12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mottgreen2 sentences2024We remand to the superior court to determine whether Gilpin is eligible for restitution, the amount of restitution owed, whether Martinez is liable for restitution payments while suffering from a mental disease or defect, and for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. criminal liability); see also State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536 , 544–55 (1997) (holding that expert testimony of mental incapacity cannot be used to establish a diminished-capacity defense by negating a crime’s mens rea). 12 2019The Mott Court similarly declined to adopt MPC § 4.02(1) after considering legislative policy. 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1051 ("Because the legislature has not provided for a diminished capacity defense, we have since consistently refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent."); see also State v. Laffoon , 125 Ariz. 484 , 486, 610 P.2d 1045 , 1047 (1980) ("Since the legislature has not seen fit to provide for a defense of diminished responsibility, we have consistently declined to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent."). ¶27 Although this Court is cons | 4 | 9 |
United States v. Pohlot, Stephengreen2 sentences2019See Pohlot , 827 F.2d at 897 (noting that "[p]roperly understood, [ MPC § 4.02 ] is therefore not a defense at all but merely a rule of evidence"). 1997See Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1061 ; United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1079-81 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir.1988); Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 897 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Laffoongreen2 sentences2019The Mott Court similarly declined to adopt MPC § 4.02(1) after considering legislative policy. 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1051 ("Because the legislature has not provided for a diminished capacity defense, we have since consistently refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent."); see also State v. Laffoon , 125 Ariz. 484 , 486, 610 P.2d 1045 , 1047 (1980) ("Since the legislature has not seen fit to provide for a defense of diminished responsibility, we have consistently declined to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent."). ¶27 Although this Court is cons 2019The Mott Court similarly declined to adopt MPC § 4.02(1) after considering legislative policy. 187 Ariz. at 541 , 931 P.2d at 1051 ("Because the legislature has not provided for a diminished capacity defense, we have since consistently refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent."); see also State v. Laffoon , 125 Ariz. 484 , 486, 610 P.2d 1045 , 1047 (1980) ("Since the legislature has not seen fit to provide for a defense of diminished responsibility, we have consistently declined to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent."). ¶27 Although this Court is cons | 2 | 2 |
Clark v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2018Because the legislature had purposely declined to adopt a 1962 Model Penal Code provision that permitted a diminished-capacity defense to a criminal charge, we concluded that "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime." Id . at 540-41, 931 P.2d at 1050-51 ; see also A.R.S. § 13-502 (allowing only mental disorders or defects that constitute legal insanity as a defense to criminal responsibility); Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735 , 762, 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (" 2018Because the legislature had purposely declined to adopt a 1962 Model Penal Code provision that permitted a diminished-capacity defense to a criminal charge, we concluded that "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime." Id . at 540-41, 931 P.2d at 1050-51 ; see also A.R.S. § 13-502 (allowing only mental disorders or defects that constitute legal insanity as a defense to criminal responsibility); Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735 , 762, 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (" | 1 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Andre Michael Letevegreen2 sentences2018Because the legislature had purposely declined to adopt a 1962 Model Penal Code provision that permitted a diminished-capacity defense to a criminal charge, we concluded that "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime." Id . at 540-41, 931 P.2d at 1050-51 ; see also A.R.S. § 13-502 (allowing only mental disorders or defects that constitute legal insanity as a defense to criminal responsibility); Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735 , 762, 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (" 2018Because the legislature had purposely declined to adopt a 1962 Model Penal Code provision that permitted a diminished-capacity defense to a criminal charge, we concluded that "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime." Id . at 540-41, 931 P.2d at 1050-51 ; see also A.R.S. § 13-502 (allowing only mental disorders or defects that constitute legal insanity as a defense to criminal responsibility); Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735 , 762, 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (" | 1 | 2 |
Readenour v. Marion Power Shovelgreen2 sentences2019See Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, a Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc. , 149 Ariz. 442 , 446, 719 P.2d 1058 , 1060 (1986) ("Under our constitutional rule-making power we cannot let the legislature define what is relevant; however, when it is appropriate we may defer to legislative decisions regarding the use or exclusion of relevant evidence to promote substantive goals of public policy such as accident prevention."). 2019See Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, a Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc. , 149 Ariz. 442 , 446, 719 P.2d 1058 , 1060 (1986) ("Under our constitutional rule-making power we cannot let the legislature define what is relevant; however, when it is appropriate we may defer to legislative decisions regarding the use or exclusion of relevant evidence to promote substantive goals of public policy such as accident prevention."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Huntergreen2 sentences2007Fundamental error is “ ‘error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential to [the] defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.’ ” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005), quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 , 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984). 2007Fundamental error is “ ‘error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential to [the] defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.’ ” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005), quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 , 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2007Fundamental error is “ ‘error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential to [the] defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.’ ” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005), quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 , 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984). 2007Fundamental error is “ ‘error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential to [the] defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.’ ” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005), quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 , 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Corvogreen2 sentences2000See id. 2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Briggsgreen2 sentences1997State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6 , 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982); State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 486 , 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980); State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382 , 542 P.2d 804, 807 (1975). 1997State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6 , 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982); State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 486 , 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980); State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382 , 542 P.2d 804, 807 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Twinegreen2 sentences1997See Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1061 ; United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1079-81 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir.1988); Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 897 . 1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. John David Bartlettgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramosgreen2 sentences1997State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6 , 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982); State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 486 , 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980); State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382 , 542 P.2d 804, 807 (1975). 1997State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6 , 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982); State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 486 , 610 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1980); State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382 , 542 P.2d 804, 807 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Karen Camerongreen2 sentences1997See Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1061 ; United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1079-81 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir.1988); Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 897 . 1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Charles G. Rhodes v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Archie W. Brawnergreen2 sentences1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 1997But as many courts have recognized, "the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Odell Bennettgreen2 sentences1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 1997But as many courts have recognized, "the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lonnie Paul Staggsgreen2 sentences1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 1997But as many courts have recognized, "the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Drukegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Schantz
green
2 sentences1997Furthermore, we found that this Court does not have the authority to adopt the diminished capacity defense. 98 Ariz. at 212-13 , 403 P.2d at 529 . 1997Furthermore, we found that this Court does not have the authority to adopt the diminished capacity defense. 98 Ariz. at 212-13 , 403 P.2d at 529 . | 2 | 1997–2019 |
State v. Smyers
green
2 sentences2007In this case our expert was going to testify that [Wright’s] mental capacity was lowered and that he is a naive-type of person.” The state argued the first trial judge had “already ruled in favor of the State regarding the requested testimony,” and that ruling was “the law of the case.” The state also characterized the proposed testimony as supporting “a diminished capacity defense which is expressly prohibited under Arizona law.” The trial court agreed and precluded the testimony. ¶ 9 As a preliminary matter, “[t]he courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [the Arizona Supreme Court 2007In this case our expert was going to testify that [Wright’s] mental capacity was lowered and that he is a naive-type of person.” The state argued the first trial judge had “already ruled in favor of the State regarding the requested testimony,” and that ruling was “the law of the case.” The state also characterized the proposed testimony as supporting “a diminished capacity defense which is expressly prohibited under Arizona law.” The trial court agreed and precluded the testimony. ¶ 9 As a preliminary matter, “[t]he courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [the Arizona Supreme Court | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2007Based on our review of the record, we agree that Wright generally challenged the Mott rule rejecting the diminished capacity defense, but did not argue below that the trial court had improperly precluded the type of observation evidence admissible under Mott 4 ¶ 14 Because Wright failed to raise this ground below, he has “forfeited] the right to obtain appellate relief unless [he] prove[s] that fundamental error occurred.” State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, n. 2 , 115 P.3d 618 , 620 n. 2, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 762 , 163 L.Ed.2d 592 (2005). 2007Based on our review of the record, we agree that Wright generally challenged the Mott rule rejecting the diminished capacity defense, but did not argue below that the trial court had improperly precluded the type of observation evidence admissible under Mott 4 ¶ 14 Because Wright failed to raise this ground below, he has “forfeited] the right to obtain appellate relief unless [he] prove[s] that fundamental error occurred.” State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, n. 2 , 115 P.3d 618 , 620 n. 2, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 762 , 163 L.Ed.2d 592 (2005). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Cohen v. Oregon
