opposite presumption in Illinois

2011This notion is contrary to our precedent which instructs us to make the opposite presumption.’ ” Amerman, 396 Ill.

2011This notion is contrary to our precedent which instructs us to make the opposite presumption.' " Amerman, 396 Ill.

1949We held the opposite rule to be the more reasonable one in the case of Bennett v. O’Brien, 37 Ill. 250 , and we are not inclined to depart from that decision.

1912We held the opposite rule to be the more reasonable one in Bennett v. O’Brien, 37 Ill. 250 , and we are not inclined to depart from that decision.

1986It is true, as both Judge Hand and Mr. Justice Holmes recognized, 7 F.2d at 60, 284 U.S. at 394, 52 S. Ct. 189 , that allowing inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials runs the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise.

1975It is true, as both Judge Hand and Mr. Justice Hólmes recognized, 7 F.2d at 60, 284 U.S. at 394, 52 S.Ct. 189 , that allowing inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials runs the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise.

2015In fact, case law is clear that the opposite principle may apply. ¶ 21 Where a party has full contractual discretion to deny an award or bonus, that “does not mean that [the party] is necessarily incapable of abusing that discretion.” Wilson v. Career Education Corp., 729 F.3d 665, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Carrico v. Delp, 141 Ill.

2015In fact, case law is clear that the opposite principle may apply. ¶ 21 Where a party has full contractual discretion to deny an award or bonus, that "does not mean that [the party] is necessarily incapable of abusing that discretion." Wilson v. Career Education Corp., 729 F.3d 665, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Carrico v. Delp, 141 Ill.

2009The Glasper opinion also noted that in People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 , 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987), the supreme court “moved away from the portion of the Zehr holding which stated that the relevant questions should be covered ‘in the course of interrogation on voir dire,’ and that the failure to ask these questions amounts to ‘prejudicial error.’ ” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 197 , quoting People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477-78 , 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1984).

2009The Glasper opinion also noted that in People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 , 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987), the supreme court “moved away from the portion of the Zehr holding which stated that the relevant questions should be covered ‘in the course of interrogation on voir dire,’ and that the failure to ask these questions amounts to ‘prejudicial error.’ ” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 197 , quoting People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477-78 , 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1984).

2001Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d at 478 ; Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 373-74 .

2001Hampton , 165 Ill. 2d at 478 ; Stewart , 123 Ill. 2d at 373-74 .

2001Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d at 478 ; Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 373-74 .

2001Hampton , 165 Ill. 2d at 478 ; Stewart , 123 Ill. 2d at 373-74 .

1993(People v. Dawson (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 278 .) If the rule were otherwise, “ ‘the Government would be entitled to have the jury warned that an acquittal on some counts might undermine a guilty verdict on others— almost the opposite of the standard instruction.’ ” Dawson, 60 Ill. 2d at 281 , quoting United States v. Carbone (2d Cir. 1967), 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 .

1993(People v. Dawson (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 278 .) If the rule were otherwise, “ ‘the Government would be entitled to have the jury warned that an acquittal on some counts might undermine a guilty verdict on others— almost the opposite of the standard instruction.’ ” Dawson, 60 Ill. 2d at 281 , quoting United States v. Carbone (2d Cir. 1967), 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 .

1993(People v. Dawson (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 278 .) If the rule were otherwise, “ ‘the Government would be entitled to have the jury warned that an acquittal on some counts might undermine a guilty verdict on others— almost the opposite of the standard instruction.’ ” Dawson, 60 Ill. 2d at 281 , quoting United States v. Carbone (2d Cir. 1967), 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 .

1993An acquittal on one count of a multicount indictment should not affect a simultaneous conviction. ( People v. Dawson (1975), 60 Ill.2d 278 , 326 N.E.2d 755 .) If the rule were otherwise, "`the Government would be entitled to have the jury warned that an acquittal on some counts might undermine a guilty verdict on others—almost the opposite of the standard instruction.'" Dawson, 60 Ill.2d at 281 , 326 N.E.2d 755 , quoting United States v. Carbone (2d Cir.1967), 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 .

