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38 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1838–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Saad v. Elmuzagreen1 sentence2025LLC v. Eskin , 46 Misc 3d 40, 41 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2014), Saad v. Elmuza , 12 Misc 3d 57, 59 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2006). [FN1] The opposite rule would obviously incentivize owners to move tenants around in order to evade legal protections for tenants. | 1 | 1 |
91 Real Estate Associates LLC v. Eskingreen1 sentence2025LLC v. Eskin , 46 Misc 3d 40, 41 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2014), Saad v. Elmuza , 12 Misc 3d 57, 59 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2006). [FN1] The opposite rule would obviously incentivize owners to move tenants around in order to evade legal protections for tenants. | 1 | 1 |
Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLeangreen1 sentence2024As it did on the motion to dismiss, plaintiff again cites to Sabo v Delman ( 3 NY2d 155, 160 [1957]) and its progeny, an old line of cases that are: (1) largely abandoned in this department; (2) severely outdated; and (3) no longer good law (see Cougar Audio, Inc. v Reich, 2000 WL 420546 , at *6 [SDNY Apr. 18, 2000] [calling the Sabo line of cases "puzzling" and noting "there are numerous Appellate Division cases that state precisely the opposite rule"]; see also Papa's-June Music, Inc. v McLean, 921 F Supp 1154, 1160-1161 [SDNY 1996] ["Most courts that have subsequently considered the issue h | 1 | 1 |
Sabo v. Delmangreen1 sentence2024As it did on the motion to dismiss, plaintiff again cites to Sabo v Delman ( 3 NY2d 155, 160 [1957]) and its progeny, an old line of cases that are: (1) largely abandoned in this department; (2) severely outdated; and (3) no longer good law (see Cougar Audio, Inc. v Reich, 2000 WL 420546 , at *6 [SDNY Apr. 18, 2000] [calling the Sabo line of cases "puzzling" and noting "there are numerous Appellate Division cases that state precisely the opposite rule"]; see also Papa's-June Music, Inc. v McLean, 921 F Supp 1154, 1160-1161 [SDNY 1996] ["Most courts that have subsequently considered the issue h | 1 | 1 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen1 sentence2002In fact, the trial court applied the opposite presumption, presuming that grandparental visitation would be in the children’s best interests unless it was shown that the children would be adversely impacted (see, Troxel v Granville, supra at 69). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Behloggreen1 sentence1990(See, People v Behlog, 74 NY2d 237, 240 [1989]; People v Oliver, 1 NY2d 152, 157 [1956].) On the other hand, a change that increases the penalty for criminal conduct may not be applied retroactively, whatever the Legislature’s intent, since such an application would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. | 1 | 1 |
Ayman v. Teachers' Retirement Boardgreen1 sentence1990(See, e.g., Matter of Mulligan v Murphy, 14 NY2d 223, 226 [1964]; Matter of Ayman v Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 9 NY2d 119, 125 [1961].) However, when the Legislature makes a nonprocedural change in a penal provision that is "ameliorative” in nature, that is, when it reduces the punishment for proscribed conduct, the opposite presumption applies: absent a clear expression of intent to the contrary, the change is applied retroactively. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Olivergreen1 sentence1990(See, People v Behlog, 74 NY2d 237, 240 [1989]; People v Oliver, 1 NY2d 152, 157 [1956].) On the other hand, a change that increases the penalty for criminal conduct may not be applied retroactively, whatever the Legislature’s intent, since such an application would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. | 1 | 1 |
Mulligan v. Murphygreen1 sentence1990(See, e.g., Matter of Mulligan v Murphy, 14 NY2d 223, 226 [1964]; Matter of Ayman v Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 9 NY2d 119, 125 [1961].) However, when the Legislature makes a nonprocedural change in a penal provision that is "ameliorative” in nature, that is, when it reduces the punishment for proscribed conduct, the opposite presumption applies: absent a clear expression of intent to the contrary, the change is applied retroactively. | 1 | 1 |
Leone v. Blumgreen1 sentence1981See, however, the discussion at n 11 (infra) respecting the regulations under former 20 CFR 416.1125 (b), (c), (d), (e), which authorized a “presumption” of “in-kind” income in various household arrangements except for an opposite presumption favoring beneficiaries of households in which all members are recipients of some form of public income maintenance, as defined to include SSI, ADC and “[g]eneral assistance provided by State or local governments [e.g., home relief]” (20 CFR 416.1125 [b] [6] [iv] [$r]; see Matter of Leone v Blum, 73 AD2d 252, 266-268 ). . | 1 | 1 |
| Boynton v. . Hatchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hixon v. Cupp
green
2 sentences1899The learned counsel for the appellant, while conceding that he has been unable to find any precedent in this state for the maintenance of this action, cites in favor of his contention Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okl. 545 , 49 Pac. 927 . 1899The learned counsel for the appellant, while conceding that he has been unable to find any precedent in this state for the maintenance of this action, cites in favor of his contention Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okl. 545 , 49 Pac. 927 . | 2 | 1899–1899 |