green
2 sentences2007Based on our review of the record, we agree that Wright generally challenged the Mott rule rejecting the diminished capacity defense, but did not argue below that the trial court had improperly precluded the type of observation evidence admissible under Mott 4 ¶ 14 Because Wright failed to raise this ground below, he has “forfeited] the right to obtain appellate relief unless [he] prove[s] that fundamental error occurred.” State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, n. 2 , 115 P.3d 618 , 620 n. 2, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 762 , 163 L.Ed.2d 592 (2005). 2007Wright’s argument below was confined to a direct challenge to State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536 , 931 P.2d 1046 (1997), and did not, in any way, suggest the testimony was admissible under Mott. 8 ¶14 Because Wright failed to raise this ground below, he has “forfeit[ed] the right to obtain appellate relief unless [he] prove[s] that fundamental error occurred.” State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, n.2 , 115 P.3d 618 , 620 n.2, cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 762 (2005). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State of Arizona v. Darrel Peter Pandeli
green
1 sentence2024State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175 , 180 ¶ 4 (2017). ¶5 First, Kashkool argues defense counsel erred by not raising a diminished capacity defense or admitting a letter Kashkool wrote to the bank explaining his mental health problems. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Buot
green
2 sentences2017Similarly, in State v. Buot, 232 Ariz. 432 , 306 P.3d 89 (App. 2013), the defendant sought to introduce evidence that he had “behavior consistent with an intermittent explosive disorder and that his actions are reflexive and therefore impulsive and not the result of a conscious thought process.” Id. ¶ 11. 2017Similarly, in State v. Buot, 232 Ariz. 432 , 306 P.3d 89 (App. 2013), the defendant sought to introduce evidence that he had “behavior consistent with an intermittent explosive disorder and that his actions are reflexive and therefore impulsive and not the result of a conscious thought process.” Id. ¶ 11. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Wright
green
2 sentences2017The court in Mott observed that our legislature declined to adopt a diminished capacity defense when given the opportunity, id. at 540-41 , 931 P.2d at 1050-51 , and instead confined “any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease” to its bearing on an insanity defense, 4 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 762 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 166 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006); Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶ 15 , 155 P.3d at 1069 . ¶ 16 In Mott , our supreme court affirmed preclusion of evidence that “battered-woman syndrome” and low intelligence diminished the defendant’s capacity to decide to seek 2017The court in Mott observed that our legislature declined to adopt a diminished capacity defense when given the opportunity, id. at 540-41 , 931 P.2d at 1050-51 , and instead confined “any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease” to its bearing on an insanity defense, 4 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 762 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 166 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006); Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶ 15 , 155 P.3d at 1069 . ¶ 16 In Mott , our supreme court affirmed preclusion of evidence that “battered-woman syndrome” and low intelligence diminished the defendant’s capacity to decide to seek | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Walters v. City of St. Louis green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 351-52 , 681 P.2d at 1370-71 . 1997Id. at 351-52 , 681 P.2d at 1370-71 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Paul Fazzini
green
1 sentence1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Ritholz v. Michigan neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Renfield Importers, Ltd. v. Brandt
green
1 sentence1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rhodes v. United States
neutral
1 sentence1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Anthony J. Demma, United States of America v. Henry Brulay
green
2 sentences1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 1997But as many courts have recognized, "the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Raines v. United States
green
2 sentences1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 1997But as many courts have recognized, "the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Collier v. United States
green
2 sentences1997But as many courts have recognized, “the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity.” United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 1997But as many courts have recognized, "the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 , 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 , 108 S.Ct. 710 , 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 4 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| General Electric Co. v. M/V Nedlloyd Rouen green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Teamsters Local No. 728 v. Mims green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Watts v. Johnson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Fazzini v. United States green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.