diminished capacity defense in Missouri

2007In other words, it contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for the crime actually committed.’ ” State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Mo. banc 1974) (quoting State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289 , 347 P.2d 312, 314 (1959)).

2007See State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d at 540 ; State v. Jones, 134 S.W.3d 706, 713-14 (Mo.App.2004); State v. Lewis, 188 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo.App.2006).

2007As the MAI-CR note explains: “In order to use evidence of mental disease or defect to negate a required culpable mental state, it is not necessary that the defendant assert the affirmative defense of lack of responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect.” 6 The state relies on this Court’s opinions in State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. banc 1993), and State v. Copeland, 928 5.W.2d 828 (Mo. banc 1996), for its position that a defendant is required to comply with the notice provisions of section 552.030 in order to assert a diminished capacity defense.

2003In order to prevail on a diminished capacity defense, a defendant must introduce evidence that he or she suffered from a mental disease or defect, State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Mo. banc 1993), and in this respect, evidence of a mental disease or defect does indeed “matter.” But, the existence of a mental disease of defect will not alone suffice to diminish the defendant’s criminal responsibility.

2014Mr. Dorsey argues that a decision to not pursue a diminished capacity defense cannot be reasonable in the absence of a reasonable investigation into the possibility of such a defense. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2014Mr. Dorsey argues that a decision to not pursue a diminished capacity defense cannot be reasonable in the absence of a reasonable investigation into the possibility of such a defense. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2019Additionally, to rely on NGRI as a defense, “the defendant [must] comply with special notice provisions.” Id.

2016State v. Walkup, 220 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Mo. banc 2007).

2018"In order to prevail on a diminished capacity defense, a defendant must introduce evidence that he or she suffered from a mental disease or defect[.]" Nicklasson v. State , 105 S.W.3d 482 , 484-85 (Mo. banc 2003).

2004"In order to prevail on a diminished capacity defense, a defendant must introduce evidence that he or she suffered from a mental disease or defectf.]” Nicklasson v. State, 105 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Mo. banc 2003).

2025“Unlike a claim of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the diminished capacity defense contemplates full responsibility, but only for a lesser crime.” State v. Lowe, 318 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

2025Id. at 291-92 ; see also Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Mo. banc 2016) (holding trial counsel is not ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another; that the strategic decision to not present a diminished capacity defense because 10 counsel did not think the jury would believe it given the overwhelming weight of the evidence was reasonable); Martin v. State, 712 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (holding a reasonably competent attorney would be led to believe that evidence of premeditation and deliberation would decrease the credibility o

2025Id. at 291-92 ; see also Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Mo. banc 2016) (holding trial counsel is not ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another; that the strategic decision to not present a diminished capacity defense because 10 counsel did not think the jury would believe it given the overwhelming weight of the evidence was reasonable); Martin v. State, 712 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (holding a reasonably competent attorney would be led to believe that evidence of premeditation and deliberation would decrease the credibility o

2025Id. at 291-92 ; see also Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Mo. banc 2016) (holding trial counsel is not ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another; that the strategic decision to not present a diminished capacity defense because 10 counsel did not think the jury would believe it given the overwhelming weight of the evidence was reasonable); Martin v. State, 712 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (holding a reasonably competent attorney would be led to believe that evidence of premeditation and deliberation would decrease the credibility o

2025Id. at 291-92 ; see also Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Mo. banc 2016) (holding trial counsel is not ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another; that the strategic decision to not present a diminished capacity defense because 10 counsel did not think the jury would believe it given the overwhelming weight of the evidence was reasonable); Martin v. State, 712 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (holding a reasonably competent attorney would be led to believe that evidence of premeditation and deliberation would decrease the credibility o

2025The motion court found it reasonable for trial counsel not to pursue a diminished capacity defense because such defense “had ‘no real prospect of success’ in light of the amount of evidence showing deliberation.” Id.

2025Id. at 291-92 ; see also Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Mo. banc 2016) (holding trial counsel is not ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another; that the strategic decision to not present a diminished capacity defense because 10 counsel did not think the jury would believe it given the overwhelming weight of the evidence was reasonable); Martin v. State, 712 S.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (holding a reasonably competent attorney would be led to believe that evidence of premeditation and deliberation would decrease the credibility o

2023This dismissive contention is not supported by any evidence, and disregards State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 815 (Mo. banc 1994), where our Supreme Court considered whether a Rule 29.15 motion that alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "establish through the testimony of a qualified mental health professional that [the movant] acted under the influence of a mental disease or defect" was specific enough to set forth a claim for relief.

2023See also Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 182 (noting that when “personality disorders do not affect cognitive abilities, their mitigating value is doubtful”); State v. Nash, 972 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (noting personality disorders “are not considered mental diseases or defects under Chapter 552”); State v. Reed, 816 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991) (observing the evidence “revealed that defendant suffers from a personality disorder, but has no mental disease or defect”).

