three part test in Montana

1998We have adopted a three part test in Interstate Production Credit Ass’n v. DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 322 , 820 P.2d 1285, 1287 , to determine whether a district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

1998We have adopted a three part test in Interstate Production Credit Ass’n v. DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 322 , 820 P.2d 1285, 1287 , to determine whether a district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶ 24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶ 24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

2008Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur., 276 Mont. 1, 28 , 914 P.2d 976, 993 (1996); In re L.M.A.T., 2002 MT 163, ¶ 34 , 310 Mont. 422, ¶ 34 , 51 P.3d 504, ¶ 34 ; In re M.F.B., 2001 MT 136, ¶¶ 9-10 , 305 Mont. 481, ¶¶ 9-10 , 29 P.3d 480, ¶¶ 9-10 . ¶24 As an alternative argument, G.M. strenuously asserts that the due process clause of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17, requires this Court to apply the bifurcated standard of proof relating to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, in order to find that a person is seriously developmentally disabled.

1986In Montana, the test to determine the applicability of collateral estoppel is a three part inquiry: “(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?” In Re Marriage of Stout (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 342 ,] 701 P.2d 729, 733-734 , 42 St.Rep. 856 , 861, quoting Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Johnson (Mont. 1984), [ 207 Mont. 409 ,] 673 P.2d 1277, 1279 , 41 St.R

1986In Montana, the test to determine the applicability of collateral estoppel is a three part inquiry: “(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?” In Re Marriage of Stout (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 342 ,] 701 P.2d 729, 733-734 , 42 St.Rep. 856 , 861, quoting Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Johnson (Mont. 1984), [ 207 Mont. 409 ,] 673 P.2d 1277, 1279 , 41 St.R

1986In Montana, the test to determine the applicability of collateral estoppel is a three part inquiry: “(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?” In Re Marriage of Stout (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 342 ,] 701 P.2d 729, 733-734 , 42 St.Rep. 856 , 861, quoting Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Johnson (Mont. 1984), [ 207 Mont. 409 ,] 673 P.2d 1277, 1279 , 41 St.R

1986In Montana, the test to determine the applicability of collateral estoppel is a three part inquiry: “(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?” In Re Marriage of Stout (Mont. 1985), [ 216 Mont. 342 ,] 701 P.2d 729, 733-734 , 42 St.Rep. 856 , 861, quoting Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Johnson (Mont. 1984), [ 207 Mont. 409 ,] 673 P.2d 1277, 1279 , 41 St.R

1986We applied this three part test in Jensen v. State Dept. of Labor and Industry (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 84 ,] 689 P.2d 1231 , 41 St.Rep. 1971 , and Sorum v. Rieder and Co. (Mont. 1983), [ 205 Mont. 98 ,] 666 P.2d 1221 , 40 St.Rep. 1120 .

1986We applied this three part test in Jensen v. State Dept. of Labor and Industry (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 84 ,] 689 P.2d 1231 , 41 St.Rep. 1971 , and Sorum v. Rieder and Co. (Mont. 1983), [ 205 Mont. 98 ,] 666 P.2d 1221 , 40 St.Rep. 1120 .

1986With respect to the first factor, respondents argue that they relied on the statement in Runge, 180 Mont. 91 , 589 P.2d 145 , that a bar owner is liable only if the patron was served while helplessly intoxicated.

1986With respect to the first factor, respondents argue that they relied on the statement in Runge, 180 Mont. 91 , 589 P.2d 145 , that a bar owner is liable only if the patron was served while helplessly intoxicated.

1986We applied this three part test in Jensen v. State Dept. of Labor and Industry (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 84 ,] 689 P.2d 1231 , 41 St.Rep. 1971 , and Sorum v. Rieder and Co. (Mont. 1983), [ 205 Mont. 98 ,] 666 P.2d 1221 , 40 St.Rep. 1120 .

1986We applied this three part test in Jensen v. State Dept. of Labor and Industry (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 84 ,] 689 P.2d 1231 , 41 St.Rep. 1971 , and Sorum v. Rieder and Co. (Mont. 1983), [ 205 Mont. 98 ,] 666 P.2d 1221 , 40 St.Rep. 1120 .