Field v. Nickerson
green
2 sentences1861In this country, one of the earliest cases on the subject which I have noticed is that of Field v. Nickerson ( 13 Mass., 131 ), which sustains the opposite doctrine. 1861In this country, one of the earliest cases on the subject which I have noticed is that of Field v. Nickerson ( 13 Mass., 131 ), which sustains the opposite doctrine. | 2 | 1861–1861 |
Foley v. Mathias
green
2 sentences2000The fiduciary rules against dual agency, which bar a broker’s simultaneous representation of seller and buyer unless both parties consent, cannot be extended to bar simultaneous representation of several sellers who are rivals for the same customer (Foley v Mathias, 211 Iowa 160, 162 , 233 NW 106, 107 ). 2000The fiduciary rules against dual agency, which bar a broker’s simultaneous representation of seller and buyer unless both parties consent, cannot be extended to bar simultaneous representation of several sellers who are rivals for the same customer (Foley v Mathias, 211 Iowa 160, 162 , 233 NW 106, 107 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Matter of Beggs
green
1 sentence1983This court may not review that decision.” (Matter of Beggs, 67 NY 120 ; emphasis supplied.) A close analysis of this language reveals that rather than standing for the proposition that review is precluded because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, exactly the opposite principle of law is established. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Lauffer v. Easter Star Temple
green
1 sentence1943(Lauffer v. Eastern Star Temple, 210 App. Div. 619 ; Matter of Strope v. Albany Steel and Iron Supply Co., 263 App. Div. 765 .) In this department the right to such relief has been rarely and sparingly granted. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
In re of Hufstutler
neutral
1 sentence1943(Matter of Hufstutler, 220 App. Div. 587 .) The opposite rule prevails in the third and fourth judicial departments. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
People v. Bruno
green
1 sentence1943(Lauffer v. Eastern Star Temple, 210 App. Div. 619 ; Matter of Strope v. Albany Steel and Iron Supply Co., 263 App. Div. 765 .) In this department the right to such relief has been rarely and sparingly granted. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
In re the Estate of Parsons
neutral
1 sentence1939(Matter of Parsons, 143 Misc. 368 ; modfd. as to the point in question, 238 App. Div. 883 .) The surety, nevertheless, argues that the public policy of the State of New York requires that bond premiums should be paid from the trust’s capital account. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
In re the Judicial Settlement of the Account of Boyle
neutral
1 sentence1939(Matter of Boyle, 99 Misc. 418, 420 ; Matter of Shepard, 136 id. 218, 220; Matter of Boyle , 140 id. 523, 526 ; Matter of Brewster, 148 id. 390; Matter of Blake, 156 id. 619, 620; Matter of Frost, 184 App. Div. 702, 704 .) In one case where the court of first instance adopted the opposite principle the Appellate Division reversed. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
In re the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Frost
neutral
1 sentence1939(Matter of Boyle, 99 Misc. 418, 420 ; Matter of Shepard, 136 id. 218, 220; Matter of Boyle , 140 id. 523, 526 ; Matter of Brewster, 148 id. 390; Matter of Blake, 156 id. 619, 620; Matter of Frost, 184 App. Div. 702, 704 .) In one case where the court of first instance adopted the opposite principle the Appellate Division reversed. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
In re White
neutral
1 sentence1939(Matter of Parsons, 143 Misc. 368 ; modfd. as to the point in question, 238 App. Div. 883 .) The surety, nevertheless, argues that the public policy of the State of New York requires that bond premiums should be paid from the trust’s capital account. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Myers v. . Davis
green
1 sentence1924If the action is founded upon a contract which has been assigned by the party thereto, other than a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange, a demand existing against the party thereto or an assignee of the contract at the time of the assignment thereof, and belonging to the defendant, in good faith, before notice of the assignment, must be allowed as a counterclaim to the amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it might have been so allowed against the party, or the assignee, while the contract belonged to him.” In the case of Myers v. Davis ( 22 N. Y. 489 ), Denio, J., said (at p. 493): | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Michigan Savings Bank v. . Millar
neutral
1 sentence1924If the action is founded upon a contract which has been assigned by the party thereto, other than a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange, a demand existing against the party thereto or an assignee of the contract at the time of the assignment thereof, and belonging to the defendant, in good faith, before notice of the assignment, must be allowed as a counterclaim to the amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it might have been so allowed against the party, or the assignee, while the contract belonged to him.” In the case of Myers v. Davis ( 22 N. Y. 489 ), Denio, J., said (at p. 493): | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Michigan Savings Bank v. Millar
