diminished capacity defense in Rhode Island

2014In Miguel v. State, 774 A.2d 19, 22 (R.I.2001), we affirmed the lower court's findings that defendant's counsel informed him of the diminished capacity defense, engaged an expert to assist in presenting the defense at trial, and apprised him fully of the consequences of a plea in terms of utilizing that defense.

2010Therefore, this Court “will reject an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel ‘unless a defendant can demonstrate that counsel’s advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases’ * * Rodrigues, 985 A.2d at 315 (quoting Moniz, 933 A.2d at 697 and Miguel v. State, 774 A.2d 19, 22 (R.I.2001)). 1 Diminished Capacity Defense In his application for postconviction relief, applicant argued that his attorney furnished ineffective assistance when he failed to present a diminished-capacity defense at trial.

2010Under a diminished-capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act, “his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.” State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674, 679 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I.1981)).

2010Under a diminished-capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act, “his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.” State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674, 679 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I.1981)).

2013“Under a diminished-capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act, ‘his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.’ ” Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 101 (R.I.2010) (quoting State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674, 679 (R.I.2006)).

2010Under a diminished-capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act, “his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.” State v. LaCroix, 911 A.2d 674, 679 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I.1981)).

2002Regarding the other general-intent crimes not subject to the diminished capacity defense, see State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130 , 134—37 (R.I.1980), the only charge Thornton completely denied was the first-degree sexual assault of Debra, for which he was acquitted.

2002Va. 261 , 470 S.E.2d 215, 220-26 (1996). [29] Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." [30] Regarding the other general-intent crimes not subject to the diminished capacity defense, see State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130, 134-37 (R.I.1980), the only charge Thornton completely denied was the first-degree sex

2002See, e.g., State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929 (R.I.2001); State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268 (R.I.1987); State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I.1987).

2001In murder cases involving a diminished capacity defense based on voluntary intoxication, "a trial justice must give a manslaughter by reason of diminished capacity instruction only if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendant's intoxication so completely paralyzed his or her will that it took from him or her the power to withstand evil impulses and the capacity to form any sane design or intent to kill." Amazeen, 526 A.2d at 1272 .

2016“Under a diminished capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act ‘his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.’ ” Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 746 (R.I.2013) (quoting Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 101 (R.I.2010)) (emphasis added).

2016“Under a diminished capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act, ‘his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.’” Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 746 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 101 (R.I. 2010)) (emphasis added).

2009See Barrett, 768 A.2d at 934, 937, 938 (where, after shooting his victim, the defendant discarded marijuana, unloaded his gun and placed it in a visible area, and removed his outer shirt so that police would not think he was armed).

2002See, e.g., State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929 (R.I.2001); State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268 (R.I.1987); State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I.1987).

2006See Hockenhull, 525 A.2d at 929 (“Under the diminished capacity doctrine, an essential element of the crime of murder is absent when a defendant is so intoxicated as to render him incapable of forming the specific intent to kill.”); see also State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 235 (R.I.2002) (“Rhode Island recognizes the defense of diminished capacity that may reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter if defendant is unable to form a specific intent.”).

2002See, e.g., State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929 (R.I.2001); State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268 (R.I.1987); State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I.1987).

1981Our adoption of the American Law Institute view of criminal responsibility in State v. Johnson, R.I., 399 A.2d 469 (1979), established a test that encompasses mental abnormalities which at the time of Fenik would not be sufficient to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility.

1980Recently, in State v. Johnson, R.I., 399 A.2d 469, 476 (1979), we adopted a standard for determining criminal responsibility whereby a person could not be held responsible for his criminal actions if at the time of those actions as a result of a mental disease or defect, his capacity either “ ‘to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held responsible.’ ” We also stressed that the term “mental disease or defect” did not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or ot

2016We have repeatedly stated that on an application for postconvictioh relief “the burden of proof resides with the applicant, who must establish ‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.’ ” Lyons v. State, 43 A.3d 62, 65 (R.I.2012) (quoting DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I.2011)); see Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I.2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I.2011); see also Brown, 964 A.2d at 526 ; Chalk, 949 A.2d at 398 .

2016We have repeatedly stated that on an application for postconvictioh relief “the burden of proof resides with the applicant, who must establish ‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.’ ” Lyons v. State, 43 A.3d 62, 65 (R.I.2012) (quoting DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I.2011)); see Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I.2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I.2011); see also Brown, 964 A.2d at 526 ; Chalk, 949 A.2d at 398 .

2016We have repeatedly stated that on an application for postconvictioh relief “the burden of proof resides with the applicant, who must establish ‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.’ ” Lyons v. State, 43 A.3d 62, 65 (R.I.2012) (quoting DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I.2011)); see Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I.2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I.2011); see also Brown, 964 A.2d at 526 ; Chalk, 949 A.2d at 398 .

