arbitrary and capricious standard in Wisconsin

2006Clearly, under this standard, the ALJ had a rational basis for his determination. [1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. [2] See also City of La Crosse v. DNR, 120 Wis. 2d 168, 179 , 353 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1984) ("We are not bound by an agency's conclusions on matters of law."). [3] See, e.g., Am.

2006Clearly, under this standard, the ALJ had a rational basis for his determination. [1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. [2] See also City of La Crosse v. DNR, 120 Wis. 2d 168, 179 , 353 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1984) ("We are not bound by an agency's conclusions on matters of law."). [3] See, e.g., Am.

1984Arbitrary action is the result of an unconsidered, wilful and irrational choice of conduct and not the result of the ‘winnowing and sifting’ process.” In Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 476-77 , 238 N.W. 2d 695 (1976), we alluded to a distinction between a substantial evidence test and an arbitrary and capricious test.

1984Arbitrary action is the result of an unconsidered, wilful and irrational choice of conduct and not the result of the ‘winnowing and sifting’ process.” In Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 476-77 , 238 N.W. 2d 695 (1976), we alluded to a distinction between a substantial evidence test and an arbitrary and capricious test.

2015See Wis. Environmental Decade v. Public Service Comm'n, 93 Wis. 2d *618 650, 659, 287 N.W.2d 737 (1980) (determining that an order denying a petition for an investigation did not qualify as an administrative decision for purposes of judicial review under Wis. Stat. Chap. 227); Tyler v. State Dep't. of Public Welfare, 19 Wis. 2d 166 , 119 N.W.2d 460 (1963) (holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole); and Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Public Service Comm'n, 205 Wis. 2d. 60, 555 N.W.2d 179 (1996) (r

2008Halpin, 962 F.2d at 688 ; Nelson, 421 F.Supp.2d at 572 . ¶ 73 Having established that we must apply the arbitrary and capricious standard to Touchpoint's decision denying benefits, I shall apply that standard.

2008Halpin v. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111 ).

1991Berry v. Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985).

1991See, e.g., Bance v. Alaska Carpenters Retirement Plan, 829 F.2d 820, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1987) (benefits denied based on an interpretation of the plan); LeFebre v. Westinghouse Elec.

1985(Emphasis supplied.) Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference, etc., 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1983), provides a statement of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review that is particularly applicable to the present cases.

1985That court explained what kinds of acts by trustees may be found to be arbitrary and capricious: “Where the trustees of a plan [under ERISA] impose a standard not required by the plan’s provisions, or interpret the plan in a manner inconsistent with its plain words, or by their interpretation render some provisions of the plan superfluous, their actions may well be found to be arbitrary and capricious.” Miles, 698 F.2d at 599.

1983The arbitrary and capricious standard is described in Olson v. Rothwell, 28 Wis. 2d 233, 239 , 137 N.W.2d 86, 89 (1965) (citation omitted), as follows: Arbitrary or capricious action on the part of an administrative agency occurs when it can be said that such action is unreasonable or does not have a rational basis.

1983The arbitrary and capricious standard is described in Olson v. Rothwell, 28 Wis. 2d 233, 239 , 137 N.W.2d 86, 89 (1965) (citation omitted), as follows: Arbitrary or capricious action on the part of an administrative agency occurs when it can be said that such action is unreasonable or does not have a rational basis.

1983Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843 (1973) (dictum).

1983Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 216 , 208 N.W.2d 839, 843 (1973) (dictum).

1979We conclude that the standard of review employed by the Federal District Court in Homeowners is incompatible with that created by WED III which held: The arbitrary and capricious standard of review . . . gives too much room for the exercise of discretion by the agency. . . . [Section 1.11(2) (c)] contemplates the exercise of judgment by the agency, but that judgment must be reasonably exercised within the limits imposed by the Act. 79 Wis.2d 409, 423-24 , 256 N.W.2d 149, 157 (emphasis added).

1979We conclude that the standard of review employed by the Federal District Court in Homeowners is incompatible with that created by WED III which held: The arbitrary and capricious standard of review . . . gives too much room for the exercise of discretion by the agency. . . . [Section 1.11(2) (c)] contemplates the exercise of judgment by the agency, but that judgment must be reasonably exercised within the limits imposed by the Act. 79 Wis.2d 409, 423-24 , 256 N.W.2d 149, 157 (emphasis added).

1977In Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1248, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court had erred in applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, and explained the reasonableness standard as follows: *422 “We are persuaded . . . that the administrative decision was not one of discretion such as administrative agencies have in innumerable matters and which is referred to in the general terms of sec. 706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. sec. 706 (2) (A) [setting forth the ‘arbitrary