settlement claim in Alabama

1996Millsap v. Williamson , 294 Ala. 634 , 320 So.2d 649 (1975); Langham Small Motors v. Thomas , 390 So.2d 1055 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980).

1996Millsap v. Williamson , 294 Ala. 634 , 320 So.2d 649 (1975); Langham Small Motors v. Thomas , 390 So.2d 1055 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980).

1996Millsap v. Williamson , 294 Ala. 634 , 320 So.2d 649 (1975); Langham Small Motors v. Thomas , 390 So.2d 1055 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980).

1995Millsap v. Williamson, 294 Ala. 634 , 320 So.2d 649 (1975); Langham Small Motors v. Thomas, 390 So.2d 1055 (Ala.Civ.

2005Thus, a settlement of a claim is conclusive of all elements of the claim except those specifically reserved by the parties.' " Nero v. Chastang , 358 So.2d 740 , 743 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) (citations omitted)." Mays v. Julian LeCraw Co. , 807 So.2d 551 , 554 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001).

2001Thus, a settlement of a claim is conclusive of all elements of the claim except those specifically reserved by the parties." Nero v. Chastang , 358 So.2d 740 , 743 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) (citations omitted).

2017Lawler's action in waiting to file an objection until after the July 22, 2016, deadline set by the trial court was consistent with the short-form notice he was sent telling him that he could object to the proposed settlement "by filing a written objection and/or by appearing at the settlement hearing." 6 This Court has explained that due process is fundamentally about fair play, see, e.g., Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler , 547 So.2d 812 , 835 (Ala. 1988) (on application for rehearing), and it would hardly be fair of this Court or comport with notions of due process to punish La

2017Lawler's action in waiting to file an objection until after the July 22, 2016, deadline set by the trial court was consistent with the short-form notice he was sent telling him that he could object to the proposed settlement "by filing a written objection and/or by appearing at the settlement hearing." 6 This Court has explained that due process is fundamentally about fair play, see, e.g., Industrial Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler , 547 So.2d 812 , 835 (Ala. 1988) (on application for rehearing), and it would hardly be fair of this Court or comport with notions of due process to punish La

2005Thus, a settlement of a claim is conclusive of all elements of the claim except those specifically reserved by the parties.' " Nero v. Chastang , 358 So.2d 740 , 743 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) (citations omitted)." Mays v. Julian LeCraw Co. , 807 So.2d 551 , 554 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001).

2003Although the Court in Stone I did not elaborate on this point, the language quoted above indicates that, when an indemnitor has refused to defend the claim and participate in the settlement of that claim, "the indemnitor [in this case, Star] is bound by any good faith reasonable settlement, and the indemnitee [in this case, Stone] need only show potential liability." 796 So.2d at 1090 .

2003Thus, this Court in Stone I meant that, under the general rules of indemnity, Stone was not required to prove its actual liability to the Clines as part of its burden of proof in its indemnification claim and Star is precluded from contesting Stone's liability to the Clines for that settlement. 3 See Stone I , *Page 1078 796 So.2d at 1090 , quoting Watts v. Talladega Fed.

2003In its analysis of whether "the cause of action is the same in both the original proceeding and the present action," 476 So.2d at 102 , the Broughton Court explained that a determination of that issue "`depends on whether the issues in the two suits are the same and whether the same evidence would support a recovery in both suits.'" 476 So.2d at 102 (quoting Dominex, Inc. v. Key , 456 So.2d 1047 , 1054 (Ala. 1984)).

2003In its analysis of whether "the cause of action is the same in both the original proceeding and the present action," 476 So.2d at 102 , the Broughton Court explained that a determination of that issue "`depends on whether the issues in the two suits are the same and whether the same evidence would support a recovery in both suits.'" 476 So.2d at 102 (quoting Dominex, Inc. v. Key , 456 So.2d 1047 , 1054 (Ala. 1984)).

2003In its analysis of whether "the cause of action is the same in both the original proceeding and the present action," 476 So.2d at 102 , the Broughton Court explained that a determination of that issue "`depends on whether the issues in the two suits are the same and whether the same evidence would support a recovery in both suits.'" 476 So.2d at 102 (quoting Dominex, Inc. v. Key , 456 So.2d 1047 , 1054 (Ala. 1984)).

2002In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hall , 643 So.2d 551 (Ala. 1994), we were asked to make Alabama's tort of bad faith failure to settle a claim available to one insurer (as subrogee of its insured) against another insurer; in that case we briefly discussed but refused to address the issue now before us: "The third issue is whether under Alabama law an insurer, as the subrogee of its insured, may bring a claim of bad faith against another insurer.

2001My disagreement with Part III of the opinion, concerning what recognition a pro tanto settlement should be given at trial, is the statement therein that "the choice of how to raise [such] a settlement as a defense rests squarely with the defendant," with the result that "the defendant must be allowed the election of either informing *1104 the jury of the settlement or choosing a postjudgment set-off performed by the trial court." 794 So.2d at 1103 .

1993Miller v. Christopher , 887 F.2d 902 , 906 (9th Cir. 1989) (criticizing Option I and noting that no federal admiralty court had applied it).

1993Although these courts have expressed considerable divergence of opinion, they were virtually unanimous in declining to apply Option I until the Eleventh Circuit refused to recognize a settlement bar to contribution in Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller , 957 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir.), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 484 , 121 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992).

1993Just as "a tortfeasor has no incentive to enter an individual settlement if it will remain vulnerable to suit based on plaintiff's claim," Stanley v. Bertram-Trojan, Inc. , 781 F. Supp. 218 , 222 (S.D.N Y 1991), it would seem to have little more incentive to settle if it were required to remain in the suit, thus incurring further litigation expense.

1993Although these courts have expressed considerable divergence of opinion, they were virtually unanimous in declining to apply Option I until the Eleventh Circuit refused to recognize a settlement bar to contribution in Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller , 957 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir.), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 484 , 121 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992).

1993In Great Lakes Dredge , the third and latest appeal in that litigation, the court framed the issue as "[w]hether, given the pro tanto method adopted in Self , a joint tortfeasor who is forced to bear more than its fair share of an injured party's damages is prohibited by a settlement bar rule from seeking contribution from a settling joint tortfeasor." Id. at 1580 .

1993Although these courts have expressed considerable divergence of opinion, they were virtually unanimous in declining to apply Option I until the Eleventh Circuit refused to recognize a settlement bar to contribution in Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller , 957 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir.), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 484 , 121 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992).

1987Jackson v. Hall, 460 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1984).

1987Jackson v. Hall , 460 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1984).

1986See, Suchta v. Robinett , 596 P.2d 1380 (Wyo. 1979); Brown v. Manchester , 384 A.2d 449 (Me. 1978); Lohman v. Woodruff , 224 Kan. 51 , 578 P.2d 251 (1978); Brazell Bros.

1986See, Suchta v. Robinett , 596 P.2d 1380 (Wyo. 1979); Brown v. Manchester , 384 A.2d 449 (Me. 1978); Lohman v. Woodruff , 224 Kan. 51 , 578 P.2d 251 (1978); Brazell Bros.

1986See, Suchta v. Robinett , 596 P.2d 1380 (Wyo. 1979); Brown v. Manchester , 384 A.2d 449 (Me. 1978); Lohman v. Woodruff , 224 Kan. 51 , 578 P.2d 251 (1978); Brazell Bros.

1947Barker v. Barker, 245 Ala. 346 , 17 So.2d 157 .