possession claim in New York

2021In these circumstances, where there was no intent to terminate the action upon a judgment of possession, the court retained "supervisory power" to consider landlord's monetary [*3]claims, which were necessarily related to his possession claim ( Teitelbaum Holdings v Gold , 48 NY2d at 53 ; see generally 952 Assoc., LLC v Palmer , 52 AD3d 236 [1st Dept 2008]; Lexington Ave.

2021By expressly reserving the monetary claims for a separate trial, the parties did not "unequivocally terminate[]" the proceedings upon the resolution of landlord's possession claim ( see Teitelbaum Holdings v Gold , 48 NY2d at 56 ; compare Lee v Green World Cleaners 1, LLC , 61 Misc 3d 155[A] , 2018 NY Slip Op 51826[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018] [once summary proceeding terminated, Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to consider landlord's motion to amend the judgment to include a monetary award for tenants' breach of the stipulation of settlement, upon which the final judg

2011Therefore, whether exculpatory or not, it did not constitute Brady material (see People v Brock, 246 AD2d 406 [1998], lv denied 91 NY2d 940 [1998]).

1994Not only is such an argument unavailing to excuse the prosecutor’s own failure to provide the material (People v Ranghelle, supra) but, unlike the documents in issue which were withheld, those in the possession of the defense neither stated where the observations had occurred, nor identified any eyewitnesses and, significantly, did not indicate that the behavior had occurred before, rather than after, the alleged rape.

1985Furthermore, "[w]here the instrumentality which was the proximate cause of the accident was identified as belonging to the defendant, it was appropriate to infer that it was under the operation and control of the defendant * * * and placed at the scene of the occurrence for the defendant’s benefit” (Demogenes v Village Carting Co., 44 AD2d 155, 156 ; see also, Norris v Kohler, 41 NY 42, 44-45 ["The property being proved to belong to the defendant * * * a presumption arises that it was in use for his benefit, and on his own account * * * No proof was given * * * separating the ownership from th

1983(See Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510 ; Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 ; Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 .) The application of the possession presumption as to defendant Wade, however, may be constitutionally and rationally applied since this defendant as the driver of the vehicle and the one to whom the officer directed to pull over would have standing to contest the stop and search in question.

1983(See Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510 ; Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 ; Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 .) The application of the possession presumption as to defendant Wade, however, may be constitutionally and rationally applied since this defendant as the driver of the vehicle and the one to whom the officer directed to pull over would have standing to contest the stop and search in question.

1983(See Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510 ; Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 ; Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 .) The application of the possession presumption as to defendant Wade, however, may be constitutionally and rationally applied since this defendant as the driver of the vehicle and the one to whom the officer directed to pull over would have standing to contest the stop and search in question.

1979As to such possession, the possessor is in legal effect not 'a person to whom a license therefor has been issued’ ”. ( 70 AD2d 387, 389 .) Justice Markewich who concurred, noted that the main thrust of the charge was an intent to commit an assault.

1972Sobell v. United States, 355 U. S. 873 ): “Whenever knowledge was in the possession of defense counsel during trial. of facts which either established the impropriety of certain evidence, or even Cast doubts upon* its admissibility, they are barred from raising this question on a motion to vacate judgment [p. 529]. ;* * * the prosedution cannot suppress evidence or facts if they are known to the defense ’ ’ [p. 528emphasis supplied].

1964Therefore the charge, viewed in its entirety, was correct (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ; Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ).

1964Therefore the charge, viewed in its entirety, was correct (Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 ; Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ).

1964The existence of evidence from which the jury may draw an inference of guilt does not destroy the presumption against guilt, unless in the jury’s view the inculpatory evidence, together with all the other evidence or lack of evidence in the ease, overcomes the presumption (1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence [12th ed.], § 89, p. 174; 1 Jones, Evidence [5th ed.], § 113, p. 196; cf. People v. Creasy, 236 N. Y. 205, 223 ; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 Harv.

1952It is true that under certain circumstances a claim of right may be proved by certain affirmative acts (Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34 ; Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240 ; Smith v. Egan, 225 App. Div. 586 ); but mere evidence of possession never has been and should not now be held to establish that the possession was under claim of right.

1952It is true that under certain circumstances a claim of right may be proved by certain affirmative acts (Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34 ; Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240 ; Smith v. Egan, 225 App. Div. 586 ); but mere evidence of possession never has been and should not now be held to establish that the possession was under claim of right.

1952It is true that under certain circumstances a claim of right may be proved by certain affirmative acts (Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34 ; Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N. Y. 240 ; Smith v. Egan, 225 App. Div. 586 ); but mere evidence of possession never has been and should not now be held to establish that the possession was under claim of right.

1933(Cf. Markantonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., 262 N. Y. 354 .) We are dealing here with a contract between the mortgagor and'mortgagee.