neutral
1 sentence1924If the action is founded upon a contract which has been assigned by the party thereto, other than a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange, a demand existing against the party thereto or an assignee of the contract at the time of the assignment thereof, and belonging to the defendant, in good faith, before notice of the assignment, must be allowed as a counterclaim to the amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it might have been so allowed against the party, or the assignee, while the contract belonged to him.” In the case of Myers v. Davis ( 22 N. Y. 489 ), Denio, J., said (at p. 493): | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Vanderzee v. Slingerland
green
1 sentence1914(In re Denton, 137 N. Y. 428 ; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 297 ; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351 ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 47 ; Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227 ; Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N. Y. 472 .)” In three cases cited there are similar words of reference to intermediate life estates, which have been considered; in four cases cited the opposite rule is stated, and in three of them applied. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Mullarky v. . Sullivan green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
People ex rel. Miller v. Elmendorf
green
1 sentence1914Miller v. Elmendorf, 57 App. Div. 340 .) When it is not necessary so to act the opposite rule should and does prevail. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Fowler v. . Ingersoll
neutral
1 sentence1914(In re Denton, 137 N. Y. 428 ; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 297 ; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351 ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 47 ; Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227 ; Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N. Y. 472 .)” In three cases cited there are similar words of reference to intermediate life estates, which have been considered; in four cases cited the opposite rule is stated, and in three of them applied. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
In Re the Judicial Settlement of the Account of Denton
neutral
1 sentence1914(In re Denton, 137 N. Y. 428 ; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 297 ; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351 ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 47 ; Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227 ; Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N. Y. 472 .)” In three cases cited there are similar words of reference to intermediate life estates, which have been considered; in four cases cited the opposite rule is stated, and in three of them applied. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Benson v. . Corbin
green
1 sentence1914(In re Denton, 137 N. Y. 428 ; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 297 ; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351 ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 47 ; Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227 ; Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N. Y. 472 .)” In three cases cited there are similar words of reference to intermediate life estates, which have been considered; in four cases cited the opposite rule is stated, and in three of them applied. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Stokes v. . Weston
green
1 sentence1914(In re Denton, 137 N. Y. 428 ; Washbon v. Cope, 144 N. Y. 297 ; Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351 ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 47 ; Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N. Y. 227 ; Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N. Y. 472 .)” In three cases cited there are similar words of reference to intermediate life estates, which have been considered; in four cases cited the opposite rule is stated, and in three of them applied. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Gray v. . Shepard green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Jerome v. . Queen City Cycle Co. green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Green v. . Green neutral | 1 | 1893–1893 |
| Eckstein v. Frank neutral | 1 | 1893–1893 |
| Martin v. . Kunzmuller green | 1 | 1892–1892 |
| Murray v. Lardner green | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| Murry, Nelson & Co. v. Ocheltree neutral | 1 | 1888–1888 |
| Lindsay v. Jackson & McJimpsey green | 1 | 1881–1881 |
| Smith v. . Felton green | 1 | 1881–1881 |
| Bradley v. . Angel neutral | 1 | 1881–1881 |
| Merchants' Insurance v. Hinman neutral | 1 | 1881–1881 |
| Jackson, ex rel. Smith v. Adams neutral | 1 | 1873–1873 |
| McCaughal v. Ryan neutral | 1 | 1873–1873 |
| Arent v. Squire & Johnson neutral | 1 | 1868–1868 |
| Knapp v. Curtis neutral | 1 | 1868–1868 |
| Logan v. Murray green | 1 | 1867–1867 |
| The People v. . Vilas green | 1 | 1867–1867 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.