opposite rule in Oklahoma

1959Those cases which hold that such legislation is special and local appear to be founded upon better reasoning, but we are committed to the opposite rule which has heretofore been adopted by this court.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the Diehl v. Crump case [ 72 Okl. 108 , 179 P. 5 ] cited in the Key case, supra, it was said: “In Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okl. [715] 720, 147 P. 324 , the question of whether an act establishing a superior court for a single county was a local or special law was presented squarely to this court for determination.

1925In Diehl v. Crump, 72 Okla. 108 , 179 Pac. 4 , this court had under consideration the act of the Legislature creating the superior court of Okfuskee county, and that part of the act creating the court was held not in violation of the Constitution governing local or special legislation, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Kane, in which he uses the following language: “In Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okla. 720 , 147 Pac. 324 , the question of whether an act establishing a superior court for a single county was local or special law was presented squarely to this court for determination.

1959Those cases which hold that such legislation is special and local appear to be founded upon better reasoning, but we are committed to the opposite rule which has heretofore been adopted by this court.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the Diehl v. Crump case [ 72 Okl. 108 , 179 P. 5 ] cited in the Key case, supra, it was said: “In Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okl. [715] 720, 147 P. 324 , the question of whether an act establishing a superior court for a single county was a local or special law was presented squarely to this court for determination.

1925In Diehl v. Crump, 72 Okla. 108 , 179 Pac. 4 , this court had under consideration the act of the Legislature creating the superior court of Okfuskee county, and that part of the act creating the court was held not in violation of the Constitution governing local or special legislation, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Kane, in which he uses the following language: “In Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okla. 720 , 147 Pac. 324 , the question of whether an act establishing a superior court for a single county was local or special law was presented squarely to this court for determination.

1929These two cases relied upon by defendant in error are In re Stire's Will, supra, decided in 1923, and Benson v. Benson, 125 Okla. 151 , 256 P. 912 , decided in 1927.

1929These two cases relied upon by defendant in error are In re Stire's Will, supra, decided in 1923, and Benson v. Benson, 125 Okla. 151 , 256 P. 912 , decided in 1927.

1929The court, in the case of Benson v. Benson, predicated its ruling wholly upon the ease of In re Stire’s Will, supra, and decisions from the courts of California on the question, — quoting from the case of In re Newhall’s Estate (Cal.) 214 Pac. 231 , as follows, to wit: “A finding on conflicting evidence that a holographic will was written entirely by testatrix will not be disturbed on appeal.” In California questions involving the contest of wills in proceedings to probate same, are properly triable before a jury, as a matter of right.

1929The court, in the case of Benson v. Benson, predicated its ruling wholly upon the case of In re Stire's Will, supra, and decisions from the courts of California on the question, — quoting from the case of In re Newhall's Estate (Cal.) 214 P. 231 , as follows, to wit: "A finding on conflicting evidence that a holographic will was written entirely by testatrix will not be disturbed on appeal." In California questions involving the contest of wills in proceedings to probate same, are properly triable before a jury, as a matter of right.

1929He did, however, cite two will cases as authority for the holding, but instead of being in support of the doctrine he announces, the eases, namely: In re Son-segra’s Will, 78 Okla. 213 , 189 Pac. 865 ; In re Mehun-kah’s Will, 78 Okla. 214 , 189 Pac. 867 , expressly announce the opposite rule.

1929He did, however, cite two will cases as authority for the holding, but instead of being in support of the doctrine he announces, the cases, namely: In re Son-se-gra's Will, 78 Okla. 213 , 189 P. 865 ; In re Me-hun-kah's Will, 78 0kla. 214, 189 P. 867 , expressly announce the opposite rule.

1929He did, however, cite two will cases as authority for the holding, but instead of being in support of the doctrine he announces, the eases, namely: In re Son-segra’s Will, 78 Okla. 213 , 189 Pac. 865 ; In re Mehun-kah’s Will, 78 Okla. 214 , 189 Pac. 867 , expressly announce the opposite rule.

1929He did, however, cite two will cases as authority for the holding, but instead of being in support of the doctrine he announces, the cases, namely: In re Son-se-gra's Will, 78 Okla. 213 , 189 P. 865 ; In re Me-hun-kah's Will, 78 0kla. 214, 189 P. 867 , expressly announce the opposite rule.

1929He did, however, cite two will cases as authority for the holding, but instead of being in support of the doctrine he announces, the eases, namely: In re Son-segra’s Will, 78 Okla. 213 , 189 Pac. 865 ; In re Mehun-kah’s Will, 78 Okla. 214 , 189 Pac. 867 , expressly announce the opposite rule.

