possession claim in Illinois

2018“The possession requirement reflects the public policy in Illinois that seeks to prevent mortgagees from stripping the rents from the property and leaving the mortgagor and the tenants without resources for maintenance or repair.” Comerica Bank, 284 Ill.

2018"The possession requirement reflects the public policy in Illinois that seeks to prevent mortgagees from stripping the rents from the property and leaving the mortgagor and the tenants without resources for maintenance or repair." Comerica Bank , 284 Ill.

2008Eckel, 256 Ill.

2007Eckel, 256 Ill.

2014Obviously, we have no authority to do this. ¶ 101 The Majority Overrules People v. Hoskins ¶ 102 The majority opinion is not only at odds with precedent from the United States Supreme Court, it is also at odds with our own decision in People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209 (1984).

2014Obviously, we have no authority to do this. ¶ 101 The Majority Overrules People v. Hoskins ¶ 102 The majority opinion is not only at odds with precedent from the United States Supreme Court, it is also at odds with our own decision in People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209 (1984).

2017App. 3d at 1034 (but the possession requirement—actual, or constructive with court authorization—reflects 4 In “title-theory” states, which retain some of the early-English legal concept of a mortgage as a conveyance, “the rents of a mortgaged property are considered an important part of the mortgagee’s security.” Id. - 13 ­ 2017 IL App (2d) 160371 a policy that seeks to prevent mortgagees from stripping the rents from the property and leaving the mortgagor and tenants without resources for maintenance or repair). ¶ 37 3.

2010Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: “(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.” Joiner, 85 Ill. 2d at 81 , 421 N.E.2d at 174 .

2010Thus, the party claiming ownership by adverse possession must prove that the following five elements existed concurrently for 20 years: “(1) continuous, (2) hostile or adverse, (3) actual, (4) open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the premises, (5) under claim of title inconsistent with that of the true owner.” Joiner, 85 Ill. 2d at 81 , 421 N.E.2d at 174 .

1979App. 2d 120 , 216 N.E.2d 490 .) The exclusive possession instruction involved is based upon logical conclusions which permit the inference to be drawn.

1974See People v. Woods (1963), 26 Ill.2d 557, 562 ; People v. Boulahanis (1964), 50 Ill.App.2d 440, 442 ; People v. Harris (1972), 53 Ill.2d 83, 85-87 .

1974See People v. Woods (1963), 26 Ill.2d 557, 562 ; People v. Boulahanis (1964), 50 Ill.App.2d 440, 442 ; People v. Harris (1972), 53 Ill.2d 83, 85-87 .

1969In People v. Stone, 349 Ill 52, 181 NE 648 , the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the giving of the exclusive possession instruction where the defendant’s possession of the stolen goods was also in issue.

1969In Tot v. United States, 319 US 463 , 63 S Ct 1241 , the Supreme Court said that for a presumption to be consistent with due process there must be a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed.

1969In Tot v. United States, 319 US 463 , 63 S Ct 1241 , the Supreme Court said that for a presumption to be consistent with due process there must be a rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed.

1968In determining whether defendant was denied a “fair trial” by the post-arraignment addition of a witness list containing three names we note that even unlisted witnesses are allowed to testify under Illinois procedure in the absence of a showing of surprise or prejudice neither of which appears here, People v. Jordan, 38 Ill.2d 83, 93 ; People v. Hopkins, 29 Ill.2d 260 ; People v. Welch, 22 Ill.2d 558 .

1968In determining whether defendant was denied a “fair trial” by the post-arraignment addition of a witness list containing three names we note that even unlisted witnesses are allowed to testify under Illinois procedure in the absence of a showing of surprise or prejudice neither of which appears here, People v. Jordan, 38 Ill.2d 83, 93 ; People v. Hopkins, 29 Ill.2d 260 ; People v. Welch, 22 Ill.2d 558 .

1968In determining whether defendant was denied a “fair trial” by the post-arraignment addition of a witness list containing three names we note that even unlisted witnesses are allowed to testify under Illinois procedure in the absence of a showing of surprise or prejudice neither of which appears here, People v. Jordan, 38 Ill.2d 83, 93 ; People v. Hopkins, 29 Ill.2d 260 ; People v. Welch, 22 Ill.2d 558 .

1958It is noteworthy, however, that, although later cases inferred that the possession rule was contained in Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376 , such is not the case.

1958It is noteworthy, however, that, although later cases inferred that the possession rule was contained in Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376 , such is not the case.

1958There the court said, at page 385: "It [the statute] does not commence running only from possession taken of the land, but from the time of the concurrence of the two things — the color of title and payment of taxes — and has performed its office, when the color of title and payment of taxes have gone together for the period of limitation; and it is the same to the party availing himself of the bar whether he is sued whilst in or out of possession." Notwithstanding the foregoing quoted language, the court, in Paullin v. Hale, 40 Ill. 274 , at page 277, said: "Ever since the case of Newland v.

1958There the court said, at page 385 : “It [the statute] does not commence running only from possession taken of the land, but from, the time of the concurrence of the two things — the color of title and payment of taxes — and has performed its office, when the color of title and payment of taxes have gone together for the period of limitation; and it is the same to the party availing himself of the bar whether he is sued whilst in or out of possession.” Notwithstanding the foregoing quoted language, the court, in Paullin v. Hale, 40 Ill. 274 , at page 277, said: “Ever since the case of Newland v

1958There the court said, at page 385: "It [the statute] does not commence running only from possession taken of the land, but from the time of the concurrence of the two things — the color of title and payment of taxes — and has performed its office, when the color of title and payment of taxes have gone together for the period of limitation; and it is the same to the party availing himself of the bar whether he is sued whilst in or out of possession." Notwithstanding the foregoing quoted language, the court, in Paullin v. Hale, 40 Ill. 274 , at page 277, said: "Ever since the case of Newland v.

1958There the court said, at page 385 : “It [the statute] does not commence running only from possession taken of the land, but from, the time of the concurrence of the two things — the color of title and payment of taxes — and has performed its office, when the color of title and payment of taxes have gone together for the period of limitation; and it is the same to the party availing himself of the bar whether he is sued whilst in or out of possession.” Notwithstanding the foregoing quoted language, the court, in Paullin v. Hale, 40 Ill. 274 , at page 277, said: “Ever since the case of Newland v

1924(Kirby v. Kirby, 236 Ill. 255 .) It is not necessary that the possession and claim of ownership be made under any muniment of title, but there must be a claim of ownership and such acts of possession as to show that the party in possession in fact claimed title to the land.

1909In Sontag v. Bigelow, 142 Ill. 143 , Sontag acquired title of one tenant in common to certain lands and by virtue of the title so acquired entered into possession of the premises.

1900The rule is “that, if the mortgagee actually obtains the possession under a clause in the mortgage permitting him to do so, before any other rights attach, as respects the property, he will hold the same position he would if the possession had passed to him at the time the mortgage was given.” (Frank v. Miner, 50 Ill. 444 ).