settlement claim in Colorado

10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1905–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Harlan v. Industrial Commissiongreen colo · 1968 · cited in 3 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1985–1998 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	2	3
Brofman v. Industrial Commissiongreen colo · 1947 · cited in 2 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1989–1998 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	1	2
Padilla v. Industrial Com'n of Coloradogreen colo · 1985 · cited in 2 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1989–1998 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally "the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award." Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	1	2
In Re Marriage of Duriegreen · 2020 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025See In re Marriage of Durie, 2020 CO 7, ¶ 32 (the moving party bears the burden to demonstrate their entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence).	1	1
Nunn v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.green colo · 2011 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021Although Nunn requires a finding of bad faith before a stipulated judgment may be enforced against the insurer as the measure of damages for a bad faith claim, Nunn, 244 P.3d at 120 (“[W]e have held that a pretrial stipulated judgment cannot be enforced against an insurer in the absence of a determination of bad faith . . . .”), whether an insured has breached an insurance contract is a different question.	1	1
Bertagnolli v. Association of Trial Lawyers Assurancegreen coloctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002In Bertagnolli v. Ass’n of Trial Lawyers Assurance, 934 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.App.1997), a division of this court interpreted a similar indemnity policy, concluding that “[b]y its plain terms, the policy does not impose on insurer a duty to defend; to the contrary, it specifically states that insurer has no such obligation.” The trial court here properly relied on Bertagnolli in concluding that the policies in question did not impose upon American Empire or First State a duty to defend Cotter.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
University of Denver v. Industrial Com'n of Colo. green colo · 1959 2 sentences 1989Also, we had previously held in University of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 138 Colo. 505 , 335 P.2d 292 (1959), that, in the context of workers’ compensation agreements, “parties cannot by private contract abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public policy of the state.” Id. at 509 , 335 P.2d at 294 . 3 Therefore, based upon the purposes, structure, and language of the workers’ compensation statutes, as set forth in the statutes themselves and in our decisions applying those statutes, we ultimately concluded in Padilla that the authority of the Director to reopen cla 1989Also, we had previously held in University of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 138 Colo. 505 , 335 P.2d 292 (1959), that, in the context of workers’ compensation agreements, “parties cannot by private contract abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public policy of the state.” Id. at 509 , 335 P.2d at 294 . 3 Therefore, based upon the purposes, structure, and language of the workers’ compensation statutes, as set forth in the statutes themselves and in our decisions applying those statutes, we ultimately concluded in Padilla that the authority of the Director to reopen cla	2	1985–1989
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission green colo · 1962 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	2	1985–1989
Claim of Brunetti v. Industrial Commission green coloctapp · 1983 2 sentences 2005Employer argues that the holding in Brunetti v. Industrial Commission, 670 P.2d 1246 (Colo.App.1983), compels the conclusion that a claimant’s acceptance of a lump sum implies acceptance of a FAL and therefore constitutes a settlement or waiver of the right to challenge the FAL. 2005Employer argues that the holding in Brunetti v. Industrial Commission, 670 P.2d 1246 (Colo.App.1983), compels the conclusion that a claimant's acceptance of a lump sum implies acceptance of a FAL and therefore constitutes a settlement or waiver of the right to challenge the FAL.	1	2005–2005
Scognamillo v. Olsen green coloctapp · 1990 1 sentence 1995We therefore agree with the trial court that the defendants in this case established an exception to the rule set forth in Scognamillo, supra. *582 Here, Miller stipulated to entry of a judgment for $1.2 million against him, while the passenger’s widow agreed in exchange to enter into a covenant not to execute against the judgment.	1	1995–1995
Woodward v. Molander green colo · 1933 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally "the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award." Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	1	1989–1989
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer & Industrial Commission neutral colo · 1933 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally "the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award." Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	1	1989–1989
Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor neutral colo · 1935 2 sentences 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)). 1989Key among these prior decisions were those recognizing that generally “the settlement of a claim is equivalent to an award.” Id. (citing Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413 , 447 P.2d 1009 (1968); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 151 Colo. 18 , 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Brofman v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 248 , 186 P.2d 584 (1947); Independence Coffee & Spice Co. v. Taylor, 97 Colo. 242 , 48 P.2d 798 (1935); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Sauer, 92 Colo. 565 , 22 P.2d 624 (1933)).	1	1989–1989
Question Submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado Concerning Section 13-50.5-101, C.R.S. 1973 v. Vail Associates, Inc. green colo · 1978 2 sentences 1985Our Supreme Court ruled in In re Question Submitted by U.S. District Court, 196 Colo. 392 , 586 P.2d 224 (1978) that: “[N]o cause of action accrues to a joint tortfeasor until there has been a judgment against him or a settlement of the claim. 1985Our Supreme Court ruled in In re Question Submitted by U.S. District Court, 196 Colo. 392 , 586 P.2d 224 (1978) that: “[N]o cause of action accrues to a joint tortfeasor until there has been a judgment against him or a settlement of the claim.	1	1985–1985
Shapter v. Pillar neutral colo · 1900 1 sentence 1905Dr. Hill, the physician who attended upon plaintiff during this time, after fully stating his physical and mental condition, was asked the following question: “Doctor, I wish you would tell the jury what the fact was, in your judgment; as to whether Mr. Scott, the plaintiff, was or was not able, in the month of April, 1901, to transact business, including such business as the settlement of the claim on account of the damages that he had sustained, if any, by reason of injuries from which he was suffering.” And, over objection, he answered: “I should say he was not.” The rule is settled in this	1	1905–1905

Where else courts name it

TX 82 (1903–2026) CA 76 (1900–2025) NY 51 (1871–2016) IL 44 (1896–2021) FL 31 (1970–2026) OH 30 (1973–2025) MO 30 (1894–2020) DE 27 (1959–2026) AL 25 (1936–2023) GA 23 (1889–2022) PA 23 (1889–2016) IN 22 (1962–2026) LA 20 (1933–2020) NJ 20 (1934–2021) NC 17 (1929–2018) MD 16 (1932–2020) CT 15 (1992–2011) OR 14 (1916–2006) WA 14 (1907–2026) KS 14 (1900–2015) WI 13 (1923–2021) MI 13 (1914–2025) MT 12 (1928–2012) KY 12 (1913–1998) MA 12 (1934–2016) AZ 11 (1935–2020) CO 10 (1905–2025) IA 10 (1889–2014) OK 10 (1923–2013) MN 8 (1962–2008) NM 8 (2000–2025) MS 8 (1970–2025) RI 7 (1937–2025) AK 6 (1989–2022) SC 6 (1942–2026) UT 6 (1929–2017) NE 5 (1912–2009) SD 4 (1976–2016) AR 4 (1886–1994) WV 4 (1985–2021) WY 4 (1979–2025) TN 4 (1954–2014) HI 4 (1999–2011) NV 3 (1963–2011) ME 3 (2017–2017) VA 3 (1992–2009) DC 3 (1980–2025) ID 2 (1894–1994) VT 2 (1861–1989)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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