arbitrary and capricious standard (Rhode Island) · Go Syfert
← Rhode Island issues

arbitrary and capricious standard in Rhode Island

17 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Canario v. Culhanegreen
ri · 2000 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2019
2 sentences

2019III Review on Certiorari of the Plan Administrator's Decision Pursuant to what we indicated at oral argument, we now reinstate and grant plaintiff's original petition for a writ of certiorari-originally denied without prejudice by this Court on June 12, 2015-and proceed to review the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits. 5 A Standard of Review This Court "review[s] a pension administrator's interpretation of a pension plan that is governed by federal law under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard-provided the plan accords the administrator discretionary authority to

2003Id. at 115 , 109 S.Ct. at 956-57 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 95 ; see Mullaney v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 103 F.Supp.2d 486, 490 (D.R.I.2000); Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 919 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.R.I.1996); cf. Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 479 (R.I.2000) (holding that the Superior Court correctly applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to an administrator’s denial of a disability pension to a police officer).

22
Goncalves v. NMU Pension Trustgreen
ri · 2003 · cited in 12 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2019
2 sentences

2019III Review on Certiorari of the Plan Administrator's Decision Pursuant to what we indicated at oral argument, we now reinstate and grant plaintiff's original petition for a writ of certiorari-originally denied without prejudice by this Court on June 12, 2015-and proceed to review the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits. 5 A Standard of Review This Court "review[s] a pension administrator's interpretation of a pension plan that is governed by federal law under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard-provided the plan accords the administrator discretionary authority to

2019Moreover, the decision notes that "unlike 'administrative employees,' probate judges, acting probate judges and assistant solicitors do not have set working hours, do not participate in any Town-provided health coverage, do not get holiday pay or overtime, and do not have vacation, sick or any other leave." "Use of the arbitrary and capricious standard means that reviewing courts will uphold administrative decisions interpreting the plan as long as the administrative interpreters have acted within their authority to make such decisions and their decisions were rational, logical, and supported

112
Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen
rid · 1996 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2007
2 sentences

2007This Court may not find that an administrative agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious "when it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for a particular outcome." Id. (quoting Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. , 919 F. Supp. 573 , 580 (D.R.I. 1996)).

2003Id. at 115 , 109 S.Ct. at 956-57 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 95 ; see Mullaney v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 103 F.Supp.2d 486, 490 (D.R.I.2000); Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 919 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.R.I.1996); cf. Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 479 (R.I.2000) (holding that the Superior Court correctly applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to an administrator’s denial of a disability pension to a police officer).

12
cluster 522950green
ca8 · 1989 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003In this case, we hold, the motion justice correctly employed the arbitrary- and-capricious standard of review because the pension plan also provided in section 18.30 that the trustees were to be “the sole judge * * * [of] the application and interpretation of this Plan.” The arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review applies when, as here, the administrators have been granted broad discretionary power to interpret the substantive provisions of the *684 plan, even though the plan does not explicitly use the word “discretion.” See Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir.1989).

11
Mullaney v. Aetna U.S. Healthcaregreen
rid · 2000 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003Id. at 115 , 109 S.Ct. at 956-57 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 95 ; see Mullaney v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 103 F.Supp.2d 486, 490 (D.R.I.2000); Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 919 F.Supp. 573, 580 (D.R.I.1996); cf. Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 479 (R.I.2000) (holding that the Superior Court correctly applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to an administrator’s denial of a disability pension to a police officer).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Insurance green
ca1 · 1998
2 sentences

2007"Use of the arbitrary and capricious standard means that reviewing courts will uphold administrative decisions . . . as long as the administrative interpreters have acted within their authority to make such decisions and their decisions were rational, logical, and supported by substantial evidence." Goncalves v. NMU Pension Trust , 818 A.2d 678 , 682-683 (citing Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. , 144 F.3d 181 , 184 (1st Cir. 1998)).

2007"Use of the arbitrary and capricious standard means that reviewing courts will uphold administrative decisions . . . as long as the administrative interpreters have acted within their authority to make such decisions and their decisions were rational, logical, and supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing Doyle , 144 F.3d at 184 ).

92003–2019
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch green
scotus · 1989
2 sentences

2019III Review on Certiorari of the Plan Administrator's Decision Pursuant to what we indicated at oral argument, we now reinstate and grant plaintiff's original petition for a writ of certiorari-originally denied without prejudice by this Court on June 12, 2015-and proceed to review the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits. 5 A Standard of Review This Court "review[s] a pension administrator's interpretation of a pension plan that is governed by federal law under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard-provided the plan accords the administrator discretionary authority to

2019III Review on Certiorari of the Plan Administrator's Decision Pursuant to what we indicated at oral argument, we now reinstate and grant plaintiff's original petition for a writ of certiorari-originally denied without prejudice by this Court on June 12, 2015-and proceed to review the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits. 5 A Standard of Review This Court "review[s] a pension administrator's interpretation of a pension plan that is governed by federal law under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard-provided the plan accords the administrator discretionary authority to

22003–2019
Grocery v. United States neutral
mdd · 1975
2 sentences

2003Wise v. U.S., 404 F. Supp. 11 (D.

