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16 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hollandgreen2 sentences1986State v. Holland, 534 S.W.2d 590, 592 [3] (Mo.App.1976). 1979State v. Holland, 534 S.W.2d 590, 592 [3] (Mo.App.1976). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2025Hanshaw cited Wright for its recognition that the post-2017 version of § 490.065.2 “is identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 702-705.” Hanshaw also quoted the three- part test Wright used to summarize the requirements of the current statute: “(1) whether the expert is qualified, (2) whether the testimony is relevant, and (3) whether the testimony is reliable.” 562 S.W.3d at 319 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Destin v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.green1 sentence2012The three part test for this exception is: (1) “there must be a complete understanding based on the record of what the excluded testimony would have been”; (2) “the objection must be to a category of evidence rather than to specific testimony”; and (3) “the record must reveal that the evidence would have helped its proponent.” Peters, 186 S.W.3d at 781 (quoting Destín v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 803 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo.App.1990)). | 1 | 1 |
Nance v. Kimbrowgreen1 sentence1988The three part test approved in Nance v. Kimbrow, 476 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Mo.1972) is satisfied in these circumstances: liability and damages required separate and distinct findings; liability has already been determined; and, White will not be prejudiced by a new trial on damages only. | 1 | 1 |
First Affiliated Securities, Inc. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commissiongreen2 sentences1988This particular section, “crucial to the ultimate issue here, sets out a three part test all part [sic] of which must be totally satisfied to establish a relationship of independent contractor as opposed to one of employment.” First Affiliated Securities, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 738 S.W.2d 495,496 (Mo.App. 1987). 1988This particular section, “crucial to the ultimate issue here, sets out a three part test all part [sic] of which must be totally satisfied to establish a relationship of independent contractor as opposed to one of employment.” First Affiliated Securities, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 738 S.W.2d 495,496 (Mo.App. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Crunden Martin Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences1987Section 287.040; Green, supra, 575 S.W.2d at 932 [2]. 1987Section 287.040; Green, supra, 575 S.W.2d at 932 [2]. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence1985A three part test was set forth in State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10, 13 [1] (Mo.App.1975) by which to examine the totality of the circumstances in pre-trial identification procedures: (1) Is there the presence of an independent basis for identification? (2) Is there an absence of any suggestive influence by others? (3) Was there a positive in-court identification? | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Outcom, Inc. v. City of Lake St. Louis
green
2 sentences1999Instead, we remanded the cause “to give the parties the opportunity to present evidence and for the court to determine the validity of the other provisions under the three part test of section 226.540.7.” Id. 1999In the prior appeal, we “remanded to give the parties the opportunity to present evidence and for the court to determine the validity of the other provisions [of Ordinance 962] under the three part test of section 226.540.7.” Outcom, 960 S.W.2d at 4-5 . | 2 | 1998–1999 |
State v. Peters
green
1 sentence2012The three part test for this exception is: (1) “there must be a complete understanding based on the record of what the excluded testimony would have been”; (2) “the objection must be to a category of evidence rather than to specific testimony”; and (3) “the record must reveal that the evidence would have helped its proponent.” Peters, 186 S.W.3d at 781 (quoting Destín v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 803 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo.App.1990)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Thomes v. Porter
green
1 sentence2008Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.App.3d 834 , 68 Ill.Dec. 396 , 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (finding that an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was one for “fraud or deceit” under Illinois’ survival statute); Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.1988) (finding *14 that abatement would confound the purposes of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noting that, in Texas, “suits for wrongful acquisition of property by fraud or deceit” survive the death of a party); State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26 , 633 A.2d 272 (1993) (holding that abatement of claims under Vermont’s | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Bracken v. Harris & Zide, L.L.P.
