opposite doctrine in Washington

2025The court in Jones also invalidated a local rule that imposed “a presumption that late-disclosed witnesses will be excluded,” holding that “Burnet and its progeny require the opposite presumption.” Id. at 343 . “[L]ate-disclosed testimony will be admitted absent a willful violation, substantial prejudice to the nonviolating party, and the insufficiency of sanctions less drastic than exclusion.” Id. (emphasis added). 11 No. 39300-3-III Green v. Kootenai Heart Clinics An important part of Jones was never explicitly noted by the majority.

2025The court in Jones also invalidated a local rule that imposed “a presumption that late-disclosed witnesses will be excluded,” holding that “Burnet and its progeny require the opposite presumption.” Id. at 343 . “[L]ate-disclosed testimony will be admitted absent a willful violation, substantial prejudice to the nonviolating party, and the insufficiency of sanctions less drastic than exclusion.” Id. (emphasis added). 11 No. 39300-3-III Green v. Kootenai Heart Clinics An important part of Jones was never explicitly noted by the majority.

2013Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 ; Burnet, 131 Wn.2d at 494 .

2013Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 ; Burnet, 131 Wn.2d at 494 . ¶47 The local rules may not be applied in a manner inconsistent with the civil rules, and they are therefore subordinate to this court’s holding in Burnet.

2013Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 ; Burnet, 131 Wn.2d at 494 .

2013Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 ; Burnet, 131 Wn.2d at 494 . ¶47 The local rules may not be applied in a manner inconsistent with the civil rules, and they are therefore subordinate to this court’s holding in Burnet.

2003More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption. 530 U.S. at 69 .

2003More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption. 530 U.S. at 69 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 .

1999We recognize that we adopted the opposite standard in Wolf v. Boeing Co., 61 Wn.

1999We recognize that we adopted the opposite standard in Wolf v. Boeing Co., 61 Wash.App. 316, 323 , 810 P.2d 943 (plaintiff bears burden of proving inadequate forum), review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1020 , 818 P.2d 1098 (1991), but our decision in Wolf relied on Pratt v. United Arab Shipping Co., 585 F.Supp. 1573 (E.D.La.1984).

1999App. 316, 323 , 810 P.2d 943 (plaintiff hears burden of proving inadequate forum), review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1020 (1991), but our decision in Wolf relied on Pratt v. United Arab Shipping Co., 585 F. Supp. 1573 (E.D.

1999We recognize that we adopted the opposite standard in Wolf v. Boeing Co., 61 Wash.App. 316, 323 , 810 P.2d 943 (plaintiff bears burden of proving inadequate forum), review denied, 117 Wash.2d 1020 , 818 P.2d 1098 (1991), but our decision in Wolf relied on Pratt v. United Arab Shipping Co., 585 F.Supp. 1573 (E.D.La.1984).

2021Rape shield statutes, which make most evidence regarding an alleged victim’s sexual history inadmissible in a rape prosecution, were enacted relatively recently as cultural attitudes shifted toward an acknowledgment that evidence of prior consent to sexual conduct “is usually of little or no probative value in predicting the victim’s consent to sexual conduct on the occasion in question.” State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 9 , 659 P.2d 514 (1983) (explaining that adoption of rape shield statutes nationwide is a “recent trend, reversing years of the opposite rule” (footnote omitted)); see also RCW 9A

2021Rape shield statutes, which make most evidence regarding an alleged victim’s sexual history inadmissible in a rape prosecution, were enacted relatively recently as cultural attitudes shifted toward an acknowledgment that evidence of prior consent to sexual conduct “is usually of little or no probative value in predicting the victim’s consent to sexual conduct on the occasion in question.” State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 9 , 659 P.2d 514 (1983) (explaining that adoption of rape shield statutes nationwide is a “recent trend, reversing years of the opposite rule” (footnote omitted)); see also RCW 9A

2014A party' s disregard of a court order without a reasonable excuse or justification is considered willful. 167 Wn.2d at 584 . 2 Whereas PCLR 26 creates a presumption of exclusion (rebutted by good cause and justice concerns), the Burnet factors create the opposite presumption of admission ( rebutted by evidence of willfulness, prejudice, and the inadequacy of lesser sanctions).

1999Pratt relied on Vaz Borralho v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379 (5th Cir.1983).

1997Thus, a tax exemption, statute that creates "doubt or ambiguity” must "be construed strictly, though fairly and in keeping with the ordinary meaning of [its] language, against the taxpayer.” Group Health Coop, of Puget Sound, Inc. v. Washington State Tax Comm’n, 72 Wn.2d 422 , 429, 433 P.2d 201 (1967).

1997Thus, a tax exemption, statute that creates "doubt or ambiguity” must "be construed strictly, though fairly and in keeping with the ordinary meaning of [its] language, against the taxpayer.” Group Health Coop, of Puget Sound, Inc. v. Washington State Tax Comm’n, 72 Wn.2d 422 , 429, 433 P.2d 201 (1967).

1997The State next argues the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that certain facts, including the property’s highest and best use, are not proper considerations in the larger parcel test. 2 The State’s proposed instruction is the opposite of an instruction given in a Florida case, Division *381 of Admin., State Dep’t of Transp. v. Jirik, 3 cited in Doolittle, 114 Wn.2d at 98 .

1995The opposite presumption applies under the Bartholomew test: "Only if the rebuttal value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect should the evidence be admitted.” Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 928 (Utter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 643 ) (quoting Bartholomew I, 98 Wn.2d at 198 ).

