18 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Avantgreen2 sentences2001While it may be true that in other cases, see IHSAA v. Vasario, 726 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) and Avant, 650 N.E.2d at 1169 , we have recognized the IHSAA's broad discretion in refusing to *417 grant a student a hardship exception, this discretion is not unreviewable and is subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard upon review. 1996See Avant, supra ; Kriss v. Brown (1979), 180 Ind.App. 594 , 390 N.E.2d 193 . | 2 | 3 |
Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc.green2 sentences1998Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, slip op. at 19 ( quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc. , 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. 1997Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, op. at 233 (quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. | 2 | 3 |
Christine M. Donato v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1998Co. , the court also applied the arbitrary and capricious standard. 19 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1994). 1998Co., the court also applied the arbitrary and capricious standard. 19 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir.1994). | 2 | 2 |
Albert Van Boxel, Cross-Appellee v. The Journal Company Employees' Pension Trust, Crossgreen2 sentences1998See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust , 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, not a point"). 1998See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that “the arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, not a point”). | 2 | 2 |
In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of V.A. (Minor Child), and A.A. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Servicesgreen1 sentence2019In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016). 3 Father cites the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act and applies the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. | 1 | 1 |
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Reyesgreen1 sentence2016See id. (stating voluntary associations may adopt rules “which will control as to all questions of discipline”). 9 There was no evidence suggesting the suspensions constituted fraud, illegality, or an infringement of rights as to the schools, yet the trial court concluded *1236 the schools demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. [24] The trial court also failed to distinguish between the schools and the students and seemed to apply an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to both challenges. | 1 | 1 |
Dayron Bell v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2016Bell v. State, 1 N.E.3d 190, 192 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citation omitted). 7 III. | 1 | 1 |
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Vasariogreen1 sentence2001While it may be true that in other cases, see IHSAA v. Vasario, 726 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) and Avant, 650 N.E.2d at 1169 , we have recognized the IHSAA's broad discretion in refusing to *417 grant a student a hardship exception, this discretion is not unreviewable and is subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard upon review. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg Ex Rel. Carlberg
green
2 sentences2010Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 230-31 . 2010Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 230-31 . | 4 | 2000–2010 |
Pepple v. Parkview Memorial Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Pepple v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc. (1989), Ind., 536 N.E.2d 274 . 1991Pepple v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc. (1989) Ind., 536 N.E.2d 274, 276 . | 3 | 1991–1991 |
Lonnie Patterson v. Caterpillar, Incorporated
green
2 sentences1998Id. 1998Id. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Sickelsmith v. Toolis
green
2 sentences1998Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, slip op. at 19 ( quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc. , 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. 1997Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, op. at 233 (quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Indiana Coal Council, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources
green
2 sentences1998Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, slip op. at 19 ( quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc. , 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. 1997Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, op. at 233 (quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Morfesis v. Department of Housing Preservation & Development of New York
green
2 sentences1998Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, slip op. at 19 ( quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc. , 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. 1997Because the majority would apply essentially the same arbitrary and capricious standard to the IHSAA that it applies to administrative agencies, op. at 233 (quoting Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078 , 110 S.Ct. 1130 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)), and because the IHSAA is a quasi-state actor, prudence and reason favor application of the same standard regardless of whether we are reviewing challenges from students or schools. | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Kriss v. Brown
green
