opposite rule in California

2025Section 1109, subdivision (e) provides, “Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.” “Thus, while evidence of past domestic violence is presumptively admissible under subdivision (a)(1), subdivision (e) establishes the opposite presumption with respect to acts more than 10 years past.” (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 537 , fn. omitted.) Subdivision (e) does not prohibit evidence of such remote acts.

2025Section 1109, subdivision (e) provides, “Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.” “Thus, while evidence of past domestic violence is presumptively admissible under subdivision (a)(1), subdivision (e) establishes the opposite presumption with respect to acts more than 10 years past.” (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 537 , fn. omitted.) Subdivision (e) does not prohibit evidence of such remote acts.

2015Even if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants—which is the opposite of the standard we actually apply (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 576 )—however, we can at most say that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the prosecution convincingly demonstrated that defendants acted with the necessary specific intent.

2015Even if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants—which is the opposite of the standard we actually apply (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 576 )—however, we can at most say that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the prosecution convincingly demonstrated that defendants acted with the necessary specific intent.

2018In DePaul, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at page 415 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 82 , the court held that "[i]f a trial court wishes to void or cancel the tolling effect of the revocation it must do so expressly." Appellant interprets Leiva' s disapproval of DePaul as creating the opposite rule, that "[t]olling does not extend the end-date of PRCS unless the trial court says so." By contrast, the Attorney General maintains that when Leiva disapproved the DePaul court's conclusion that " 'if probation is reinstated the period of revocation cannot be counted in calculating the expiration date' " ( Leiva, supra, 56

2018In DePaul, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at page 415 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 82 , the court held that "[i]f a trial court wishes to void or cancel the tolling effect of the revocation it must do so expressly." Appellant interprets Leiva' s disapproval of DePaul as creating the opposite rule, that "[t]olling does not extend the end-date of PRCS unless the trial court says so." By contrast, the Attorney General maintains that when Leiva disapproved the DePaul court's conclusion that " 'if probation is reinstated the period of revocation cannot be counted in calculating the expiration date' " ( Leiva, supra, 56

1942The property cannot go to the designated heirs, and the charitable bequest is therefore valid if (a) the testator does not leave surviving him a nephew, niece or nearer heir (Estate of Mautner, 38 Cal.App.2d 521 [ 101 P.2d 520 ]; see Estate of Garthwaite, 131 Cal.App. 321 [ 21 P.2d 465 ] for the opposite rule before the 1937 amendment to section 41), or (b) if he has so framed his will that his nephews, nieces, or nearer heirs would not take what would otherwise be a defeated gift to charity.

1942The property cannot go to the designated heirs, and the charitable bequest is therefore valid if (a) the testator does not leave surviving him a nephew, niece or nearer heir (Estate of Mautner, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 521 [ 101 P. (2d) 520 ]; see Estate of Garthwaite, 131 Cal. App. 321 [ 21 P. (2d) 465 ] for the opposite rule before the 1937 amendment to section 41), or (b) if he has so framed his will that his nephews, nieces, or nearer heirs would not take what would otherwise be a defeated gift to charity.

2024The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” 8 trial court’s original ruling.” (Chango, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1253 .) Chango considered and rejected the appellant’s argument that because the amendment did not “provide that an order denying a renewed motion made pursuant to section 1008, subdivision (b) is not separately appealable,” the amendment “effectively abrogated Tate.” (Id. at p. 1253.) Instead, C

2024When the Legislature amends a statute that has been the subject of judicial construction, changing it only in part, the presumption is that the Legislature intended to leave the law unchanged in the aspects not amended.’ ” (Chango, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1253 .) The court concluded, “the Legislature’s decision not to address the appealability of orders denying renewed motions under section 1008, subdivision (b) suggests the Legislature intended the Tate court’s construction to control.” (Ibid.) Further, Chango stated that, “as the Senate Judiciary Committee observed in its analysis of the

2021(People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323-324 .) But, under Estrada, certain ameliorative statutes are governed by the opposite presumption: “When new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 673 .) The amendment at issue here narrows the scope of the one-year prior prison term sentencing enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) It is generally entitled to retroactive effect under Estrada.

2021(People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323-324 .) But, under Estrada, certain ameliorative statutes are governed by the opposite presumption: “When new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 673 .) The amendment at issue here narrows the scope of the one-year prior prison term sentencing enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) It is generally entitled to retroactive effect under Estrada.

2019(E.g., In re Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) A case now under review by our Supreme Court-the lead case of several dealing with probationary digital search conditions-involves a minor, and the Court of Appeal there struck down the search condition even after articulating the principle that a condition not permitted for an adult may be permitted for a minor. ( In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 , 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 , review granted, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 365 P.3d 343 (2016).) The majority's view here articulates an odd state of affairs t

2019(E.g., In re Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) A case now under review by our Supreme Court-the lead case of several dealing with probationary digital search conditions-involves a minor, and the Court of Appeal there struck down the search condition even after articulating the principle that a condition not permitted for an adult may be permitted for a minor. ( In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 , 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 , review granted, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 365 P.3d 343 (2016).) The majority's view here articulates an odd state of affairs t

2019As we explained in one of Taylor’s recent progeny, it is true that the prosecution benefits from retrial, but the same “may be said about any case that is retried after the jury deadlocks . . . . [T]he high court has recognized that ‘ “a defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just 73 PEOPLE v. RHOADES Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. judgments.” ’ ” (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 356 .) That a rule barring retrial of penalty on jury deadlock wou

