arbitrary and capricious standard in Massachusetts

2013See, e.g., Caswell v. Licensing Commr. of Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 878 (1983); Yerardi’s Moody St.

2002See Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 878 (1983); Police Commissioner of Boston v. Personnel Administrator, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 360, 363 (1995) (“Where an agency has been granted broad, discretionary authority, the standard of review is error of law or abuse of discretion, measured by the arbitrary and capricious test”).

2004Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Cambridge, 395 Mass. 535, 553 (1985).

2002Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Cambridge, 395 Mass. 535, 553 (1985).

2004New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 466 (1981), Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, it is the plaintiffs “formidable burden of proving the absence of any conceivable ground upon which the regulations can be upheld.” Worcester Sand & Gravel Co. v. Board of Fire Prevention Regulations, 400 Mass. 464, 466 (1987), citing Arthur D.

2002Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, it is the plaintiffs “formidable burden of proving the absence of any conceivable ground upon which the regulations can be upheld.” Worcester Sand & Gravel Co. v. Board of Fire Prevention Regulations, 400 Mass. 464, 466 (1987), citing Arthur D.

2020"A decision is arbitrary or capricious such that it constitutes an abuse of discretion where it 'lacks any rational explanation that reasonable persons might support.' Frawley v. Police Commissioner of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 729 (2016), quoting Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 6 (2002).

2014In cases reviewing the decisions of administrative bodies which, like the parole board, are accorded considerable deference, see Barriere v. Hubbard, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 79, 83 (1999), the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies. 9 See Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 5 (2002); Firearms Records Bureau v. Simkin, 466 Mass, at 179.

2004FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Comm’n of Blackstone, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 681, 684-85 .

2002FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Comm’n of Blackstone, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 681, 684 (1996).

2023Certiorari review "is calibrated to the nature of the action for which review is sought," Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 604 (2017), and thus may involve either the substantial evidence standard or the arbitrary and capricious standard.

2023See id. at 604-605 .

2020"A decision is arbitrary or capricious such that it constitutes an abuse of discretion where it 'lacks any rational explanation that reasonable persons might support.' Frawley v. Police Commissioner of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 729 (2016), quoting Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 6 (2002).

2020"In reviewing the decisions of administrative bodies which, like the parole board, are accorded considerable deference, . . . the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies." Doucette, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 541 (citations omitted).

2015The arbitrary and capricious standard of review “requires only that there be a rational basis for the decision.” Howe v. Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 534 (1985).

2014In cases reviewing the decisions of administrative bodies which, like the parole board, are accorded considerable deference, see Barriere v. Hubbard, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 79, 83 (1999), the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies. 9 See Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 5 (2002); Firearms Records Bureau v. Simkin, 466 Mass, at 179.

2009See Fafard v. Conservation Comm’n of Reading, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 565, 567-68 (1996); T.D.J.

2006Judge Botsford ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision and that the standard of review is “for error of law or abuse of discretion, as measured by the arbitrary and capricious test.” Memorandum and Order, Dec. 8, 2004, at 12, quoting Sierra Club v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Envt’l Mgmt., 439 Mass. 738, 748-49 (2003).

2004New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 466 (1981), Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, it is the plaintiffs “formidable burden of proving the absence of any conceivable ground upon which the regulations can be upheld.” Worcester Sand & Gravel Co. v. Board of Fire Prevention Regulations, 400 Mass. 464, 466 (1987), citing Arthur D.

2002See Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton, 387 Mass. 864, 878 (1983); Police Commissioner of Boston v. Personnel Administrator, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 360, 363 (1995) (“Where an agency has been granted broad, discretionary authority, the standard of review is error of law or abuse of discretion, measured by the arbitrary and capricious test”).

1990In this case, however, the arbitrary and capricious standard was applied below not as a shield to avoid excessive judicial interference (Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 [D.

1989As long as he bases his decision on a legally tenable ground that is not arbitrary or capricious, the commissioner may withhold a license from a person, even if that person is “proper.” 7 Although we have said that the refusal of a mayor to give his statutory approval to a contract because of a pending criminal investigation is suffi *85 dent to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard, see Urban Transp., Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 373 Mass. 693, 698 (1977), the reason or reasons on which the commissioner relied to make his decision have not been established on this record.