5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bethea v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013The court thus said it was guarding against “the unrestrained application of the diminished capacity doctrine.” Id. 2013The fact that a defendant would need an expert to put on a diminished capacity defense also weighed on the court: mental illness— unlike intoxication, infancy, and the few other common conditions for which the law is willing to depart from the presumption of capacity — is not “susceptible to quantification or objective demonstration, and to lay understanding.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Degen v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020P. 57(b) to compel a mental examination in a case where defendant sought to use her psychiatric expert’s examination findings to support a diminished capacity defense, reasoning that “fundamental fairness” and “judicial common sense” require that the government “be able to follow where the defendant has led” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 13 that provoke it.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1988) (holding, in a state without the diminished capacity defense, that it was error for a trial court to exclude as a matter of law expert testimony from a psychiatrist "that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief”); but see Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297 ; 301-03 (D.C.Cir.1939) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intoxication defense could be used to establish the mitigating circumstance of adequate provocation because the "heat of passion” standard assumes an "ordinary man,” meani 2013See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1988) (holding, in a state without the diminished capacity defense, that it was error for a trial court to exclude as a matter of law expert testimony from a psychiatrist "that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief”); but see Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297 ; 301-03 (D.C.Cir.1939) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intoxication defense could be used to establish the mitigating circumstance of adequate provocation because the "heat of passion” standard assumes an "ordinary man,” meani | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2008See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (holding that Arizona rule that expert testimony about mental disease and incapacity cannot be considered in criminal cases except in the context of an insanity defense does not violate due process); Brown v. Trigg, 791 F.2d 598, 600-601 (7th Cir.1986) (rejecting claim that Indiana trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of mental retardation, because “Indiana does not recognize a diminished capacity defense,” violated defendant’s “constitutional right to rebut the prosecution’s proof on an element of the offense 2008See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (holding that Arizona rule that expert testimony about mental disease and incapacity cannot be considered in criminal cases except in the context of an insanity defense does not violate due process); Brown v. Trigg, 791 F.2d 598, 600-601 (7th Cir.1986) (rejecting claim that Indiana trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of mental retardation, because “Indiana does not recognize a diminished capacity defense,” violated defendant’s “constitutional right to rebut the prosecution’s proof on an element of the offense | 1 | 1 |
Delores Brown v. Clarence Trigg and Indiana Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2008See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 , 126 S.Ct. 2709 , 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006) (holding that Arizona rule that expert testimony about mental disease and incapacity cannot be considered in criminal cases except in the context of an insanity defense does not violate due process); Brown v. Trigg, 791 F.2d 598, 600-601 (7th Cir.1986) (rejecting claim that Indiana trial court’s refusal to admit evidence of mental retardation, because “Indiana does not recognize a diminished capacity defense,” violated defendant’s “constitutional right to rebut the prosecution’s proof on an element of the offense | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). 1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Willie Lee Stewart v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Walter H. Stewart, Jr. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). 1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Edward Smith, Jr.green1 sentence1976See S.Rep.No.93-0000 (S-l), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1974) ; see also United States v. Smith, supra, 404 F.2d at 727 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul Bradleygreen1 sentence1976See also United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972); Rouse v. Cameron, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 283 , 387 F.2d 241 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gordon Alexander, United States of America v. Benjamin Murdockgreen1 sentence1976See, e. g., United States v. Alexander, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 403, 413, 471 F.2d 923, 955, 965 (Bazelon, C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bishop v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1988) (holding, in a state without the diminished capacity defense, that it was error for a trial court to exclude as a matter of law expert testimony from a psychiatrist "that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief”); but see Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297 ; 301-03 (D.C.Cir.1939) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intoxication defense could be used to establish the mitigating circumstance of adequate provocation because the "heat of passion” standard assumes an "ordinary man,” meani | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Archie W. Brawner
green
1 sentence2013Circuit recently had approved of in Brawner, 471 F.2d at 999 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Heard v. United States
green
1 sentence1986Heard v. United States, 245 A.2d 125 (D.C.1968). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Russell E. Carter v. United States
green
1 sentence1976Id., 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 7, 471 F.2d at 975. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Stewart v. United States
green
2 sentences1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). 1976See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 297 , 214 F.2d 879, 883 (1954); Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159 , 166, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961); Stewart v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304-05 , 394 F.2d 778, 779-80 (1968). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Gorham v. United States
green
1 sentence1976In Moore , the circuit court rejected an argument for the creation of a drug dependency defense based, inter alia, on the principles of diminished capacity. [We later came to the same conclusion in Gorham v. United States, D.C.App., 339 A.2d 401 (1975) (en banc).] Judge Levanthal’s observations in Moore concerning the constancy of the standards governing criminal responsibility appear to be in conflict with the diminished capacity doctrine earlier embraced in Brawner. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Charles C. Rouse v. Dale C. Cameron, Superintendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital
green
2 sentences1976See also United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972); Rouse v. Cameron, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 283 , 387 F.2d 241 (1967). 1976See also United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972); Rouse v. Cameron, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 283 , 387 F.2d 241 (1967). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Raymond Moore
green
2 sentences1976It was suggested in Moore , however, that there exist “crucial distinctions” between the conditions of drug dependency and those of mental deficiency, e. g., that loss of control as a result of the latter is more suspectible to accurate verification. 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 417-21 , 486 F.2d at 1181-35 . 1976It was suggested in Moore , however, that there exist “crucial distinctions” between the conditions of drug dependency and those of mental deficiency, e. g., that loss of control as a result of the latter is more suspectible to accurate verification. 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 417-21 , 486 F.2d at 1181-35 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.