2016We have repeatedly stated that on an application for postconvictioh relief “the burden of proof resides with the applicant, who must establish ‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.’ ” Lyons v. State, 43 A.3d 62, 65 (R.I.2012) (quoting DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I.2011)); see Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I.2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I.2011); see also Brown, 964 A.2d at 526 ; Chalk, 949 A.2d at 398 .

2016We have repeatedly stated that on an application for postconvictioh relief “the burden of proof resides with the applicant, who must establish ‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.’ ” Lyons v. State, 43 A.3d 62, 65 (R.I.2012) (quoting DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I.2011)); see Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I.2011); State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I.2011); see also Brown, 964 A.2d at 526 ; Chalk, 949 A.2d at 398 .

2016See State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I.2000).

2016See State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946, 951 (R.I. 2000).

2016“Under a diminished capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act ‘his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.’ ” Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 746 (R.I.2013) (quoting Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 101 (R.I.2010)) (emphasis added).

2016“Under a diminished capacity defense, a defendant submits that, although he is responsible for the prohibited act, ‘his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged.’” Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 746 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 101 (R.I. 2010)) (emphasis added).

2016Ill Standard of Review Postconviction relief, under G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1, is “available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges * * * that the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights * * Merida v. State, 93 A.3d 545, 548 (R.I.2014) (internal- quotation marks omitted).

2013Standard of Review “The statutory remedy of post-conviction relief set forth in G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-1 is ‘available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.’ ” Hall v. State, 60 A.3d 928, 931 (R.I.2013) (quoting Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I.2008)).

2013Trial counsel’s decision to proceed with the defense of accident without layering an additional diminished capacity defense was therefore a sound tactical decision, such that “tactical decisions by trial counsel, even if ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 180-81 (R.I.2013) (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 18 (R.I.2012)).

2013Trial counsel’s decision to proceed with the defense of accident without layering an additional diminished capacity defense was therefore a sound tactical decision, such that “tactical decisions by trial counsel, even if ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 180-81 (R.I.2013) (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 18 (R.I.2012)).

2013Standard of Review “The statutory remedy of post-conviction relief set forth in G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-1 is ‘available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.’ ” Hall v. State, 60 A.3d 928, 931 (R.I.2013) (quoting Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 1016 (R.I.2008)).

2013Trial counsel’s decision to proceed with the defense of accident without layering an additional diminished capacity defense was therefore a sound tactical decision, such that “tactical decisions by trial counsel, even if ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 180-81 (R.I.2013) (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 18 (R.I.2012)).

2013Trial counsel’s decision to proceed with the defense of accident without layering an additional diminished capacity defense was therefore a sound tactical decision, such that “tactical decisions by trial counsel, even if ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 180-81 (R.I.2013) (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 18 (R.I.2012)).

2006We have also held, however, that in order to merit an instruction concerning the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity, a defendant’s intoxication must have been “of such a degree as to completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him the power to withstand evil impulses, and render his mind incapable of forming any sane design.” Jimenez, 882 A.2d at 555 (quoting State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 281 , 107 A. 85, 86 (1919)); see also Edwards, 810 A.2d at 235 ; State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 528-29 (R.I.1995).

2006See Hockenhull, 525 A.2d at 929 (“Under the diminished capacity doctrine, an essential element of the crime of murder is absent when a defendant is so intoxicated as to render him incapable of forming the specific intent to kill.”); see also State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 235 (R.I.2002) (“Rhode Island recognizes the defense of diminished capacity that may reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter if defendant is unable to form a specific intent.”).

2006We have also held, however, that in order to merit an instruction concerning the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity, a defendant’s intoxication must have been “of such a degree as to completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him the power to withstand evil impulses, and render his mind incapable of forming any sane design.” Jimenez, 882 A.2d at 555 (quoting State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 281 , 107 A. 85, 86 (1919)); see also Edwards, 810 A.2d at 235 ; State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 528-29 (R.I.1995).

2006We have also held, however, that in order to merit an instruction concerning the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity, a defendant’s intoxication must have been “of such a degree as to completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him the power to withstand evil impulses, and render his mind incapable of forming any sane design.” Jimenez, 882 A.2d at 555 (quoting State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 281 , 107 A. 85, 86 (1919)); see also Edwards, 810 A.2d at 235 ; State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 528-29 (R.I.1995).

2006We have also held, however, that in order to merit an instruction concerning the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter due to diminished capacity, a defendant’s intoxication must have been “of such a degree as to completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him the power to withstand evil impulses, and render his mind incapable of forming any sane design.” Jimenez, 882 A.2d at 555 (quoting State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 281 , 107 A. 85, 86 (1919)); see also Edwards, 810 A.2d at 235 ; State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 528-29 (R.I.1995).