1929He did, however, cite two will cases as authority for the holding, but instead of being in support of the doctrine he announces, the cases, namely: In re Son-se-gra's Will, 78 Okla. 213 , 189 P. 865 ; In re Me-hun-kah's Will, 78 0kla. 214, 189 P. 867 , expressly announce the opposite rule.

1963The opposite rule heretofore adhered to by this court in City of Kingfisher v. Altizer, 13 Okl. 121 , 74 P. 107 , and other cases of similar import is specifically overruled.” In the body of the opinion we held that in all cases tried subsequent to the issuance of the mandate in that case, the trial court upon timely request therefor, shall have discretionary power to require the plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit to a physical examination.

1963The opposite rule heretofore adhered to by this court in City of Kingfisher v. Altizer, 13 Okl. 121 , 74 P. 107 , and other cases of similar import is specifically overruled.” In the body of the opinion we held that in all cases tried subsequent to the issuance of the mandate in that case, the trial court upon timely request therefor, shall have discretionary power to require the plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit to a physical examination.

1939In the case of Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 P. 240 , it was said: “The states which hold that the grantee in a deed, who takes subject to a mortgage and assumes and agrees to pay the same, is not liable unless his immediate grantor was also liable, are as follows: New York, Kansas, California, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Dakota, North Carolina, and Oregon; and those who hold to the opposite doctrine are North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, Washington, Colorado, Tennessee, Missouri, Utah, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. * * * “We have examined the authorities and

1939In the case of Beardsley v. Stephens, 134 Okla. 243 , 273 P. 240 , it was said: “The states which hold that the grantee in a deed, who takes subject to a mortgage and assumes and agrees to pay the same, is not liable unless his immediate grantor was also liable, are as follows: New York, Kansas, California, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Dakota, North Carolina, and Oregon; and those who hold to the opposite doctrine are North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, Washington, Colorado, Tennessee, Missouri, Utah, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. * * * “We have examined the authorities and

1937In Bland v. Lawyer-Cuff Co., 72 Okla. 128 , 178 P. 885 , in the syllabus. we held: “An acknowledgment by the plaintiff of Satisfaction against one of two defendants sued as joint tort-feasors will not release the other unless such instrument shows that it was intended to have such effect.” In the body of the opinion this further expression is made: “The earlier cases are somewhat committed to the doctrine that a release of one or more joint tort-feasors was a release of all, but this doctrine has been modified and changed by the weight of modern authorities, and our courts and the weight of au

1937In Bland v. Lawyer-Cuff Co., 72 Okla. 128 , 178 P. 885 , in the syllabus. we held: “An acknowledgment by the plaintiff of Satisfaction against one of two defendants sued as joint tort-feasors will not release the other unless such instrument shows that it was intended to have such effect.” In the body of the opinion this further expression is made: “The earlier cases are somewhat committed to the doctrine that a release of one or more joint tort-feasors was a release of all, but this doctrine has been modified and changed by the weight of modern authorities, and our courts and the weight of au

1937In Bland v. Lawyer-Cuff Co., 72 Okla. 128 , 178 P. 885 , in the syllabus. we held: “An acknowledgment by the plaintiff of Satisfaction against one of two defendants sued as joint tort-feasors will not release the other unless such instrument shows that it was intended to have such effect.” In the body of the opinion this further expression is made: “The earlier cases are somewhat committed to the doctrine that a release of one or more joint tort-feasors was a release of all, but this doctrine has been modified and changed by the weight of modern authorities, and our courts and the weight of au

1929In the case of Duffitt & Ramsey v. Robert Crozier, Judge (Kan.) 1 Pac. 69 , the syllabus thereto announced the rule to be: “In cases decided by the Supreme Court, brought on error, when the facts are found by the trial court, and a mandate is sent to that court directing it to render judgment upon the findings for the defendant below, the case is not to be retried by the district-court upon the old facts, nor upon the facts which ought to have been, and might have been, presented on the trial; nor is the court below, after receiving the mandate, authorized to make additional findings, upon the

1929These two cases relied upon by defendant in error are In re Stire's Will, supra, decided in 1923, and Benson v. Benson, 125 Okla. 151 , 256 P. 912 , decided in 1927.

1928In the case of Morey v. Ball, 90 Ind. 450 , the opposite rule, and, to our minds, the one more in keeping with a proper construction of the statute, is promulgated.

1927A. 1915A, 715; Cady v. South Omaha Bank, 46 Neb. 756 , 65 N. W. 906 , and cases in Texas awl South Carolina, all of which appear t~ hold the opposite doctrine to that above stated.

1927A. 1915A, 715; Cady v. South Omaha Bank, 46 Neb. 756 , 65 N. W. 906 , and cases in Texas awl South Carolina, all of which appear t~ hold the opposite doctrine to that above stated.

1926App.) 260 S. W. 324 .