arbitrary and capricious standard in New York

2004Co. ( 89 NY2d 214 [1996]), the Court of Appeals determined that stricter scrutiny is required, and the arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable, if arbitration is compulsory pursuant to a statutory mandate (id. at 223).

2003Co. ( 89 NY2d 214 [1996], supra), the Court of Appeals determined that closer judicial scrutiny is required, and the arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable, if arbitration is compulsory pursuant to a statutory mandate (id. at 223).

1994Whether respondent New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) properly invoked its default procedures for determining the base date stabilized rent is subject to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review (see, Matter of Colton v Berman, 21 NY2d 322, 329 ; Matter of Mazel Real Estate v Mirabal, 138 AD2d 600, 601-602 ; Matter of Kraus Mgt. v State of N. Y., Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 137 AD2d 689, 691 ), and the proceeding should have been resolved by Supreme Court.

1991Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, " 'the proper test is whether there is a rational basis for the administrative orders’ ” (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 , 231, quoting from Matter of Colton v Berman, 21 NY2d 322, 329 ).

2013We note that, while petitioner incorrectly invoked the arbitrary and capricious standard of review before Supreme Court, the petition raised a question of substantial evidence and, therefore, should have been transferred to this Court after Supreme Court disposed of the other objections that could have terminated the proceeding (see CPLR 7804 [g]; Matter of Brunner v Bertoni, 91 AD3d 1100 , 1101 n [2012]; Matter of Thibodeau v Northeastern Clinton Cent.

2013We note that, while petitioner incorrectly invoked the arbitrary and capricious standard of review before Supreme Court, the petition raised a question of substantial evidence and, therefore, should have been transferred to this Court after Supreme Court disposed of the other objections that could have terminated the proceeding (see CPLR 7804 [g]; Matter of Brunner v Bertoni, 91 AD3d 1100 , 1101 n [2012]; Matter of Thibodeau v Northeastern Clinton Cent.

2016Initially, we note that the court erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and instead should have determined whether the Records Appeal Officer’s determination “ ‘was affected by an error of law’ ” (Mulgrew v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 87 AD3d 506, 507 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 806 [2012]).

2016Initially, we note that the court erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and instead should have determined whether the Records Appeal Officer’s determination “ ‘was affected by an error of law’ ” (Mulgrew v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 87 AD3d 506, 507 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 806 [2012]).

2016We conclude that the immunities asserted by defendants in support of their motion are applicable to this civil action regardless of whether defendants pursued an erroneous course of action in enforcing the residency policy that resulted, or may have resulted, in a judgment favorable to plaintiff as petitioner in the article 78 proceeding (see Lloyd v Town of Wheatfield, 109 AD2d 1084 , 1084 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 809 [1986]).

2016We conclude that the immunities asserted by defendants in support of their motion are applicable to this civil action regardless of whether defendants pursued an erroneous course of action in enforcing the residency policy that resulted, or may have resulted, in a judgment favorable to plaintiff as petitioner in the article 78 proceeding (see Lloyd v Town of Wheatfield, 109 AD2d 1084 , 1084 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 809 [1986]).

2016We conclude that the immunities asserted by defendants in support of their motion are applicable to this civil action regardless of whether defendants pursued an erroneous course of action in enforcing the residency policy that resulted, or may have resulted, in a judgment favorable to plaintiff as petitioner in the article 78 proceeding (see Lloyd v Town of Wheatfield, 109 AD2d 1084 , 1084 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 809 [1986]).

2016We conclude that the immunities asserted by defendants in support of their motion are applicable to this civil action regardless of whether defendants pursued an erroneous course of action in enforcing the residency policy that resulted, or may have resulted, in a judgment favorable to plaintiff as petitioner in the article 78 proceeding (see Lloyd v Town of Wheatfield, 109 AD2d 1084 , 1084 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 809 [1986]).

2016Initially, we note that the court erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and instead should have determined whether the Records Appeal Officer’s determination “ ‘was affected by an error of law’ ” (Mulgrew v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 87 AD3d 506, 507 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 806 [2012]).

2016Initially, we note that the court erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and instead should have determined whether the Records Appeal Officer’s determination “ ‘was affected by an error of law’ ” (Mulgrew v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 87 AD3d 506, 507 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 806 [2012]).

1998It is this concept which guides our analysis * * * [as to] rationality and record support” (Matter of Jennings v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 90 NY2d 227, 240 , citing Matter of Borenstein v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d 756, 760-761 ).

1997It is this concept which guides our analysis of the Commissioner’s decision for both its rationality and record support (see, Matter of Borenstein v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d 756, 760-761 ).

1981Auth., 24 NY2d 174, 178 ; 1 NY Jur, Administrative Law, § 184).