1995The opposite presumption applies under the Bartholomew test: "Only if the rebuttal value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect should the evidence be admitted.” Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 928 (Utter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 643 ) (quoting Bartholomew I, 98 Wn.2d at 198 ).

1983As stated in State v. Geer, 13 Wn.

1983As stated in State v. Geer, 13 Wn.

1979State v. Robbins, 37 Wn.2d 492 , 224 P.2d 1076 (1950); State v. Johnson, 141 Wash. 324 , 251 P. 589 (1926).

1979State v. Robbins, 37 Wn.2d 492 , 224 P.2d 1076 (1950); State v. Johnson, 141 Wash. 324 , 251 P. 589 (1926).

1979State v. Robbins, 37 Wn.2d 492 , 224 P.2d 1076 (1950); State v. Johnson, 141 Wash. 324 , 251 P. 589 (1926).

1979State v. Robbins, 37 Wn.2d 492 , 224 P.2d 1076 (1950); State v. Johnson, 141 Wash. 324 , 251 P. 589 (1926).

1913Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 ; Dunlap v. Rauch, 24 Wash. 620 , 64 Pac. 807 ; Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292 , 116 Pac. 833 .

1913Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 ; Dunlap v. Rauch, 24 Wash. 620 , 64 Pac. 807 ; Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292 , 116 Pac. 833 .

1913Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 ; Dunlap v. Rauch, 24 Wash. 620 , 64 Pac. 807 ; Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292 , 116 Pac. 833 .

1913Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 ; Dunlap v. Rauch, 24 Wash. 620 , 64 Pac. 807 ; Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292 , 116 Pac. 833 .

1913Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 ; Dunlap v. Rauch, 24 Wash. 620 , 64 Pac. 807 ; Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292 , 116 Pac. 833 .

1913Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 ; Dunlap v. Rauch, 24 Wash. 620 , 64 Pac. 807 ; Davies v. Ball, 64 Wash. 292 , 116 Pac. 833 .

1910In support of the opposite rule, counsel cite In re Sullivan’s Estate, 25 Wash. 430 , 65 Pac. 793 , but the right of an assignee of a claim to administer upon an estate was neither involved nor considered in that case.

1910In support of the opposite rule, counsel cite In re Sullivan’s Estate, 25 Wash. 430 , 65 Pac. 793 , but the right of an assignee of a claim to administer upon an estate was neither involved nor considered in that case.

1909While in Yesler Estate v. Holmes, 39 Wash. 34 , 80 Pac. 851 , the opposite doctrine is announced, the court saying: “On this subject .the court, in substance, instructed the jury that, under our statute, the rightful owner of real property is seized of the same, whether he is in possession of it or not, and that, disseizin can only occur where there is an adverse, and hostile entry; that an entry, to constitute an adverse or hostile entry, must be under a claim of right, made for the purpose of dispossessing the owner; and that an entry on the lands of another, under a mistaken, though honest,

1909While in Yesler Estate v. Holmes, 39 Wash. 34 , 80 Pac. 851 , the opposite doctrine is announced, the court saying: “On this subject .the court, in substance, instructed the jury that, under our statute, the rightful owner of real property is seized of the same, whether he is in possession of it or not, and that, disseizin can only occur where there is an adverse, and hostile entry; that an entry, to constitute an adverse or hostile entry, must be under a claim of right, made for the purpose of dispossessing the owner; and that an entry on the lands of another, under a mistaken, though honest,

1904If the principal and agent are both known, and exclusive credit is given to the latter, the principal will not be liable, although the agent should subsequently fail; for it is competent for the parties to agree to charge one, exonerating the other; and an election, when once made, becomes conclusive and irrevocable.” But the preceding section, 446, states that, “The fact that the agent has contracted in his own name in writing, yet with the assent of his principal, and for his benefit, will not exclude the principal from liability, unless exclusive credit is given to the agent.” And so with a

1903There are some authoriities which hold the opposite rule, notably Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225 ( 23 N. E. 156 , 7 L.

1903There are some authoriities which hold the opposite rule, notably Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225 ( 23 N. E. 156 , 7 L.

1903The cases cited hv the respondent, viz., Collier v. Cowger, 52 Ark. 322 ( 12 S. W. 702 , 6 L.

1902Kirtley v. Spokane County, 20 Wash. 111 ( 54 Pac. 936 ) ; Einseidler v. Whitman County, 22 Wash. 388 ( 60 Pac. 1122 ) ; Commercial Electric, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288 ( 55 Pac. 219 , 72 Am.

1902Kirtley v. Spokane County, 20 Wash. 111 ( 54 Pac. 936 ) ; Einseidler v. Whitman County, 22 Wash. 388 ( 60 Pac. 1122 ) ; Commercial Electric, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288 ( 55 Pac. 219 , 72 Am.

1902Kirtley v. Spokane County, 20 Wash. 111 ( 54 Pac. 936 ) ; Einseidler v. Whitman County, 22 Wash. 388 ( 60 Pac. 1122 ) ; Commercial Electric, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288 ( 55 Pac. 219 , 72 Am.

1902Kirtley v. Spokane County, 20 Wash. 111 ( 54 Pac. 936 ) ; Einseidler v. Whitman County, 22 Wash. 388 ( 60 Pac. 1122 ) ; Commercial Electric, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288 ( 55 Pac. 219 , 72 Am.

1902Kirtley v. Spokane County, 20 Wash. 111 ( 54 Pac. 936 ) ; Einseidler v. Whitman County, 22 Wash. 388 ( 60 Pac. 1122 ) ; Commercial Electric, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288 ( 55 Pac. 219 , 72 Am.