second-degree murder. 16 E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 (D.C.App.1972) (en banc); Hensel v. State, 604 P.2d 222, 232 (Alaska 1979); State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 471 , 210 A.2d 193, 203 (1965); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 217 , 360 A.2d 914, 917 (1976); W.