1979Auth., 24 NY2d 174, 178 ; Matter of Sled Hill Cafe v Hostetter, 22 NY2d 607, 613 .) Thus, in the case at bar, our inquiry is directed to a determination of whether the commission’s designation had a rational basis or, if, as the society contends, it was arbitrary and capricious.

2024The applicable standard of review "is whether the challenged determination 'was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion'" ( Matter of Gorecki v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 201 AD3d 802, 803 , quoting Matter of Gerber v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 129 AD3d 959, 960 ). "'In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court inquires whether the determination under review had a rational basis'" ( Matter of Gibson v Commissioner of the N.Y.

2023"The scope of authority delegated to the [DMV] Commissioner, particularly with regard to licensing, is broad" ( Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 29 NY3d 202, 221 ). 15 NYCRR 136.4(c) provides that "[a]n application for a driver's license may be denied if the applicant has been convicted of a violation of section 125.10, 125.12, 125.13, 125.14, 125.15, 125.20, 125.22, 125.25, 125.26 or 125.27 of the Penal Law arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, or if the applicant has been convicted of a violation of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law where death o

2024Even if the action were to be converted into an article 78 special proceeding in the interest of justice ( see CPLR 103[3]; Matter of Scarano v City of New York , 86 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 901 [2011]), and plaintiff's allegations construed as seeking a review of defendant's determination pursuant to an arbitrary and capricious standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]), the four-month limitations provision (CPLR 217[1]) would still apply ( see Matter of LaSonde v Seabrook , 89 AD3d 132, 139 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024Even if the action were to be converted into an article 78 special proceeding in the interest of justice ( see CPLR 103[3]; Matter of Scarano v City of New York , 86 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 901 [2011]), and plaintiff's allegations construed as seeking a review of defendant's determination pursuant to an arbitrary and capricious standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]), the four-month limitations provision (CPLR 217[1]) would still apply ( see Matter of LaSonde v Seabrook , 89 AD3d 132, 139 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024Even if the action were to be converted into an article 78 special proceeding in the interest of justice ( see CPLR 103[3]; Matter of Scarano v City of New York , 86 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 901 [2011]), and plaintiff's allegations construed as seeking a review of defendant's determination pursuant to an arbitrary and capricious standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]), the four-month limitations provision (CPLR 217[1]) would still apply ( see Matter of LaSonde v Seabrook , 89 AD3d 132, 139 [1st Dept 2011]).

2024Even if the action were to be converted into an article 78 special proceeding in the interest of justice ( see CPLR 103[3]; Matter of Scarano v City of New York , 86 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 901 [2011]), and plaintiff's allegations construed as seeking a review of defendant's determination pursuant to an arbitrary and capricious standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]), the four-month limitations provision (CPLR 217[1]) would still apply ( see Matter of LaSonde v Seabrook , 89 AD3d 132, 139 [1st Dept 2011]).

2021We reject plaintiff's contention that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate before HHS because appellate review was limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard rather than a full review on the merits ( see Johnson v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 2011 WL 13300034 , *3, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 172308 *10-11 [ED NY Apr. 22, 2011, No. 08-CV-5260 (ENV)(LB)]).Indeed, New York courts give preclusive effect to agency determinations confirmed in CPLR article 78 proceedings employing the same highly deferential standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]; Coffey v CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. , 117 A

2021We reject plaintiff's contention that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate before HHS because appellate review was limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard rather than a full review on the merits ( see Johnson v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 2011 WL 13300034 , *3, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 172308 *10-11 [ED NY Apr. 22, 2011, No. 08-CV-5260 (ENV)(LB)]).Indeed, New York courts give preclusive effect to agency determinations confirmed in CPLR article 78 proceedings employing the same highly deferential standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]; Coffey v CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. , 117 A

2021We reject plaintiff's contention that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate before HHS because appellate review was limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard rather than a full review on the merits ( see Johnson v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 2011 WL 13300034 , *3, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 172308 *10-11 [ED NY Apr. 22, 2011, No. 08-CV-5260 (ENV)(LB)]).Indeed, New York courts give preclusive effect to agency determinations confirmed in CPLR article 78 proceedings employing the same highly deferential standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]; Coffey v CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. , 117 A

2021We reject plaintiff's contention that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate before HHS because appellate review was limited to an arbitrary and capricious standard rather than a full review on the merits ( see Johnson v New York City Dept. of Educ. , 2011 WL 13300034 , *3, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 172308 *10-11 [ED NY Apr. 22, 2011, No. 08-CV-5260 (ENV)(LB)]).Indeed, New York courts give preclusive effect to agency determinations confirmed in CPLR article 78 proceedings employing the same highly deferential standard ( see CPLR 7803[3]; Coffey v CRP/Extell Parcel I, L.P. , 117 A