2019(E.g., In re Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) A case now under review by our Supreme Court-the lead case of several dealing with probationary digital search conditions-involves a minor, and the Court of Appeal there struck down the search condition even after articulating the principle that a condition not permitted for an adult may be permitted for a minor. ( In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 , 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 , review granted, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 365 P.3d 343 (2016).) The majority's view here articulates an odd state of affairs t

2019(E.g., In re Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) A case now under review by our Supreme Court-the lead case of several dealing with probationary digital search conditions-involves a minor, and the Court of Appeal there struck down the search condition even after articulating the principle that a condition not permitted for an adult may be permitted for a minor. ( In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 , 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 , review granted, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 365 P.3d 343 (2016).) The majority's view here articulates an odd state of affairs t

2016(See generally Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745 , 753–754 (Williams) [protecting even potentially slanderous statements an employer made to the EDD as “absolutely 8 privileged” because an opposite rule would prohibit important communication and expose the speaker to “a risk of liability for libel”].)5 We do not consider Nieto’s references to the CUIAB decision, indicating she was constructively discharged under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1960, which explicitly prevents findings or evidence submitted in a CUIAB proceeding to be used in subsequent legal proceedings.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274 , 281–282.) 3.

2014“We independently review an order granting a nonsuit, evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in his or her favor. [Citations.] ‘Although a judgment of nonsuit must not be reversed if plaintiff’s proof raises nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or conjecture, reversal is warranted if there is “some substance to plaintiff’s evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ . . . .”’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘[i]f there is substantial evidence to support [the plaintiff’s] claim, and if the state of the la

2013“It is not necessary that the contract identify the third party by name as long as such third party can show that it is one of a class of persons for whose benefit it was made. [Citation.] Having found that the subject release agreement does provide for the release of all tortfeasors, including General Motors, it follows that General Motors is among the class of persons for whose benefit the agreement was made and has standing to raise it as a bar to the present action.” (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 444 .) The District would have us apply the opposite ru

2013“It is not necessary that the contract identify the third party by name as long as such third party can show that it is one of a class of persons for whose benefit it was made. [Citation.] Having found that the subject release agreement does provide for the release of all tortfeasors, including General Motors, it follows that General Motors is among the class of persons for whose benefit the agreement was made and has standing to raise it as a bar to the present action.” (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 444 .) The District would have us apply the opposite ru

2011(Rent-A-Center[, supra,] 561 U.S._-_ [ 177 L.Ed.2d 403 , 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778-2779 ].) Sonic[-Calabasas A, Inc.] has not contended that the arbitration agreement delegates responsibility to the arbitrator to decide questions of the agreement’s unconscionability or violation of public policy.

2011(Rent-A-Center[, supra,] 561 U.S._-_ [ 177 L.Ed.2d 403 , 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778-2779 ].) Sonic[-Calabasas A, Inc.] has not contended that the arbitration agreement delegates responsibility to the arbitrator to decide questions of the agreement’s unconscionability or violation of public policy.

2011The opposite presumption applies to procedural arbitrability issues, such as waiver, or satisfaction of conditions precedent to arbitration.” (James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC (Del. 2006) 906 A.2d 76, 79 , citing Howsam, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 83 .) Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 688 , footnote 12, states: “We note that in general, the question whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable or contrary to public policy is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide. [Citation.] Recently, the Supreme Court held, in a case brought in federal court, that

2011The opposite presumption applies to procedural arbitrability issues, such as waiver, or satisfaction of conditions precedent to arbitration.” (James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC (Del. 2006) 906 A.2d 76, 79 , citing Howsam, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 83 .) Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 688 , footnote 12, states: “We note that in general, the question whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable or contrary to public policy is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide. [Citation.] Recently, the Supreme Court held, in a case brought in federal court, that

2011The opposite presumption applies to procedural arbitrability issues, such as waiver, or satisfaction of conditions precedent to arbitration.” (James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC (Del. 2006) 906 A.2d 76, 79 , citing Howsam, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 83 .) Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 688 , footnote 12, states: “We note that in general, the question whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable or contrary to public policy is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide. [Citation.] Recently, the Supreme Court held, in a case brought in federal court, that

2009The courts have already found that the opposite presumption is true: “The police in making investigations of suspected criminal activity are, we surmise, generally completely unaware of any consequences of success in their investigative efforts other than the subsequent criminal prosecution of the suspected offender.” (Governing Board v. Metcalf, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 549 ; see Conservatorship of Susan T, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1017-1018; Dyson v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 718 .) Surely, there is no limit to the conceivable musings of a law enforcement officer rega

2009Thus Marvell cites Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works (1923) 261 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed. 516 , 43 S.Ct. 254 ] (Crown Co.), to illustrate the federal courts’ “long . . . recognition]” of an “ownership standing rule.” But the question in that case was whether an assignee of the patent-in-suit could maintain a claim for preassignment infringement. 8 In *1002 addressing that question, the court reaffirmed the analysis in Moore v. Marsh (1868) 74 U.S. 515 [ 19 L.Ed. 37 ] (Moore), which it described as deciding a question precisely analogous to the one before us: “whether a sale and assignment by a patentee of

2009Thus Marvell cites Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works (1923) 261 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed. 516 , 43 S.Ct. 254 ] (Crown Co.), to illustrate the federal courts’ “long . . . recognition]” of an “ownership standing rule.” But the question in that case was whether an assignee of the patent-in-suit could maintain a claim for preassignment infringement. 8 In *1002 addressing that question, the court reaffirmed the analysis in Moore v. Marsh (1868) 74 U.S. 515 [ 19 L.Ed. 37 ] (Moore), which it described as deciding a question precisely analogous to the one before us: “whether a sale and assignment by a patentee of