2 sentences1996See Avant, supra ; Kriss v. Brown (1979), 180 Ind.App. 594 , 390 N.E.2d 193 . 1996See Avant, supra ; Kriss v. Brown (1979), 180 Ind.App. 594 , 390 N.E.2d 193 . | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Kennedy v. St. Joseph Memorial Hospital of Kokomo Indiana, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Joseph Memorial Hospital (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 268, 271 , is disapproved to the extent that it permits courts to review a private hospital’s decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard. 1987Joseph Memorial Hosp. (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 268 , an arbitrary and capricious standard of review was freely applied. | 2 | 1987–1989 |
Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Watson
green
1 sentence2016Instead of' analyzing the record to determine whether substantial evidence supported the Review Committee’s decision, see Watson, 938 N.E.2d at 680 , the trial court concluded the ‘plaintiffs “set forth substantial evidence” to support their position, tr. at 310. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews
green
2 sentences1989While this Court has reviewed a public hospital’s decision to deny privileges in the face of a doctor’s claim that excluding him was “arbitrary, discriminatory, [and] unreasonable,” Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews (1949), 227 Ind. 217, 223 , 84 N.E.2d 469, 471 , cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 , 70 S.Ct. 73 , 94 L.Ed. 506 , we have never reviewed a private hospital’s decision under such a standard. 1989While this Court has reviewed a public hospital’s decision to deny privileges in the face of a doctor’s claim that excluding him was “arbitrary, discriminatory, [and] unreasonable,” Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews (1949), 227 Ind. 217, 223 , 84 N.E.2d 469, 471 , cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 , 70 S.Ct. 73 , 94 L.Ed. 506 , we have never reviewed a private hospital’s decision under such a standard. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Affolder v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad
green
1 sentence1989While this Court has reviewed a public hospital’s decision to deny privileges in the face of a doctor’s claim that excluding him was “arbitrary, discriminatory, [and] unreasonable,” Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews (1949), 227 Ind. 217, 223 , 84 N.E.2d 469, 471 , cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 , 70 S.Ct. 73 , 94 L.Ed. 506 , we have never reviewed a private hospital’s decision under such a standard. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Principale v. General Public Utilities Corp.
green
2 sentences1989While this Court has reviewed a public hospital’s decision to deny privileges in the face of a doctor’s claim that excluding him was “arbitrary, discriminatory, [and] unreasonable,” Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews (1949), 227 Ind. 217, 223 , 84 N.E.2d 469, 471 , cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 , 70 S.Ct. 73 , 94 L.Ed. 506 , we have never reviewed a private hospital’s decision under such a standard. 1989While this Court has reviewed a public hospital’s decision to deny privileges in the face of a doctor’s claim that excluding him was “arbitrary, discriminatory, [and] unreasonable,” Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews (1949), 227 Ind. 217, 223 , 84 N.E.2d 469, 471 , cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 , 70 S.Ct. 73 , 94 L.Ed. 506 , we have never reviewed a private hospital’s decision under such a standard. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Fernandez v. Vazquez
green
1 sentence1988In Fernandez et al. v. Vazquez (1981), Fla.App., 397 So.2d 1171 , the Florida court of appeals discussed the continuing erosion of the arbitrary and capricious rule in the United States. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden
green
1 sentence1988In doing just that, the supreme court of Alabama stated, "... in recent times, the necessity of reasonable alienation of commercial building space has become paramount in our everincreasing urban society." Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden (1977), Ala., 350 So.2d 1035, 1039 , reh. denied. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Parkview Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Pepple
green
2 sentences1987On September 4, 1986 the trial court concluded inter alia, that Pepple received every due process right conferred by the medical staff by-laws; that Parkview is a private not-for-profit institution; that review of a private hospital's determination to exclude a physician is limited to an examination of the procedures required by the by-laws; that this Court's decision in Parkview, supra, forecloses review of the substantive issues even under an arbitrary and capricious standard because the records, proceedings, and communications within the peer review committee are privileged and confidential 1987On September 4,1986 the trial court concluded inter alia, that Pepple received every due process right conferred by the medical staff by-laws; that Parkview is a private not-for-profit institution; that review of a private hospital’s determination to exclude a physician is limited to an examination of the procedures required by the by-laws; that this Court’s decision in Parkview, supra, forecloses review of the substantive issues even under an arbitrary and capricious standard because the records, proceedings, and communications within the peer review committee are privileged and confidential; | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.