diminished capacity defense in California

2008As Justice Brown herself made clear, in abolishing the diminished capacity doctrine in 1981, the Legislature “rejected the awareness-of-civic-duty gloss we had put on the definition of malice aforethought.” (Wright, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 978 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) Referring to the same amendment of section 188 that was at issue in Saille , Justice Brown explained, “As amended, section 188 now provides: ‘Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice.’ ” (Wright

2007We denied Noel’s petition, and in granting Knoller’s petition we limited review to other issues. 4 In People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 679 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ], we quoted that passage from Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310 at page 322, in summarizing the doctrine of diminished capacity; we then explained how imperfect self-defense—the issue in Flannel— differed from diminished capacity.

2022(See People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1116 [“The abolition of the diminished capacity defense and limitation of admissible evidence to actual formation of various mental states has been held not to violate the due process right to present a defense.”]; see also People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 981 [“The Legislature has decided, for policy reasons, that evidence of voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to proof of certain mental states.

2016(People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 91 [sua sponte instructions on the effect of mental disabilities became unnecessary with the abolition of the diminished capacity doctrine]; see People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 [after abolition of diminished capacity doctrine, instruction relating evidence of intoxication to mental state required for an offense is a pinpoint instruction that need not be given sua sponte].) However, defendant argues that once the trial court gave such an instruction, it had a duty to do so correctly.

2014(People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 ; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585 ; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 593 ; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 .) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished- capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self- defense doctrine: „ “[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the ground of self-defense, the killing is manslaughter” [citation].‟ (Pe

2014(People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 ; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585 ; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 593 ; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 .) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished- capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self- defense doctrine: „ “[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the ground of self-defense, the killing is manslaughter” [citation].‟ (Pe

2014(Ibid.) The Wetmore court acknowledged that the diminished capacity defense, once the limits imposed in Wells were removed, allowed the duplication of evidence at the guilt and sanity phases to “approach[] a totality.” (Wetmore, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 331 .) As noted above, the statutory amendments of 1981 and 1982 abolished that practice and effectively endorsed the distinctions and restrictions delineated in Wells.

2014(Ibid.) The Wetmore court acknowledged that the diminished capacity defense, once the limits imposed in Wells were removed, allowed the duplication of evidence at the guilt and sanity phases to “approach[] a totality.” (Wetmore, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 331.) As noted above, the statutory amendments of 1981 and 1982 abolished that practice and effectively endorsed the distinctions and restrictions delineated in Wells .

2014Similarly, in Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 163 , defense counsel could have put on a diminished capacity defense, but he failed to investigate any aspect of this defense.

2014Similarly, in Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 163 , defense counsel could have put on a diminished capacity defense, but he failed to investigate any aspect of this defense.

1998In Horn we concluded such conspiracies could take the form of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, conspiracy to commit second degree murder, and conspiracy to commit manslaughter. {Id. at pp. 298-300 & fn. 5.) In so concluding, we gave three reasons why, contrary to our earlier holding in Kynette , all conspiracies to commit murder were not necessarily conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree: (1) the then existing availability of the diminished capacity defense; (2) the then existing requirement that in order to establish the requisite element of premeditation for first degree mu

1998In Horn we concluded such conspiracies could take the form of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, conspiracy to commit second degree murder, and conspiracy to commit manslaughter. {Id. at pp. 298-300 & fn. 5.) In so concluding, we gave three reasons why, contrary to our earlier holding in Kynette , all conspiracies to commit murder were not necessarily conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree: (1) the then existing availability of the diminished capacity defense; (2) the then existing requirement that in order to establish the requisite element of premeditation for first degree mu

1991When the record is silent on the reason that counsel acted as he or she did "unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, these cases are affirmed on appeal." ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) (21b) The record does not show the basis for trial counsel's decision not to put on a diminished capacity defense, or whether he investigated or failed to investigate such a defense.

1991When the record is silent on the reason that counsel acted as he or she did "unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, these cases are affirmed on appeal." ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) (21b) The record does not show the basis for trial counsel's decision not to put on a diminished capacity defense, or whether he investigated or failed to investigate such a defense.

1990Abolition of the diminished capacity defense does not alter our interpretation because evidence of intoxication that formerly bore upon capacity may still be used to show that a requisite mental state has not “actually” been formed. (§ 22; People v. Olea (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 891, 896-897 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 829 ]; see also People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 961, 968 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 848 ] [exclusion of capacity evidence does not prevent accused from disproving mental state necessary to a charge].) Respondent notes that a majority of the drafters of the Model Penal Code were of the view that “

1990Abolition of the diminished capacity defense does not alter our interpretation because evidence of intoxication that formerly bore upon capacity may still be used to show that a requisite mental state has not “actually” been formed. (§ 22; People v. Olea (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 891, 896-897 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 829 ]; see also People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 961, 968 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 848 ] [exclusion of capacity evidence does not prevent accused from disproving mental state necessary to a charge].) Respondent notes that a majority of the drafters of the Model Penal Code were of the view that “