green
1 sentence2008Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.App.3d 834 , 68 Ill.Dec. 396 , 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (finding that an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was one for “fraud or deceit” under Illinois’ survival statute); Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.1988) (finding *14 that abatement would confound the purposes of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noting that, in Texas, “suits for wrongful acquisition of property by fraud or deceit” survive the death of a party); State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26 , 633 A.2d 272 (1993) (holding that abatement of claims under Vermont’s | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People Ex Rel. Fahner v. Testa
green
2 sentences2008Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.App.3d 834 , 68 Ill.Dec. 396 , 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (finding that an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was one for “fraud or deceit” under Illinois’ survival statute); Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.1988) (finding *14 that abatement would confound the purposes of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noting that, in Texas, “suits for wrongful acquisition of property by fraud or deceit” survive the death of a party); State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26 , 633 A.2d 272 (1993) (holding that abatement of claims under Vermont’s 2008Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.App.3d 834 , 68 Ill.Dec. 396 , 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (finding that an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was one for “fraud or deceit” under Illinois’ survival statute); Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.1988) (finding *14 that abatement would confound the purposes of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noting that, in Texas, “suits for wrongful acquisition of property by fraud or deceit” survive the death of a party); State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26 , 633 A.2d 272 (1993) (holding that abatement of claims under Vermont’s | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Therrien
green
2 sentences2008Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.App.3d 834 , 68 Ill.Dec. 396 , 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (finding that an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was one for “fraud or deceit” under Illinois’ survival statute); Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.1988) (finding *14 that abatement would confound the purposes of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noting that, in Texas, “suits for wrongful acquisition of property by fraud or deceit” survive the death of a party); State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26 , 633 A.2d 272 (1993) (holding that abatement of claims under Vermont’s 2008Fahner v. Testa, 112 Ill.App.3d 834 , 68 Ill.Dec. 396 , 445 N.E.2d 1249 (1983) (finding that an action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was one for “fraud or deceit” under Illinois’ survival statute); Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.1988) (finding *14 that abatement would confound the purposes of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and noting that, in Texas, “suits for wrongful acquisition of property by fraud or deceit” survive the death of a party); State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26 , 633 A.2d 272 (1993) (holding that abatement of claims under Vermont’s | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Parker
green
1 sentence1998In State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 , 113 S.Ct. 636 , 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992), the Missouri Supreme Court set out a three part test for a trial court to follow when confronted with a Batson challenge. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Missouri v. Parker
green
1 sentence1998In State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 , 113 S.Ct. 636 , 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992), the Missouri Supreme Court set out a three part test for a trial court to follow when confronted with a Batson challenge. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Adoptive Parents of M. N. M. v. M. J. L.
green
1 sentence1998In State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 , 113 S.Ct. 636 , 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992), the Missouri Supreme Court set out a three part test for a trial court to follow when confronted with a Batson challenge. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Missouri v. Parker
green
1 sentence1998In State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 , 113 S.Ct. 636 , 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992), the Missouri Supreme Court set out a three part test for a trial court to follow when confronted with a Batson challenge. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
2 sentences1996Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 91 , 92 S.Ct. at 1999 . 1996Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 91 , 92 S.Ct. at 1999 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Division of Employment Security v. Hatfield
green
1 sentence1993The amendment is clearly substantive and it therefore may not be retroactive.” 2 Referring to § 288.034.5, as amended 1989, in Division of Employment Security v. Hatfield, 831 S.W.2d 216 (Mo.App.1992), the court said, at 218-219: Under the authority provided by the legislature, the director of the Division of Employment Security has promulgated regulations to efficiently and properly administer this statute. § 288.220.5. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Burns v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission
green
1 sentence1993In Burns, 845 S.W.2d at 557 , the court said: “In 1989, the three part test of § 288.-034.5 was amended, and a single test was substituted, which applies ‘the common law of agency right to control’ test.... | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Beal v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence1988Although the Commission found that the excess of the sales price over the price paid by a dealer to Herron was remuneration constituting wages, this court, in Beal v. Industrial Commission, 535 S.W.2d at 458 , rejected the need for such a finding and instead focused on the three part test from Section 288.034.5 to determine the existence of an independent contractor. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Stemmler v. Crutcher
green
2 sentences1987Id. [6], A three part test of good cause for failure to obtain service has been established. 1987Stemmler v. Crutcher, supra, [1-4]; Collier v. Dunne, 712 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.App.1986) [4], The failure must pertain to difficulties in obtaining service of process; there must be proof showing circumstances that prevent or impair service; and those circumstances that cause the difficulties must be outside the control of the plaintiffs. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Collier v. Dunne
green
1 sentence1987Stemmler v. Crutcher, supra, [1-4]; Collier v. Dunne, 712 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.App.1986) [4], The failure must pertain to difficulties in obtaining service of process; there must be proof showing circumstances that prevent or impair service; and those circumstances that cause the difficulties must be outside the control of the plaintiffs. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1985People v. Taylor, 12 Cal.3d 686 , 527 P.2d 622 , 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 (1974) set out a three part test to apply in determining whether collateral estoppel was applicable to bar litigation of an issue in a criminal trial. 1985People v. Taylor, 12 Cal.3d 686 , 527 P.2d 622 , 117 Cal.Rptr. 70 (1974) set out a three part test to apply in determining whether collateral estoppel was applicable to bar litigation of an issue in a criminal trial. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.