diminished capacity doctrine in Alaska

1980The defense of diminished capacity was described in Johnson v. State, 511 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1973): The diminished capacity doctrine is based on the theory that while an accused may not have been suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of his offense, sufficient to absolve him totally of criminal responsibility, the accused’s mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease to such an extent that he did not possess a specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense.

1979In Johnson v. State, 511 P.2d 118, 124 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted), we said: The diminished capacity doctrine is based on the theory that while an accused may not have been suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of his offense, sufficient to absolve him totally of criminal responsibility, the accused’s mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease to such an extent that he did not possess a specific mental state or intent essential to a particular offense. 11 .

1988See Larson v. State, 614 P.2d 776, 780 (Alaska 1980) (without deciding whether jury might have accepted a diminished-capacity defense, outlook for an acquittal or a conviction on lesser offense was so improbable that counsel’s failure to fully explain the elements of this defense to defendant would not render his legal assistance ineffective.) 2 Third, Shetters argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate a legal defense to the charge of burglary in the first degree based upon the contention that a residence in the process of construction does not become a dwelling until its owners move

1984Larson, 614 P.2d at 778-80 .

2007See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (upholding a state legislature's authority to preclude evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to rebut the government's proof of the defendant's culpable mental state); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475-77 , 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (upholding Congress's authority to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of a mental disability or deficiency short of insanity on the issue of the defendant's capacity for premeditation and deliberation); Muench v. Israe

2007See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (upholding a state legislature's authority to preclude evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to rebut the government's proof of the defendant's culpable mental state); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475-77 , 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (upholding Congress's authority to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of a mental disability or deficiency short of insanity on the issue of the defendant's capacity for premeditation and deliberation); Muench v. Israe

2007See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (upholding a state legislature's authority to preclude evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to rebut the government's proof of the defendant's culpable mental state); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475-77 , 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (upholding Congress's authority to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of a mental disability or deficiency short of insanity on the issue of the defendant's capacity for premeditation and deliberation); Muench v. Israe

2007See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (upholding a state legislature's authority to preclude evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to rebut the government's proof of the defendant's culpable mental state); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475-77 , 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (upholding Congress's authority to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of a mental disability or deficiency short of insanity on the issue of the defendant's capacity for premeditation and deliberation); Muench v. Israe

2007See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (upholding a state legislature's authority to preclude evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to rebut the government's proof of the defendant's culpable mental state); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475-77 , 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (upholding Congress's authority to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of a mental disability or deficiency short of insanity on the issue of the defendant's capacity for premeditation and deliberation); Muench v. Israe

2007See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2023-24 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (upholding a state legislature's authority to preclude evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication to rebut the government's proof of the defendant's culpable mental state); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 475-77 , 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25 , 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) (upholding Congress's authority to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence of a mental disability or deficiency short of insanity on the issue of the defendant's capacity for premeditation and deliberation); Muench v. Israe

1988See James v. United States, 238 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.1956).

1986See Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772 , 779 n. 10(d) (Alaska App.1982).

1979In Mill v. State, 585 P.2d 546, 550 (Alaska 1978), we noted the “limited function” of the diminished capacity doctrine, “which acts only to negate a specific mental element or intent necessary to the charged offense.” Thus, in Mill , we held that diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes. 33 Id. at 551 .

1979In Mill v. State, 585 P.2d 546, 550 (Alaska 1978), we noted the “limited function” of the diminished capacity doctrine, “which acts only to negate a specific mental element or intent necessary to the charged offense.” Thus, in Mill , we held that diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes. 33 Id. at 551 .

1977Cf. King v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 318 , 372 F.2d 383, 398 (1967). 30 .