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12 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1913–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Orr v. Colemangreen1 sentence1998He relies on the following reasoning contained in Orr v. Coleman, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (1970), a case involving a settlement between the plaintiff and one of two joint tort-feasors: Knowledge by the jury that one of the claimed tortfeasors had paid off certainly could serve no legitimate purpose and could easily give rise to inferences prejudicial to either side. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ohio River Contract Co. v. Pennybacher
neutral
2 sentences1948It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an agreement of compromise is supported by sufficient consideration where it is in settlement of a claim which is unliquidated, or in the settlement of a claim in dispute, or one which is in doubt; ” ^ In Ohio River Contract Co. v. Pennybacher, 168 Ky. 78 , 181 S. W. 946, 947 , with reference to deciding a question that had been compromised, we said: “If appellant’s position be correct, and the judgment should be reversed, there would be nothing to try upon the return of the case to the circuit court, since the settlement would be a bar to the furth 1948It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an agreement of compromise is supported by sufficient consideration where it is in settlement of a claim which is unliquidated, or in the settlement of a claim in dispute, or one which is in doubt; ” ^ In Ohio River Contract Co. v. Pennybacher, 168 Ky. 78 , 181 S. W. 946, 947 , with reference to deciding a question that had been compromised, we said: “If appellant’s position be correct, and the judgment should be reversed, there would be nothing to try upon the return of the case to the circuit court, since the settlement would be a bar to the furth | 2 | 1948–1948 |
Richardson v. Eastland, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990The partial settlement principle stated in Richardson v. Eastland, Inc., Ky., 660 S.W.2d 7 (1983) and Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 885(1) has no application to this case. 1990The partial settlement principle stated in Richardson v. Eastland, Inc., Ky., 660 S.W.2d 7 (1983) and Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 885(1) has no application to this case. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop
green
1 sentence1975It is contended however that Biven v. Charlie’s Hobby Shop, Ky., 500 S.W.2d 597 (1973), modified the rule announced in Kingins v. Hurt, supra. Biven involved the settlement of a claim by means of the execution of a loan receipt which provided that the loan was repayable to the insurer only to the extent and in the event that the claimant should make a recovery from other persons causing or liable for the accident. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Kingins v. Hurt
green
1 sentence1975It is contended however that Biven v. Charlie’s Hobby Shop, Ky., 500 S.W.2d 597 (1973), modified the rule announced in Kingins v. Hurt, supra. Biven involved the settlement of a claim by means of the execution of a loan receipt which provided that the loan was repayable to the insurer only to the extent and in the event that the claimant should make a recovery from other persons causing or liable for the accident. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Cambron v. Co-Operative Distributing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1969Under the decision in Cambron v. Co-operative Distributing Company, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 687 (where the claim of lulling was based on statements by the insurance adjuster that a settlement of the claim would be made when the claimant’s disability could be medically determined), it is exceedingly doubtful that Parrish could prevail in this case even were his testimony given full credence. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Smallwood v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co.
neutral
2 sentences1955Smallwood v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 297 Ky. 202 , 179 S.W.2d 877 ; Landrum v. Louisville & N. R. 1955Smallwood v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 297 Ky. 202 , 179 S.W.2d 877 ; Landrum v. Louisville & N. R. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Nuckols v. Nuckols
neutral
2 sentences1949Litigation is always burdensome, and the courts everywhere look favorably upon the settlement of eases out of court.” In Nuckols v. Nuckols, 293 Ky. 603 , 169 S. W. 2d 828, 829 , it is said: “It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an agreement of compromise is supported by sufficient consideration where it is in settlement of a claim which is unliquidated, or in the settlement of a claim in dispute, or one which is in doubt.” The judgment is reversed with directions to set it aside and to overrule the demurrer to the petition as amended. 1949Litigation is always burdensome, and the courts everywhere look favorably upon the settlement of eases out of court.” In Nuckols v. Nuckols, 293 Ky. 603 , 169 S. W. 2d 828, 829 , it is said: “It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an agreement of compromise is supported by sufficient consideration where it is in settlement of a claim which is unliquidated, or in the settlement of a claim in dispute, or one which is in doubt.” The judgment is reversed with directions to set it aside and to overrule the demurrer to the petition as amended. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
McKnight's Administrator v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1948In dismissing the appeal, we stated, 168 Ky. at page 80 , 181 S. W. at page 947 : *647 “If appellant’s position be correct, and the judgment should be reversed, there would be nothing to try upon the return of the case to the circuit court, since the settlement would be a bar to the further prosecution of the action. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Baker's Adm'x v. Louisville N. R. Co.
green
2 sentences1942Toppass v. Perkins’ Administratrix, 268 Ky. 186 , 104 S. W. (2d) 423 ; Baker’s Administratrix v. Louisville & N. Railroad Company, 287 Ky. 13 , 152 S. W. (2d) 276 . *606 Section 6 of the Statutes authorizes a suit for damages for the tortious death of a person to he prosecuted by his personal representative. 1942Toppass v. Perkins’ Administratrix, 268 Ky. 186 , 104 S. W. (2d) 423 ; Baker’s Administratrix v. Louisville & N. Railroad Company, 287 Ky. 13 , 152 S. W. (2d) 276 . *606 Section 6 of the Statutes authorizes a suit for damages for the tortious death of a person to he prosecuted by his personal representative. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Toppass v. Perkins' Administratrix
green
2 sentences1942Toppass v. Perkins’ Administratrix, 268 Ky. 186 , 104 S. W. (2d) 423 ; Baker’s Administratrix v. Louisville & N. Railroad Company, 287 Ky. 13 , 152 S. W. (2d) 276 . *606 Section 6 of the Statutes authorizes a suit for damages for the tortious death of a person to he prosecuted by his personal representative. 1942Toppass v. Perkins’ Administratrix, 268 Ky. 186 , 104 S. W. (2d) 423 ; Baker’s Administratrix v. Louisville & N. Railroad Company, 287 Ky. 13 , 152 S. W. (2d) 276 . *606 Section 6 of the Statutes authorizes a suit for damages for the tortious death of a person to he prosecuted by his personal representative. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Nepier v. John P. Gorman Coal Company
green
1 sentence1940In.the Napier case, supra, where, as here, there was a settlement made and concluded by the administrator with the alleged tort feasor in advance of the application for a compensation award by the dependents of the deceased employee, the court, in construing section 4890, Workmen’s Compensation Act, said [ 242 Ky. 127 , 45 S. W. (2d) 1066 ]: “It is the purpose, policy, and provision of the law that the wrongdoer shall be liable for the whole damage caused by his wrongful act. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Robb v. Sherrill-Russell Lumber Co.
neutral
2 sentences1929Robb v. Sherrill-Russell Lumber Company, 194 Ky. 835 , 241 S. W. 64 . 1929Robb v. Sherrill-Russell Lumber Company, 194 Ky. 835 , 241 S. W. 64 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
American Surety Co. v. Ballman
neutral
1 sentence1913American Surety Co. v. Ballman, 104 Fed., 634 ; Robb v. Security Trust Co., 121 Fed., 460 ; Wheeler v. Sweet, 137 N. Y., 435 . | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Robb v. Security Trust Co.
neutral
1 sentence1913American Surety Co. v. Ballman, 104 Fed., 634 ; Robb v. Security Trust Co., 121 Fed., 460 ; Wheeler v. Sweet, 137 N. Y., 435 . | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Wheeler v. . Sweet
green
1 sentence1913American Surety Co. v. Ballman, 104 Fed., 634 ; Robb v. Security Trust Co., 121 Fed., 460 ; Wheeler v. Sweet, 137 N. Y., 435 . | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.