possession claim in California

1923His right of possession will continue until he has in fact abandoned it, or has forfeited it by failure to do the requisite amount of work within the prescribed time (Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279 [ 26 L.

1923His right of possession will continue until he has in fact abandoned it, or has forfeited it by failure to do the requisite amount of work within the prescribed time (Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279 [ 26 L.

2012(Id. at p. 403.) Applying these two principles to the possession of child pornography, the Court of Appeal concluded the Hertzig defendant’s possession of multiple child pornography videos on his laptop computer constituted a single act of possession in violation of section 311.11(a), stating it (the appellate court) was “not at liberty to fragment a single crime into more than one offense.” ( 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 403 .) In reaching this conclusion, however, the Hertzig court also explained that “[t]he act proscribed by section 311.11 is the act of possessing child pornography, not the act of

2012(Id. at p. 403.) Applying these two principles to the possession of child pornography, the Court of Appeal concluded the Hertzig defendant’s possession of multiple child pornography videos on his laptop computer constituted a single act of possession in violation of section 311.11(a), stating it (the appellate court) was “not at liberty to fragment a single crime into more than one offense.” ( 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 403 .) In reaching this conclusion, however, the Hertzig court also explained that “[t]he act proscribed by section 311.11 is the act of possessing child pornography, not the act of

2012(Id. at p. 403.) Applying these two principles to the possession of child pornography, the Court of Appeal concluded the Hertzig defendant’s possession of multiple child pornography videos on his laptop computer constituted a single act of possession in violation of section 311.11(a), stating it (the appellate court) was “not at liberty to fragment a single crime into more than one offense.” ( 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 403 .) In reaching this conclusion, however, the Hertzig court also explained that “[t]he act proscribed by section 311.11 is the act of possessing child pornography, not the act of

1989However, in Freeman v. County of Fresno, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 459 , this court concluded “[t]he requirement that the use must be exclusive means that it must not be one shared by the general public . . . .” (Id. at pp. 463-464.) Since the special rights of access to public rights-of-way authorized by the franchises are not shared with the general public, the exclusive possession requirement is satisfied.

1984(See, People v. Carmen, supra, 773 .)” (People v. Mooney, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 502, 506 .) Without the alternative possession instruction, the jury was bound to find guilt of possession for sale even if they believed that David did not intend to sell heroin but believed he merely possessed it.

1909His right of possession will continue until he has in fact abandoned it, or has forfeited it by failure to do the requisite amount of work within the prescribed time.” (Harris v. Kellogg, 117 Cal. 488 , [ 49 Pac. 708 ] ; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279 .) This finding, however, is attacked upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to sustain it.

1898Co., 160 U. S. 303 : “The possession under a claim established according to law is fully recognized by the acts of Congress, and the patent adds little to the security of the party in the eontinuoiis possession of a mine he has discovered or bought.” In Plummer v. Brown, 70 Cal. 546 , this court said: “To entitle the alleged owner, however, to such equitable relief he must show that he occupies such a status as entitles him to control the legal title.” This court in Robinson v. Forrest, 29 Cal. 320 , has declared in express terms what must be the status of a party who seeks the character of re

1869It was held in People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 656 , People v. Frisbie, 31 Cal. 146 , and People v. Cohen, 31 Cal. 210 , that the possession of and claim to public land was property, and, as such, was taxable to the claimant, without violation of the Act admitting the State into the Union.

1869It was held in People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 656 , People v. Frisbie, 31 Cal. 146 , and People v. Cohen, 31 Cal. 210 , that the possession of and claim to public land was property, and, as such, was taxable to the claimant, without violation of the Act admitting the State into the Union.

1869It was held in People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 656 , People v. Frisbie, 31 Cal. 146 , and People v. Cohen, 31 Cal. 210 , that the possession of and claim to public land was property, and, as such, was taxable to the claimant, without violation of the Act admitting the State into the Union.

1869It was held in People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 656 , People v. Frisbie, 31 Cal. 146 , and People v. Cohen, 31 Cal. 210 , that the possession of and claim to public land was property, and, as such, was taxable to the claimant, without violation of the Act admitting the State into the Union.

1869The appellant’s position, that the property is not taxable, because property of that character is exempted from taxation by the General Revenue Act, is answered by People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 433 , and People v. Gerke, 35 Cal. 677 , and it is unnecessary to repeat the argument here.

1866In the State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56 , it is held that the possessory right in a mining claim is subject to taxation, and that such possession is not within the provision of the Act admitting California into the Union, which provides that the State of California “ shall never lay any tax or assessment of any description whatever upon the public domain of the United States.” If that case was correctly decided it must govern this, for there can be no distinction taken between the possession of a mining claim upon the pub.lic lands, and the possession of a claim for agricultural purposes.