2023Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 181 (Mo. banc 2009).

2023See also Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 182 (noting that when “personality disorders do not affect cognitive abilities, their mitigating value is doubtful”); State v. Nash, 972 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (noting personality disorders “are not considered mental diseases or defects under Chapter 552”); State v. Reed, 816 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991) (observing the evidence “revealed that defendant suffers from a personality disorder, but has no mental disease or defect”).

2023See also Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 182 (noting that when “personality disorders do not affect cognitive abilities, their mitigating value is doubtful”); State v. Nash, 972 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (noting personality disorders “are not considered mental diseases or defects under Chapter 552”); State v. Reed, 816 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991) (observing the evidence “revealed that defendant suffers from a personality disorder, but has no mental disease or defect”).

2017See, e.g., Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 898-99 (holding that not selecting a diminished-capacity defense to present at trial was trial strategy); Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636, 652 (Mo. banc 2008) (holding that not calling defendant’s friend as a witness was trial strategy).

2017See, e.g., Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 898-99 (holding that not selecting a diminished-capacity defense to present at trial was trial strategy); Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636, 652 (Mo. banc 2008) (holding that not calling defendant’s friend as a witness was trial strategy).

2017In matters of trial strategy, “[c]ounsel is allowed wide latitude in conducting a defense and may use his best judgment.” Patterson v. State, 467 S.W.3d 395, 406 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).

2016See State v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (holding that imperfect self-defense evidence will support submission of involuntary manslaughter where “either the need to defend or the manner in which [a person] defended herself was unreasonable”); State v. Davis, 26 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (holding that defendant was entitled to lesser-included offense instruction on involuntary manslaughter where self-defense was at issue, but evidence suggested unreasonable use of force).

2016See State v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (holding that imperfect self-defense evidence will support submission of involuntary manslaughter where “either the need to defend or the manner in which [a person] defended herself was unreasonable”); State v. Davis, 26 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (holding that defendant was entitled to lesser-included offense instruction on involuntary manslaughter where self-defense was at issue, but evidence suggested unreasonable use of force).

2016“In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that his attorney failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances, and (2) that he was prejudiced thereby.” Whitehead v. *742 State, 481 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856 ; 857 (Mo. banc 1987) itself citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

2014However, the motion court specifically found that “the defense of diminished capacity was abandoned in favor of a defense of self-defense.” “The motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed correct and deemed clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with a firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Haidul v. State, 425 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Mo.App.E.D.2014). *272 We discern no evidence in the record on appeal 9 that supports Shore’s argument that the defense of diminished capacity was presented ineffectively, and not abandoned as the motio

2007See State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d at 540 ; State v. Jones, 134 S.W.3d 706, 713-14 (Mo.App.2004); State v. Lewis, 188 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo.App.2006).

2007See State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d at 540 ; State v. Jones, 134 S.W.3d 706, 713-14 (Mo.App.2004); State v. Lewis, 188 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo.App.2006).

2007In other words, it contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for the crime actually committed.’ ” State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Mo. banc 1974) (quoting State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289 , 347 P.2d 312, 314 (1959)).

2007In other words, it contemplates full responsibility, not partial, but only for the crime actually committed.’ ” State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Mo. banc 1974) (quoting State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289 , 347 P.2d 312, 314 (1959)).

2005Taylor v. State, 126 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Mo. banc 2004).

2003Under MAI-CR3d 308.03, the jury must consider all evidence — not just evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect — in determining whether the accused acted with the requisite intent. 2 See also State v. Bell, 798 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Mo.App.1990) (“[T]he fact that the only psychiatric testimony in this case was to the effect that the defendant did not knowingly cause serious physical injury [due to a mental defect] does not mean that the jury must reject a reasonable inference from his actions that the defendant acted knowingly.”) Considered in context, the prosecutor’s a

2003Under MAI-CR3d 308.03, the jury must consider all evidence — not just evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect — in determining whether the accused acted with the requisite intent. 2 See also State v. Bell, 798 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Mo.App.1990) (“[T]he fact that the only psychiatric testimony in this case was to the effect that the defendant did not knowingly cause serious physical injury [due to a mental defect] does not mean that the jury must reject a reasonable inference from his actions that the defendant acted knowingly.”) Considered in context, the prosecutor’s a

2003See State v. Foerstel, 674 S.W.2d 583, 592 (Mo.App.1984) (“Under [the] defense [of diminished capacity], a finding of mental disease or defect would permit the jury to conclude *485 that appellant was unable to form the necessary specific or general intent and to thereby acquit him of the offense charged ... ”) (emphasis added).