1989According to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883 , an articulable suspicion is something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.'" In United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , the Court specifically held that a 48-hour trip between Miami and Honolulu during the month of July "is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel." ( 490 U.S. at 9 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1586.) But if the additional combination of factors which the Court held

1989According to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883 , an articulable suspicion is something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.'" In United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , the Court specifically held that a 48-hour trip between Miami and Honolulu during the month of July "is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel." ( 490 U.S. at 9 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1586.) But if the additional combination of factors which the Court held

1989According to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883 , an articulable suspicion is something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.'" In United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , the Court specifically held that a 48-hour trip between Miami and Honolulu during the month of July "is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel." ( 490 U.S. at 9 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1586.) But if the additional combination of factors which the Court held

1989According to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883 , an articulable suspicion is something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.'" In United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , the Court specifically held that a 48-hour trip between Miami and Honolulu during the month of July "is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel." ( 490 U.S. at 9 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1586.) But if the additional combination of factors which the Court held

1988This court noted a similar paradox in Cockrum v. Baumgartner (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 193, 202 , which denied a parental claim for damages in a “wrongful birth” action.

1988This court noted a similar paradox in Cockrum v. Baumgartner (1983), 95 Ill.2d 193, 202 , which denied a parental claim for damages in a "wrongful birth" action.

1979(See People v. Mullinax (1979), 67 Ill.

1978Co. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 518 , 202 N.E.2d 512 ), defendants’ argument that the absence of a rate schedule left them without authority to pay plaintiff’s claims would make the opposite presumption regarding the appropriations act.

1978Co. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 518 , 202 N.E.2d 512 ), defendants’ argument that the absence of a rate schedule left them without authority to pay plaintiff’s claims would make the opposite presumption regarding the appropriations act.

1978The lack of such authorities is expected in a situation involving a military or para-military institution such as the police department as an opposite rule could not prevail if the discipline necessarily inherent in such an operation is to be maintained.” 8 Ill.

1978App. 3d 345, 347 , 290 N.E.2d 669, 672 .

1977The majority of the court have failed to follow the opposite rule which was applied in People v. Canaday, 49 Ill. 2d 416 , 275 N.E.2d 356 , and People v. Brown, 36 Ill.

1977The majority of the court have failed to follow the opposite rule which was applied in People v. Canaday, 49 Ill. 2d 416 , 275 N.E.2d 356 , and People v. Brown, 36 Ill.

1977The majority of the court have failed to follow the opposite rule which was applied in People v. Canaday, 49 Ill.2d 416 , 275 N.E.2d 356 , and People v. Brown, 36 Ill.

1977The majority of the court have failed to follow the opposite rule which was applied in People v. Canaday, 49 Ill. 2d 416 , 275 N.E.2d 356 , and People v. Brown, 36 Ill.

1972As stated in Coursey v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1967), 90 Ill.App.2d 31, 43 , 234 N.E.2d 339, 345 , "As a private individual Coursey did not have to submit to the examination, but as a policeman he did not have the privilege of refusing; having refused, he forfeited any right he had to be retained on the police force because his refusal was in conflict with his obligation as a policeman to obey the order of his commanding officer.” Thus, plaintiff’s theory is unavailing.

1972As stated in Coursey v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1967), 90 Ill.App.2d 31, 43 , 234 N.E.2d 339, 345 , "As a private individual Coursey did not have to submit to the examination, but as a policeman he did not have the privilege of refusing; having refused, he forfeited any right he had to be retained on the police force because his refusal was in conflict with his obligation as a policeman to obey the order of his commanding officer.” Thus, plaintiff’s theory is unavailing.

1950The appellee cites the case of Colbert v. Ashland Construction Co. 176 Va. 500 , 11 S.E. 2d 612 , along with several other foreign cases in support of the opposite rule.

1950The appellee cites the case of Colbert v. Ashland Construction Co. 176 Va. 500 , 11 S.E. 2d 612 , along with several other foreign cases in support of the opposite rule.

1941Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 ; Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 329 , 14 Atl. 201 ; Boden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191 , 98 N. W. 701 ; In re Milne’s Appeal, 99 Pa. 483 ; Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593 , 199 S. W. 613 ; In Re Schaefer’s Estate, 53 Cal. App. 493 , 200 Pac. 508 .

1941Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 ; Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 329 , 14 Atl. 201 ; Boden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191 , 98 N. W. 701 ; In re Milne’s Appeal, 99 Pa. 483 ; Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593 , 199 S. W. 613 ; In Re Schaefer’s Estate, 53 Cal. App. 493 , 200 Pac. 508 .

1941Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 ; Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 329 , 14 Atl. 201 ; Boden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191 , 98 N. W. 701 ; In re Milne’s Appeal, 99 Pa. 483 ; Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593 , 199 S. W. 613 ; In Re Schaefer’s Estate, 53 Cal. App. 493 , 200 Pac. 508 .

1941Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 ; Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 329 , 14 Atl. 201 ; Boden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191 , 98 N. W. 701 ; In re Milne’s Appeal, 99 Pa. 483 ; Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593 , 199 S. W. 613 ; In Re Schaefer’s Estate, 53 Cal. App. 493 , 200 Pac. 508 .