possession claim in Virginia

2026While ownership of a firearm is relevant to the possession inquiry, “it is not dispositive.” Smallwood, 278 Va. at 631 . -9- Rather, “[p]ossession and not ownership is the vital issue.” Id. (quoting Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 792 (1953)).

2026While ownership of a firearm is relevant to the possession inquiry, “it is not dispositive.” Smallwood, 278 Va. at 631 . -9- Rather, “[p]ossession and not ownership is the vital issue.” Id. (quoting Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 792 (1953)).

2009“Proof of actual possession may be by use and occupation of the property; a person is in hostile possession if the possession is under a claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner; and possession is exclusive when it is not in common with others.” Grappo, 241 Va. at 61 , 400 S.E.2d at 171 .

2009“Proof of actual possession may be by use and occupation of the property; a person is in hostile possession if the possession is under a claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner; and possession is exclusive when it is not in common with others.” Grappo, 241 Va. at 61 , 400 S.E.2d at 171 .

2026“In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that a defendant constructively possessed an item, ‘an appellate court must consider all the evidence admitted at trial[.]’” Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176 , 183 (2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Bolden, 275 Va. at 147 ).

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2004Cases Argued Counsel for the defendant argued the following authorities: Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 292 , 456 S.E.2d 531 (1995) (the Fairfax County Department of Social Services (DSS) was held not subject to having its records produced by a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 3A:12 because it was an agent of the Commonwealth, based in primary part on a statutory provision which requires DSS, when investigating a child protective services complaint, to notify and inform the Commonwealth’s Attorney, thereby making the DSS an agent to the Commonwealth); Via v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164

2003As recent, exclusive possession of a stolen item provides circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilty knowledge that an item was stolen, Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451 , 65 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951), such evidence is relevant to prove the “use [was] without the consent of the owner,” Overstreet, 17 Va.App. at 236 , 435 S.E.2d at 907 , in *438 prosecutions under Code § 18.2-102.

2003As recent, exclusive possession of a stolen item provides circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilty knowledge that an item was stolen, Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451 , 65 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951), such evidence is relevant to prove the “use [was] without the consent of the owner,” Overstreet, 17 Va.App. at 236 , 435 S.E.2d at 907 , in *438 prosecutions under Code § 18.2-102.

1922Baber v. Baber, supra ( 121 Va. 740, 758-761 , 94 S. E. 209 ); Sedgwick & Wait on Trial of Title to Land, secs. 280a, 281; Caperton v. Gregory, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 505; Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 186 , 23 S. E. 233 ; and also the cases above cited.

1922Baber v. Baber, supra ( 121 Va. 740, 758-761 , 94 S. E. 209 ); Sedgwick & Wait on Trial of Title to Land, secs. 280a, 281; Caperton v. Gregory, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 505; Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 186 , 23 S. E. 233 ; and also the cases above cited.

1922Baber v. Baber, supra ( 121 Va. 740, 758-761 , 94 S. E. 209 ); Sedgwick & Wait on Trial of Title to Land, secs. 280a, 281; Caperton v. Gregory, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 505; Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 186 , 23 S. E. 233 ; and also the cases above cited.

1918The holding in Coulter v. Philips, supra, however, that a possession that would bar the debtor would divest the rights of his creditor, is obiter, as no such question was involved in that case; and while Coulter v. Philips is quoted in Pratt v. Pratt, and the latter in turn is quoted in Flanary v. Kane, yet in neither instance was the quotation made for the purpose of approving the doctrine announced in the quotation made from the case of Coulter v. Philips .

1918The holding in Coulter v. Philips, supra, however, that a possession that would bar the debtor would divest the rights of his creditor, is obiter, as no such question was involved in that case; and while Coulter v. Philips is quoted in Pratt v. Pratt, and the latter in turn is quoted in Flanary v. Kane, yet in neither instance was the quotation made for the purpose of approving the doctrine announced in the quotation made from the case of Coulter v. Philips .

1918But a party coming into possession under and according to the title of the defendant (the judgment debtor) takes it cum onere, and the creditor’s relation to the land remains unchanged.” In LeRoy v. Rogers, 30 Cal. 229 , 89 Am.