1990The second principle, however, is that the Legislature can limit the mental elements included in the statutory definitions of crimes and thereby curtail the use of mens rea defenses. (§ 6.) (11) It has been judicially established that the 1981 legislation abolishing the diminished capacity defense and limiting admissible evidence to actual formation of various mental states does not violate the due process right to present a defense. ( People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 961, 967-970 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 848 ]; People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 715, 731-733 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 181 ]; People

1990The second principle, however, is that the Legislature can limit the mental elements included in the statutory definitions of crimes and thereby curtail the use of mens rea defenses. (§ 6.) (11) It has been judicially established that the 1981 legislation abolishing the diminished capacity defense and limiting admissible evidence to actual formation of various mental states does not violate the due process right to present a defense. ( People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 961, 967-970 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 848 ]; People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 715, 731-733 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 181 ]; People

1992(People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 196, fn. 24 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ]; People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 86-87 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 58 , 473 P.2d 762 ]; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 455 P.2d 153 ].) Saille, however, held that abolition of the diminished capacity defense had eliminated the need for sua sponte instructions relating voluntary intoxication to a required mental state: “[U]nder the law relating to mental capacity as it exists today, it makes more sense to place on the defendant the duty to request an instruction which relates

1992(People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 196, fn. 24 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ]; People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 86-87 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 58 , 473 P.2d 762 ]; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 455 P.2d 153 ].) Saille, however, held that abolition of the diminished capacity defense had eliminated the need for sua sponte instructions relating voluntary intoxication to a required mental state: “[U]nder the law relating to mental capacity as it exists today, it makes more sense to place on the defendant the duty to request an instruction which relates

1980(Wetmore, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 331; cf. People v. McDowell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 737, at pp. 747-748, fn. 4 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 447 P.2d 97 ]; Estate of Ladd (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 219, 226-227 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 888 ]; Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 805, 821.) Yet in this case we do not face the problem of a duplication of evidence at another insanity phase trial because the jury completely rejected the diminished capacity defense by returning a verdict of first degree murder.

1980(Wetmore, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 331; cf. People v. McDowell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 737, at pp. 747-748, fn. 4 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 447 P.2d 97 ]; Estate of Ladd (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 219, 226-227 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 888 ]; Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 805, 821.) Yet in this case we do not face the problem of a duplication of evidence at another insanity phase trial because the jury completely rejected the diminished capacity defense by returning a verdict of first degree murder.

2006(People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 251 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 605 P.2d 830 ]; People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 330-331 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 583 P.2d 1308 ].) Under the Drew test, a person is legally insane if “ ‘as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ ” (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 345.) Defense counsel had fully prepared a diminished capacity defense and therefore should have been well aware of the possibility of an insanity defense.

2006(People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 251 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 605 P.2d 830 ]; People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 330-331 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 583 P.2d 1308 ].) Under the Drew test, a person is legally insane if “ ‘as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ ” (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 345.) Defense counsel had fully prepared a diminished capacity defense and therefore should have been well aware of the possibility of an insanity defense.

1992(People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 196, fn. 24 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ]; People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 86-87 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 58 , 473 P.2d 762 ]; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 455 P.2d 153 ].) Saille, however, held that abolition of the diminished capacity defense had eliminated the need for sua sponte instructions relating voluntary intoxication to a required mental state: “[U]nder the law relating to mental capacity as it exists today, it makes more sense to place on the defendant the duty to request an instruction which relates

1992(People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 196, fn. 24 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ]; People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 86-87 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 58 , 473 P.2d 762 ]; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 455 P.2d 153 ].) Saille, however, held that abolition of the diminished capacity defense had eliminated the need for sua sponte instructions relating voluntary intoxication to a required mental state: “[U]nder the law relating to mental capacity as it exists today, it makes more sense to place on the defendant the duty to request an instruction which relates

2006While the Legislature, in eliminating the diminished capacity defense, “precluded jury consideration of mental disease, defect, or disorder as evidence of a defendant’s capacity to form a requisite criminal intent, ... it did not preclude jury consideration of mental condition in deciding whether a defendant actually formed the requisite criminal intent.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ]; see People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 583 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ], overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Ca

2006While the Legislature, in eliminating the diminished capacity defense, “precluded jury consideration of mental disease, defect, or disorder as evidence of a defendant’s capacity to form a requisite criminal intent, ... it did not preclude jury consideration of mental condition in deciding whether a defendant actually formed the requisite criminal intent.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ]; see People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 583 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ], overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Ca

2026(In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 776 .) The court found more than 30 years ago that, when the Legislature eliminated the doctrine of diminished capacity, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense remained intact.

2016In In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 , our Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense had not been abrogated by the Legislature when the Legislature eliminated the diminished capacity defense.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 196 , 222–223 [counsel’s performance was deficient where he chose to not investigate a diminished capacity defense based on a competency evaluation and the defendant’s alleged confession, both of which said “little if anything about defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing”]; In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 777 [counsel’s decision to focus on a third party culpability defense without investigating the victim’s time of death was constitutionally deficient; “the two lines of defense were potentially complementary, not mutually exc

1983For example, in In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 472 P.2d 921 ], defense counsel had decided not to raise the diminished capacity defense without a consulting medical opinion, with full knowledge that medical reports were in existence.

