arbitrary and capricious standard in Alabama

2016Therefore, under the TTA, the deference a reviewing body afforded the decision of the fact-finder was equivalent to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review. “[T]he arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review is ‘extremely deferential,’ and ... the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer.... [Wjhere ‘reasonable people could differ as to the wisdom of a hearing officer’s decision[,] .., the decision is not arbitrary.’ ... “ ‘If the decision-maker has “ ‘examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, including

2016Pursuant to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review, this court may ‘disagree with the wisdom of the decision, [but] we may not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer.’ Ex parte Dunn, 962 So.2d at 823-24 .” Bishop State Cmty. Coll. v. Thomas, 13 So.3d 978, 986 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (emphasis added).

2016Pursuant to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review, this court may ‘disagree with the wisdom of the decision, [but] we may not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer.’ Ex parte Dunn, 962 So.2d at 823-24 .” Bishop State Cmty. Coll. v. Thomas, 13 So.3d 978, 986 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (emphasis added).

2016“Pursuant to the arbitrary- and-capricious standard of review, this court may ‘disagree with the wisdom of the decision, [but] we may not substitute our judgment for that of the [decision-maker].’ Ex parte Dunn, 962 So.2d at 823-24.” Bishop State Cmty. Coll. v. Thomas, 13 So.3d 978, 986 (Ala.Civ.App.2008).

2016Because we have applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to teacher-termination appeals arising under the SFA based on its historical application in the fact-finder’s decisions in teacher-termination cases, see Cahalane, 117 So.3d at 366 (collecting cases), and because of what we perceive to be the legislature’s intent that personnel decisions of school boards be given deference to support the legislators stated objective in the SFA of placing control over maintaining a competent teaching force with those boards, we reject [the teacher’s] contention that the declaration in the SFA that th

2015In Ex parte Lambert, 199 So.3d at 768 , our supreme court wrote: “We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review to challenged decisions in teacher-termination cases accords with the legislature’s stated purposes in enacting the SFA: “ ‘[T]he legislature has specifically stated that it intended for the SFA to “[r]estor[e] primary authority and responsibility for maintaining a competent educational workforce” to school boards, § 16-24C-2(2), [Ala.Code 1975,] and further stated that its objective was . to “[e]liminat[e] costly, cumbersome,

2016Because we have applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to teacher-termination appeals arising under the SFA based on its historical application in the fact-finder’s decisions in teacher-termination cases, see Cahalane, 117 So.3d at 366 (collecting cases), and because of what we perceive to be the legislature’s intent that personnel decisions of school boards be given deference to support the legislators stated objective in the SFA of placing control over maintaining a competent teaching force with those boards, we reject [the teacher’s] contention that the declaration in the SFA that th

2014The arbitrary and capricious standard of review is meant to be extremely deferential to the Board’s decision; put another way, a “hearing officer ... [is] required to afford deference to [a] decision of the Board, even if he [or she] would have reached a different result than did the Board.” Cahalane, 117 So.3d at 368 .

2010See Alabama Dep't of Human Res. v. Dye, 921 So.2d 421, 426 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (stating that, although review under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is narrow, a reviewing court may look to see if the agency has an explanation that rationally connects the facts and the decision reached).

2010See Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dye, 921 So.2d 421, 426 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (stating that, although review under the arbitrary- and-capricious standard is narrow, a reviewing court may look to see if the agency has an explanation that rationally connects the facts and the decision reached).

2000See Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.2d 922 (Ala. 1987).

2000See Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.2d 922 (Ala. 1987).

2017Thus, the document -and testimony that Carter attempted to introduce were admissible for multiple'purposes, and it was arbitrary and capricious for the acting president to exclude them. “e. The demotion- constitutes an arbitrary and capricious sanction. “‘Under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review, if-a hearing officer determines that the sanction imposed by an employer is arbitrary and capricious, the hearing officer may remand the matter with instructions to the employer to impose a lesser penalty.’ Ex parte Lambert, [ 199 So.3d 761, 769 ] (Ala. 2015).

2017Our supreme court has explained that “the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review ... applies to hearing officers’ review of employers’ decisions under the SFA.” Ex parte Lambert, 199 So.3d 761, 768 (Ala. 2015). “ ‘[I]t is well established[, however,] that where the issues involve only the application of law to undisputed facts appellate review is de novo.’ ” Ex parte Lambert, 199 So.3d at 765 (quoting Ex parte Soleyn, 33 So.3d 584 , 587 (Ala. 2009)).

2026Calhoun Cmty. Coll. v. Hudson, 200 So. 3d 1175, 1178-79 (Ala. Civ.

2017Bd. of Educ. v. Lambert , 255 So.3d 198 , 206 (Ala. Civ.

2017Ex parte Lambert , 199 So.3d 769 -70 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stuart and Bolin, JJ.)." 255 So.3d at 202 (footnote omitted).

2016Further, the legislature rejected a proposed version of the SFA that expressly established the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. “[A] strong inference is established by the Legislature’s deletion during the legislative process of language in prior versions of the bill.” Ex parte Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., 856 So.2d 834, 840 (Ala.2003).

2016Further, the legislature rejected a proposed version of the SFA that expressly established the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. “[A] strong inference is established by the Legislature’s deletion during the legislative process of language in prior versions of the bill.” Ex parte Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., 856 So.2d 834, 840 (Ala.2003).

2016On March 11, 2016, the hearing officer entered the following order on remand: "This matter has been remanded to the Hearing Officer by the Alabama Supreme Court through the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals to ' "review the sanction imposed against [John] Lambert under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review as that standard of review is articulated in" Ex Parte Lambert , 199 So.3d 761 (Ala.2016).' [ Lambert II , 199 So.3d at 772.] "The pertinent facts are set out in the Supreme Court's opinion referenced above.

2014This court also applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in Cox v. Mobile County Board of School Commissioners, 157 So.3d 897, 899 (Ala.Civ.App.2013).

2013See King v. City of Birmingham, 885 So.2d 802 (Ala.Civ.App.2004).

2010See Alabama Dep't of Human Res. v. Dye, 921 So.2d [421, 426 *9 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) ] (quoting Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d [372, 389 (3d Cir.2004) ] (quoting in turn Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).'" Ex parte Dunn, 962 So.2d 814, 816-17 (Ala.2007) (quoting with approval, but reversing on other grounds, Board of Sch.

2010See Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dye, 921 So.2d [421, 426 (AIa.Civ.App.2005) ] (quoting Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d [372, 389 (3d Cir.2004) ] (quoting in turn Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).’ ” Ex parte Dunn, 962 So.2d 814, 816-17 (Ala.2007) (quoting with approval, but reversing on other grounds, Board of Sch.

2010See T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So.2d 669 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (declining to consider issue that circuit court used inappropriate standard for modifying custody when father failed to present argument to circuit court and raised issue for first time on appeal).