1928No proof was given in the present case, separating the ownership from the possession and the presumption of law is, that the wagon and horses of the defendant were in use in his service, and on his account.” (Norris v. Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42, 44 .) Firm in brewery business; truck had the firm name on it; many trucks of the same kind were employed in its business; the truck was loaded with ale barrels at the time of the accident, and was engaged in delivering ale from the brewery of the firm. “ Held, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the truck belonged to defendant’s firm, an

1928This made a prima facie case.” (Hodgson v. Conklin, 50 App. Div. 604, 605 .) “ The license number of the car, coupled with evidence that the defendant held the license, was prima facie proof that the defendant was the owner.

1928No proof was given in the present case, separating the ownership from the possession and the presumption of law is, that the wagon and horses of the defendant were in use in his service, and on his account.” (Norris v. Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42, 44 .) Firm in brewery business; truck had the firm name on it; many trucks of the same kind were employed in its business; the truck was loaded with ale barrels at the time of the accident, and was engaged in delivering ale from the brewery of the firm. “ Held, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the truck belonged to defendant’s firm, an

1911(Joyce v. Capel, 8 Carr. & Payne, 370; Vonderhorst Brewing Co. v. Amrhine, 98 Md. 406 ; Edgeworth v. Wood, 58 N. J.

1910In Carr v. Barnett (supra) the court said : “ There was no concealment, fraudulent or otherwise, of his possession *267 and claim, but the facts were unknown to the plaintiff until a short time before the suit was brought.” In Connor v. Hawkins (supra) it was said: “ Her (defendant’s) possession was adverse, public and continuous.” In Gaillard v. Hudson (supra) the court said : “ The defendant to the possessory warrant, and those under whom he claimed, had been in the peaceable, quiet and honest possession of this property for more than four years next immediately preceding the issuing of the

1910In Carr v. Barnett (supra) the court said : “ There was no concealment, fraudulent or otherwise, of his possession *267 and claim, but the facts were unknown to the plaintiff until a short time before the suit was brought.” In Connor v. Hawkins (supra) it was said: “ Her (defendant’s) possession was adverse, public and continuous.” In Gaillard v. Hudson (supra) the court said : “ The defendant to the possessory warrant, and those under whom he claimed, had been in the peaceable, quiet and honest possession of this property for more than four years next immediately preceding the issuing of the

1910(Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379; Bassett v. Spofford, 45 id. 387 .) If the acquisition of personal property by adverse possession rests on analogy to the law relating to real property — and that is the ground on which it seems to rest — it is clear that the possession must be under claim of right, and open, public and notorious.

1910(Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379; Bassett v. Spofford, 45 id. 387 .) If the acquisition of personal property by adverse possession rests on analogy to the law relating to real property — and that is the ground on which it seems to rest — it is clear that the possession must be under claim of right, and open, public and notorious.

1910In Carr v. Barnett (supra) the court said : “ There was no concealment, fraudulent or otherwise, of his possession *267 and claim, but the facts were unknown to the plaintiff until a short time before the suit was brought.” In Connor v. Hawkins (supra) it was said: “ Her (defendant’s) possession was adverse, public and continuous.” In Gaillard v. Hudson (supra) the court said : “ The defendant to the possessory warrant, and those under whom he claimed, had been in the peaceable, quiet and honest possession of this property for more than four years next immediately preceding the issuing of the

1890In Kidd v. McCormick, 83 N. Y. 391 , it was held that where the builder, under a contract, abandoned the building before completing the contract the owner might complete the work, and still insist on the terms of the contract.

1885S., 722, § 1; Averill v. Taylor, 8 N. Y., 44, 52 .) Before the time of Henry YII an action of ejectment could not be sustained by the lessee to recover the term, but since then it might in England and maybe in this State. (1 Wash. Real Prop., 291; Goodtitle v. Tombs, 3 Wilson, 121 ; Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill, 332 ; Whitney v. Allaire, 1 N. Y., 311 .) The transfer of such an interest or estate, or a deed purporting to convey less than a freehold, cannot furnish a color of title adverse to the owner, so as to support the possession under claim of title to it within the meaning of the statute a

1884Hart v. Vose, 19 Wend. 365 ; Kingman v. Sparrow, 12 Barb. 201 ; Thomas v. Marshfield, 13 Pick. 240 ; Parish of Medford v. Pratt, 4 Id. 221; Patten v. Elevated R.

1884Hart v. Vose, 19 Wend. 365 ; Kingman v. Sparrow, 12 Barb. 201 ; Thomas v. Marshfield, 13 Pick. 240 ; Parish of Medford v. Pratt, 4 Id. 221; Patten v. Elevated R.