2014Although Wells predated the enactment of section 28, its analysis established the distinction between actual formation of a mental state and capacity to form a mental state that is now found in section 28(a).14 “Whenever a particular mental state, such as a specific intent, is by statute made an essential element of a crime, that specific state must be proved like any other fact. [Citations.] Since, however, the mental capacity to commit the crime 14 Wells has been described as “[t]he first step in the development of the diminished capacity doctrine” (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d. at p.

2014Although Wells predated the enactment of section 28, its analysis established the distinction between actual formation of a mental state and capacity to form a mental state that is now found in section 28(a).14 “Whenever a particular mental state, such as a specific intent, is by statute made an essential element of a crime, that specific state must be proved like any other fact. [Citations.] Since, however, the mental capacity to commit the crime 14 Wells has been described as “[t]he first step in the development of the diminished capacity doctrine” (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d. at p.

1976He claims: (1) that he was entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as defined by statute (§ 192) since the killing was done upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and (2) that he was also entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in the context of a diminished capacity defense (see People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 385, fn. 1, 389-393 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 461 P.2d 659 ]) since malice was negatived by mental defect or disease.

1976He claims: (1) that he was entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as defined by statute (§ 192) since the killing was done upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and (2) that he was also entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in the context of a diminished capacity defense (see People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 385, fn. 1, 389-393 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 379 , 461 P.2d 659 ]) since malice was negatived by mental defect or disease.

2006While the Legislature, in eliminating the diminished capacity defense, “precluded jury consideration of mental disease, defect, or disorder as evidence of a defendant’s capacity to form a requisite criminal intent, ... it did not preclude jury consideration of mental condition in deciding whether a defendant actually formed the requisite criminal intent.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ]; see People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 583 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ], overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Ca

2006While the Legislature, in eliminating the diminished capacity defense, “precluded jury consideration of mental disease, defect, or disorder as evidence of a defendant’s capacity to form a requisite criminal intent, ... it did not preclude jury consideration of mental condition in deciding whether a defendant actually formed the requisite criminal intent.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ]; see People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 583 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ], overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Ca

1974In People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.2d 264 at page 270 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 449 P.2d 449 ], the court said: “Indeed, the trial court instructed the jury on the significance of the diminished capacity defense in other respects.

1974In People v. Castillo, 70 Cal.2d 264 at page 270 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 449 P.2d 449 ], the court said: “Indeed, the trial court instructed the jury on the significance of the diminished capacity defense in other respects.

2022(See People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 344 ; see also People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076 , 1082–1083 [discussing the reasons for the rule precluding evidence of mental illness as a defense to a general intent crime, or for use in a mistake- of-fact defense].) “The diminished capacity defense, which addressed an accused’s ‘general capacity or ability to form a specific intent or harbor a mental element of an offense,’ was abolished in 1982.” (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 , fn. omitted (Reyes); § 25, subds. (a), (b).) Consequently, evidence of a defendant’s menta

2016“The diminished capacity defense, which addressed an accused’s ‘general capacity or ability to form a specific intent or harbor a mental element of an offense,’ was abolished in 1982.” (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 .) On the other hand, a defense of “ ‘diminished actuality’ ” is still available, under which “a defendant presents evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental condition to show he ‘actually’ lacked the mental states required for the crime.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 880, fn. 3 .) In particular, a defendant may present evidence about a mental deficie

2022(See People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 344 ; see also People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076 , 1082–1083 [discussing the reasons for the rule precluding evidence of mental illness as a defense to a general intent crime, or for use in a mistake- of-fact defense].) “The diminished capacity defense, which addressed an accused’s ‘general capacity or ability to form a specific intent or harbor a mental element of an offense,’ was abolished in 1982.” (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 , fn. omitted (Reyes); § 25, subds. (a), (b).) Consequently, evidence of a defendant’s menta

2006(People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 251 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 605 P.2d 830 ]; People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 330-331 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 583 P.2d 1308 ].) Under the Drew test, a person is legally insane if “ ‘as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ ” (Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 345.) Defense counsel had fully prepared a diminished capacity defense and therefore should have been well aware of the possibility of an insanity defense.

2014(People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 ; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585 ; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 593 ; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 .) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished- capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self- defense doctrine: „ “[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the ground of self-defense, the killing is manslaughter” [citation].‟ (Pe

2014(People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ]; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 263 ]; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 593 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 169 ]; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished-capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self-defense doctrine: ‘ “[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excus

2014(People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 ; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585 ; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 593 ; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 .) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished- capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self- defense doctrine: „ “[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the act on the ground of self-defense, the killing is manslaughter” [citation].‟ (Pe

2014(People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ]; People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 263 ]; Roads v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 593 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 169 ]; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) Indeed, 30 years before the diminished-capacity defense was allowed, a California court approved the imperfect self-defense doctrine: ‘ “[I]f the act is committed under the influence of an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but without the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excus