2013Karlen, 276 Mont. at 190 , 915 P.2d at 238 .

2013Karlen, 276 Mont. at 190 , 915 P.2d at 238 .

2013Importantly, we did not hold that was the exclusive method of satisfying the requirement of subsection (6). ¶52 In Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244 , 301 Mont. 434 , 10 P.3d 99 , another case involving attorney error, we restated our Karlen holding in unqualified terms as a three- part test.

2013Importantly, we did not hold that was the exclusive method of satisfying the requirement of subsection (6). ¶52 In Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244 , 301 Mont. 434 , 10 P.3d 99 , another case involving attorney error, we restated our Karlen holding in unqualified terms as a three- part test.

2013State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184, ¶ 13 , 338 Mont. 330 , 167 P.3d 389 . ¶9 We apply a three part test to determine whether double jeopardy bars a subsequent prosecution.

2013State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184, ¶ 13 , 338 Mont. 330 , 167 P.3d 389 . ¶9 We apply a three part test to determine whether double jeopardy bars a subsequent prosecution.

2013Subsection (1) provides that a judgment can be set aside for “mistake, inadvertence, 1 We purportedly adopted this interpretation of subsection (6) in Bartell v. Zabawa, 2009 MT 204 , 351 Mont. 211 , 214 P.3d 735 , yet in that case we nevertheless applied the three- part test as the Court does here. 23 surprise, or excusable neglect.” We held that subsection (1) will be applicable in ordinary circumstances of attorney error, but that, where the moving party can meet the higher burden of demonstrating extraordinary circumstances, gross neglect or actual misconduct, that the client was blameless

2013Subsection (1) provides that a judgment can be set aside for “mistake, inadvertence, 1 We purportedly adopted this interpretation of subsection (6) in Bartell v. Zabawa, 2009 MT 204 , 351 Mont. 211 , 214 P.3d 735 , yet in that case we nevertheless applied the three- part test as the Court does here. 23 surprise, or excusable neglect.” We held that subsection (1) will be applicable in ordinary circumstances of attorney error, but that, where the moving party can meet the higher burden of demonstrating extraordinary circumstances, gross neglect or actual misconduct, that the client was blameless

2013State v. Fox, 2012 MT 172, ¶ 19 , 336 Mont. 10 , 285 P.3d 454 .

2013State v. Fox, 2012 MT 172, ¶ 19 , 336 Mont. 10 , 285 P.3d 454 .

2005However, we have also acknowledged that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate [when] the State’s self-interest is at stake.” City of Billings, 281 Mont. at 229 , 935 P.2d at 252 . ¶41 These Contracts Clause principles are applied by way of a three- part test this Court employs when analyzing a Contracts Clause challenge: (1) Is the state law a substantial impairment to the contractual relationship; (2) Does the state have a significant and legitimate purpose for the law; and, (3) Does the law impose reasonable conditions which are re

2005However, we have also acknowledged that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate [when] the State’s self-interest is at stake.” City of Billings, 281 Mont. at 229 , 935 P.2d at 252 . ¶41 These Contracts Clause principles are applied by way of a three- part test this Court employs when analyzing a Contracts Clause challenge: (1) Is the state law a substantial impairment to the contractual relationship; (2) Does the state have a significant and legitimate purpose for the law; and, (3) Does the law impose reasonable conditions which are re

2001Holtman v. 4-G’s Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 432, 439 , 872 P.2d 318, 322 . ¶16 This Court applies a three part test to determine if collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue.

2001Holtman v. 4-G’s Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 432, 439 , 872 P.2d 318, 322 . ¶16 This Court applies a three part test to determine if collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue.

2001Haines Pipeline Const. v. Montana Power (1994), 265 Mont. 282, 288 , 876 P.2d 632, 636 .

2001Haines Pipeline Const. v. Montana Power (1994), 265 Mont. 282, 288 , 876 P.2d 632, 636 .

