diminished capacity defense in Illinois

2022See id. at 641 ; see also Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 62 (holding that expert testimony that defendant was in a post-seizure state at the time of the offense was “properly excluded because it amounted to a diminished capacity defense”). ¶ 37 Because diminished capacity is not a recognized defense in Illinois, evidence of Roland’s mental health history is inadmissible to show he did not intend to kill Officer Rewers.

2022See People v. Frazier, 2019 IL App (1st) 172250, ¶ 36 (under Hulitt, “ ‘[a]n expert may not give an opinion supporting the doctrine of diminished mental capacity because *** that doctrine is not recognized in Illinois’ ” (quoting People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 70 ); People v. Nepras, 2020 IL App (2d) 180081, ¶ 28 (under Hulitt, defense expert was properly barred from testifying that defendant could not form intent to commit theft, as such testimony was “effectively a diminished-capacity defense” that is “no longer available in Illinois” and, thus, “a defendant may not raise it

2018Instead, she claimed to have been in a "postictal" state, during which she "wax[ed] and wane[d]" between volitional and "erratic" behavior, according to her proposed expert. ¶ 62 We ultimately agree with the State that the evidence was properly excluded because it amounted to a diminished capacity defense. ¶ 63 Diminished capacity is an affirmative defense that permits a "legally sane defendant to present evidence of mental illness to negate the specific intent required to commit a particular crime." Metrish v. Lancaster , 569 U.S. 351 , 133 S.Ct. 1781 , 185 L.Ed.2d 988 (2013) ; see also Black

2018Instead, she claimed to have been in a "postictal" state, during which she "wax[ed] and wane[d]" between volitional and "erratic" behavior, according to her proposed expert. ¶ 62 We ultimately agree with the State that the evidence was properly excluded because it amounted to a diminished capacity defense. ¶ 63 Diminished capacity is an affirmative defense that permits a "legally sane defendant to present evidence of mental illness to negate the specific intent required to commit a particular crime." Metrish v. Lancaster , 569 U.S. 351 , 133 S.Ct. 1781 , 185 L.Ed.2d 988 (2013) ; see also Black

2020People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 58 (citing Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006)).

2020People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 58 (citing Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006)).

2022As we discussed in Hulitt, “[t]he doctrine of diminished capacity, also known as the doctrine of diminished or partial responsibility, allows a defendant to offer evidence of her mental condition in relation to her capacity to form the mens rea or intent required for commission of the charged offense. [Citation.] Similar to the insanity defense in that it calls into question the mental abnormality of a defendant, it differs in that it may be raised by a defendant who is legally sane.” Id. at 640-41 . ¶ 35 This case is analogous to Hulitt, where we found that the defendant’s proposed mental hea

2022As we discussed in Hulitt, “[t]he doctrine of diminished capacity, also known as the doctrine of diminished or partial responsibility, allows a defendant to offer evidence of her mental condition in relation to her capacity to form the mens rea or intent required for commission of the charged offense. [Citation.] Similar to the insanity defense in that it calls into question the mental abnormality of a defendant, it differs in that it may be raised by a defendant who is legally sane.” Id. at 640-41 . ¶ 35 This case is analogous to Hulitt, where we found that the defendant’s proposed mental hea

2022See People v. Frazier, 2019 IL App (1st) 172250, ¶ 36 (under Hulitt, “ ‘[a]n expert may not give an opinion supporting the doctrine of diminished mental capacity because *** that doctrine is not recognized in Illinois’ ” (quoting People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 70 ); People v. Nepras, 2020 IL App (2d) 180081, ¶ 28 (under Hulitt, defense expert was properly barred from testifying that defendant could not form intent to commit theft, as such testimony was “effectively a diminished-capacity defense” that is “no longer available in Illinois” and, thus, “a defendant may not raise it

2020The State responds that the evidence was properly excluded, because it essentially amounted to a diminished-capacity defense. -4- 2020 IL App (2d) 180081 ¶ 20 A criminal defendant has a right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.

2022See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540 (1997) (“The Arizona legislature, however, declined to adopt the defense of diminished capacity when presented with the opportunity to do so.

2022State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 199 (1982) (“the partial defense of diminished capacity is not recognized in Ohio.”); Carpenter, 464 Mich. at 241 (rejecting the diminished capacity defense in Michigan); Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (noting that Arizona has “rejected the theory of diminished responsibility.”); Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2022State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 199 (1982) (“the partial defense of diminished capacity is not recognized in Ohio.”); Carpenter, 464 Mich. at 241 (rejecting the diminished capacity defense in Michigan); Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (noting that Arizona has “rejected the theory of diminished responsibility.”); Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2022State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 199 (1982) (“the partial defense of diminished capacity is not recognized in Ohio.”); Carpenter, 464 Mich. at 241 (rejecting the diminished capacity defense in Michigan); Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (noting that Arizona has “rejected the theory of diminished responsibility.”); Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2022State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 199 (1982) (“the partial defense of diminished capacity is not recognized in Ohio.”); Carpenter, 464 Mich. at 241 (rejecting the diminished capacity defense in Michigan); Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (noting that Arizona has “rejected the theory of diminished responsibility.”); Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2022Even California, which has been described as a “pioneer[ ] [of] the diminished capacity defense” (see Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d at 187 ), abolished the diminished capacity defense by statute in 1982.

2022At present, there is a wide divergence of views among the states concerning the admissibility of evidence of mental illness short of insanity.” People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Mich. 2001). ¶ 126 Some states, by statute, prohibit evidence of a defendant’s mental defect to disprove mens rea.

2022State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 199 (1982) (“the partial defense of diminished capacity is not recognized in Ohio.”); Carpenter, 464 Mich. at 241 (rejecting the diminished capacity defense in Michigan); Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540 (noting that Arizona has “rejected the theory of diminished responsibility.”); Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.

2022See People v. Frazier, 2019 IL App (1st) 172250, ¶ 36 (under Hulitt, “ ‘[a]n expert may not give an opinion supporting the doctrine of diminished mental capacity because *** that doctrine is not recognized in Illinois’ ” (quoting People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725, ¶ 70 ); People v. Nepras, 2020 IL App (2d) 180081, ¶ 28 (under Hulitt, defense expert was properly barred from testifying that defendant could not form intent to commit theft, as such testimony was “effectively a diminished-capacity defense” that is “no longer available in Illinois” and, thus, “a defendant may not raise it

2021App. 3d 597, 606-07 (1988) (the court noted that counsel’s failure to investigate a diminished-capacity defense would be more amenable to a post- conviction proceeding, where additional facts could be presented); see also People v. Treadway, 138 Ill.