settlement claim in Oregon

1999The Supreme Court held that telling the jury of the settlement was error, because "in the usual case, it is not proper to inform the jury concerning a plaintiff's remedies or potential remedies against persons who are not parties in the dispute that the jury is to decide, unless that information has independent relevance." Id. at 414 , 851 P.2d 1122 .

1999The Supreme Court held that telling the jury of the settlement was error, because “in the usual case, it is not proper to inform the jury concerning a plaintiffs remedies or potential remedies against persons who are not parties in the dispute that the jury is to decide, unless that information has independent relevance.” Id. at 414 .

2006More than 10 days before the commencement of his action, the plaintiff sent the following written demand to the defendants: “Unless you contact me within ten days and make satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of this claim for personal injury * * * I [will] commence legal proceedings against you * * * to recover full and just compensation * * * together with attorney's fees and court costs pursuant to ORS 20.080.” Id.

1996We disagreed, noting that the correct inquiry was “whether the claimant’s condition and its compensability could have been negotiated before approval of the settlement.” Id. at 73 .

1994The Court of Appeals already has addressed that question, Weems v. American International Adjustment Co., supra, 123 Or App at 88 , and we conclude that it would benefit neither bench nor bar for this court to revisit that substantial evidence issue in this case.

1993Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 747 F.Supp. 618 (D.Or.1990).

1993Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 747 F Supp 618 (D Or 1990).

1984This case is controlled by Seeber v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 30 Or App 233 , 566 P2d 926 (1977).

1984This case is controlled by Seeber v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 30 Or App 233 , 566 P2d 926 (1977).

1979Satisfaction takes place when [the] accord is performed * * Restatement, Contracts § 417, Comment a. at 787-788.” Capps v. Georgia-Pacific, 253 Or 248 , 453 P2d 935 (1969).

1979Satisfaction takes place when [the] accord is performed * * Restatement, Contracts § 417, Comment a. at 787-788.” Capps v. Georgia-Pacific, 253 Or 248 , 453 P2d 935 (1969).

1933Co., — La. — ( 145 So. 304 ), not yet reported [in state report], we held that a life insurance company, in making settlement under the facility of payment clause, was obliged to make a reasonable investigation to determine who is equitably entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy and that if, after such investigation, the company paid one of the claimants in good faith, the settlement would be a bar to an action by any other claimant.

1930With respect to the first proposition presented by defendant, it is proper to observe the holding of this court in a number of instances to the effect that, when a law action is tried to the court without a jury, it is the duty of the court to enter findings of fact upon all material issues, and upon the failure of the court to make such findings upon all material issues the judgment is void: Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Investment Co., 94 Or. 349 ( 184 P. 487 ); Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562 ( 220 P. 155 ).

1930With respect to the first proposition presented by defendant, it is proper to observe the holding of this court in a number of instances to the effect that, when a law action is tried to the court without a jury, it is the duty of the court to enter findings of fact upon all material issues, and upon the failure of the court to make such findings upon all material issues the judgment is void: Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Investment Co., 94 Or. 349 ( 184 P. 487 ); Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562 ( 220 P. 155 ).

1930With respect to the first proposition presented by defendant, it is proper to observe the holding of this court in a number of instances to the effect that, when a law action is tried to the court without a jury, it is the duty of the court to enter findings of fact upon all material issues, and upon the failure of the court to make such findings upon all material issues the judgment is void: Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Investment Co., 94 Or. 349 ( 184 P. 487 ); Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562 ( 220 P. 155 ).

1930With respect to the first proposition presented by defendant, it is proper to observe the holding of this court in a number of instances to the effect that, when a law action is tried to the court without a jury, it is the duty of the court to enter findings of fact upon all material issues, and upon the failure of the court to make such findings upon all material issues the judgment is void: Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Investment Co., 94 Or. 349 ( 184 P. 487 ); Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562 ( 220 P. 155 ).

1925The divorced wife, in her answer to the application, admitted her remarriage, *Page 44 but alleged affirmatively that "the award of $10,000 permanent alimony was based upon loans made by plaintiff to defendant during their married life." On trial the court found, among other things, that, since her marriage with Moore, the divorced wife had contributed not less than $5,000 from her own funds, and that the alimony was "in the nature * * of a settlement of the claim of plaintiff against defendant, and that therefore the said decree should not at this time be modified." The petitioner also cites

1925The divorced wife, in her answer to the application, admitted her remarriage, *Page 44 but alleged affirmatively that "the award of $10,000 permanent alimony was based upon loans made by plaintiff to defendant during their married life." On trial the court found, among other things, that, since her marriage with Moore, the divorced wife had contributed not less than $5,000 from her own funds, and that the alimony was "in the nature * * of a settlement of the claim of plaintiff against defendant, and that therefore the said decree should not at this time be modified." The petitioner also cites

1916A party sui juris, seeking to rescind a compromise agreement, alleged to have been induced by fraud, is not relieved of the obligation to restore the benefits which he has received merely because of his inability to do so, and it is not sufficient, under such circumstances, to offer to set off the amount so obtained against what is claimed from the other party: Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14 ( 91 N. E. 683 , 137 Am.

1916A party sui juris, seeking to rescind a compromise agreement, alleged to have been induced by fraud, is not relieved of the obligation to restore the benefits which he has received merely because of his inability to do so, and it is not sufficient, under such circumstances, to offer to set off the amount so obtained against what is claimed from the other party: Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14 ( 91 N. E. 683 , 137 Am.

1916Before the settlement of a claim by the payment of any sum less than the amount due thereon can be set aside on the ground of fraud, the party receiving the money must rescind the settlement and tender back whatever sum had been paid in effecting the agreement: Bisbee v. Ham, 47 Me. 543 .