1999The Serrano court also noted that the uncontested findings of the district court established that the "benefits flowing from this adjudication are to be widely enjoyed among the citizens of this state," and concluded that under those circumstances, the award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs "was proper under the theory posited by the trial court." Serrano, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d at 1315 . ¶ 67 We adopt the private attorney general theory and the three part inquiry set forth in Serrano .

1999The Serrano court also noted that the uncontested findings of the district court established that the “benefits flowing from this adjudication are to be widely enjoyed among the citizens of this state,” and concluded that under those circumstances, the award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs “was proper under the theory posited by the trial court.” Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1315 . ¶67 We adopt the private attorney general theory and the three part inquiry set forth in Serrano .

1998The evidence must satisfy a three part test: “Corroborative evidence must clearly (1) be independent, (2) point toward the defendant’s guilt, and (3) provide a legally sufficient connection between the defendant and the offense.” State v. Paulson (1991), 250 Mont. 32, 46 , 817 P.2d 1137, 1145-46 . ¶29 In this case, there was sufficient evidence to corroborate Agner’s testimony.

1998The evidence must satisfy a three part test: “Corroborative evidence must clearly (1) be independent, (2) point toward the defendant’s guilt, and (3) provide a legally sufficient connection between the defendant and the offense.” State v. Paulson (1991), 250 Mont. 32, 46 , 817 P.2d 1137, 1145-46 . ¶29 In this case, there was sufficient evidence to corroborate Agner’s testimony.

1998The test provides that: (1) The Court will determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence; (2) if the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court will determine if the trial court has misapprehended the evidence; (3) if the findings are supported by substantial evidence and that evidence has not been misapprehended, this Court may still find “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citing United States

1998The test provides that: (1) The Court will determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence; (2) if the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court will determine if the trial court has misapprehended the evidence; (3) if the findings are supported by substantial evidence and that evidence has not been misapprehended, this Court may still find “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citing United States

1994Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Johnson (1984), 207 Mont. 409, 413 , 673 P.2d 1277, 1279 ; In re Marriage of Stout (1985), 216 Mont. 342, 349-50 , 701 P.2d 729, 733-34 ; Anderson v. State (1991), 250 Mont. 18, 21 , 817 P.2d 699, 701 .

1994Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Johnson (1984), 207 Mont. 409, 413 , 673 P.2d 1277, 1279 ; In re Marriage of Stout (1985), 216 Mont. 342, 349-50 , 701 P.2d 729, 733-34 ; Anderson v. State (1991), 250 Mont. 18, 21 , 817 P.2d 699, 701 .

1992Western Energy Company v. Genie Land Company (1987), 227 Mont. 74 , 737 P.2d 478 ; Neel v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association (1984), 207 Mont. 376 , 675 P.2d 96 ; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co. (1983), 459 U.S. 400 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 .

1992Western Energy Company v. Genie Land Company (1987), 227 Mont. 74 , 737 P.2d 478 ; Neel v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association (1984), 207 Mont. 376 , 675 P.2d 96 ; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co. (1983), 459 U.S. 400 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 .

1992Western Energy Company v. Genie Land Company (1987), 227 Mont. 74 , 737 P.2d 478 ; Neel v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association (1984), 207 Mont. 376 , 675 P.2d 96 ; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co. (1983), 459 U.S. 400 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 .

1992Western Energy Company v. Genie Land Company (1987), 227 Mont. 74 , 737 P.2d 478 ; Neel v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association (1984), 207 Mont. 376 , 675 P.2d 96 ; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co. (1983), 459 U.S. 400 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 .

1992Western Energy Company v. Genie Land Company (1987), 227 Mont. 74 , 737 P.2d 478 ; Neel v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association (1984), 207 Mont. 376 , 675 P.2d 96 ; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co. (1983), 459 U.S. 400 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 .

1992Western Energy Company v. Genie Land Company (1987), 227 Mont. 74 , 737 P.2d 478 ; Neel v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association (1984), 207 Mont. 376 , 675 P.2d 96 ; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co. (1983), 459 U.S. 400 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 .