2002Wise v. U.S, 404 F. Supp. 11 (D.

22002–2003
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights green
ri · 1984
1 sentence

2011Mgmt. v. State Labor Relations Bd. , 799 A.2d 274 , 277 (R.I. 2002)) (further citation omitted). "[A]n administrative decision can be vacated if it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the whole record." Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 543 A.2d 1307 , 1309 (R.I. 1988) (citing Newport Shipyard , 484 A.2d 893 .) In addition, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review "means that reviewing courts will uphold administrative decisions . . . as long as the administrative interpreters have acted within their authority to make such

12011–2011
Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles green
ri · 1988
1 sentence

2011Mgmt. v. State Labor Relations Bd. , 799 A.2d 274 , 277 (R.I. 2002)) (further citation omitted). "[A]n administrative decision can be vacated if it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the whole record." Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 543 A.2d 1307 , 1309 (R.I. 1988) (citing Newport Shipyard , 484 A.2d 893 .) In addition, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review "means that reviewing courts will uphold administrative decisions . . . as long as the administrative interpreters have acted within their authority to make such

12011–2011
STATE, DEPT. OF ENV. MGMT. v. Labor Bd. green
ri · 2002
1 sentence

2011Mgmt. v. State Labor Relations Bd. , 799 A.2d 274 , 277 (R.I. 2002)) (further citation omitted). "[A]n administrative decision can be vacated if it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the whole record." Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 543 A.2d 1307 , 1309 (R.I. 1988) (citing Newport Shipyard , 484 A.2d 893 .) In addition, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review "means that reviewing courts will uphold administrative decisions . . . as long as the administrative interpreters have acted within their authority to make such

12011–2011
Sewall v. Zoning Board of Review of Barrington neutral
ri · 1961
2 sentences

2010A zoning board possesses jurisdiction to evaluate the application before it and is required to "prescind[] from wisdom of previous exceptions or variances." Sewall v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Barrington , 93 R.I. 109 , 114 , 172 A.2d 81 , 84 (1961) (appellant's contention that board's denial of application for relief subsequent to prior grants of similar relief constituted an abuse of discretion held to be without merit).

2010A zoning board possesses jurisdiction to evaluate the application before it and is required to "prescind[] from wisdom of previous exceptions or variances." Sewall v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Barrington , 93 R.I. 109 , 114 , 172 A.2d 81 , 84 (1961) (appellant's contention that board's denial of application for relief subsequent to prior grants of similar relief constituted an abuse of discretion held to be without merit).

12010–2010
State v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board green
ri · 1997
1 sentence

2004The Rhode Island Supreme Court has declared that "[a]dministrative fiat and surmise cannot alone sustain an agency's factual findings." State of Rhode Island, Office of the Secretary of State v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board et al., 694 A.2d 24 , 28 (R.I. 1997).

12004–2004
James T. Cross v. United States green
ca4 · 1975
1 sentence

2004Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212 , 1217 n. 8 (4th Cir. 1975).

12004–2004
Donna Cole Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, a Washington Corporation Concept Administrators, Inc., a California Corporation green
ca9 · 1995
1 sentence

2003Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550 (9th Cir.1995).

12003–2003
James Guy, Counterclaim v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, Counterclaim green
ca11 · 1989
1 sentence

2003Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers’ Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37 (11th Cir.1989). 'A legally incorrect interpretation does not automatically signal an abuse of discretion.

12003–2003

Where else courts name it

NY 154 (1973–2026) WA 95 (1976–2026) WY 90 (1989–2024) LA 51 (1987–2026) MS 35 (1991–2024) TX 35 (1990–2025) NJ 35 (1992–2026) CA 34 (1977–2026) AL 25 (2000–2026) MD 25 (1980–2024) MA 19 (1977–2023) IN 18 (1987–2019) KS 17 (1984–2020) RI 17 (2002–2019) IL 16 (1978–2020) WV 14 (1995–2025) MN 13 (1986–2019) MT 11 (1989–2025) WI 10 (1977–2015) MI 9 (1984–2026) AK 8 (1990–1997) UT 8 (1983–2024) HI 8 (2014–2021) TN 7 (2002–2022) NC 6 (1989–2004) NV 6 (2017–2020) NM 6 (1992–2025) FL 5 (1981–2010) CO 4 (1994–1996) DE 3 (1995–2021) VA 3 (1982–2001) PA 3 (1999–2026) OK 3 (2003–2018) AR 2 (1993–2025) OR 2 (2023–2023) OH 2 (1989–1999) VT 2 (2019–2021) SC 2 (1996–2021) ME 2 (1989–2005) ND 2 (2018–2018) KY 2 (1987–1992)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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