13 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Khourigreen2 sentences2017See Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 527-528 ; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). 2017See Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 527-528 ; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Rascop v. Nationwide Carriersgreen2 sentences1992In Rascop v Nationwide Carriers, 281 NW2d 170, 173 (Minn, 1979), the court held that a compensation carrier lost any right to object to a settlement of a claim for loss of consortium because, inter alia, although it received notice of and even objected to the proposed settlement and distribution, it failed to intervene. 1992In Rascop v Nationwide Carriers, 281 NW2d 170, 173 (Minn, 1979), the court held that a compensation carrier lost any right to object to a settlement of a claim for loss of consortium because, inter alia, although it received notice of and even objected to the proposed settlement and distribution, it failed to intervene. | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.green1 sentence1984Rather, the Court stated that it found the settlement was not a bar to the plaintiffs suit because there was "nothing in the record to indicate that Davies had authority from plaintiff to compromise her claim against defendant”, Henderson, supra, p 147 (emphasis added), and not because Davies lacked authority to represent the plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
Cleaver v. Traders' Insurancegreen2 sentences1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 | 1 | 1 |
Walter v. Mutual City & Village Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 | 1 | 1 |
Burnham v. Interstate Casualty Co.green1 sentence1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 | 1 | 1 |
Crystal Ice Co. v. United Surety Co.green2 sentences1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Richmond & Danville Railroadgreen2 sentences1914If this fact is established, it establishes the further fact that he did not receive the money, which was paid him when the paper was signed, in consideration of the settlement of his claim; for the only ground on which the effect of the paper is destroyed is that it was not his intelligent act, but was fraudulently procured by the artifice of the defendant, who knew that he had not made the settlement and had not received a consideration for a settlement.” The court, in Butler v. Railroad Co., 88 Ga. 594, 598, 599 ( 15 S. E. 668 ), states and applies the rule in the following: “It is quite tr 1914If this fact is established, it establishes the further fact that he did not receive the money, which was paid him when the paper was signed, in consideration of the settlement of his claim; for the only ground on which the effect of the paper is destroyed is that it was not his intelligent act, but was fraudulently procured by the artifice of the defendant, who knew that he had not made the settlement and had not received a consideration for a settlement.” The court, in Butler v. Railroad Co., 88 Ga. 594, 598, 599 ( 15 S. E. 668 ), states and applies the rule in the following: “It is quite tr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
v. Town of Ellenburgh
green
2 sentences1976Justice Sharpe’s opinion used this quotation from a New York case, Griffin v Town of Ellenburgh, 171 App Div 713, 715 ; 157 NYS 813 (1916): *102 " 'The purpose of the notice is to fairly apprise the officers of the town of the nature and circumstances of the accident, so that they may investigate the same fully and intelligently and with certainty as to the place and conditions of the accident, so far as the facts are concerned, with a view to making either an appropriate settlement of the claim or an effective and intelligent defense of the action, and if the notice serves that purpose the re 1976Justice Sharpe’s opinion used this quotation from a New York case, Griffin v Town of Ellenburgh, 171 App Div 713, 715 ; 157 NYS 813 (1916): *102 " 'The purpose of the notice is to fairly apprise the officers of the town of the nature and circumstances of the accident, so that they may investigate the same fully and intelligently and with certainty as to the place and conditions of the accident, so far as the facts are concerned, with a view to making either an appropriate settlement of the claim or an effective and intelligent defense of the action, and if the notice serves that purpose the re | 2 | 1948–1976 |
Howard v. Howard
green
1 sentence2025Howard, 134 Mich App at 397 , (which dismissed claims of attorney coercion due to the absence of coercion or collusion or the lack of authority granted to plaintiff’s attorney at the settlement hearing). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mazzola v. Vineyard Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Mazzola v Vineyard Homes, Inc, 54 Mich App 608 ; 221 NW2d 406 (1974). 1993Mazzola v Vineyard Homes, Inc, 54 Mich App 608 ; 221 NW2d 406 (1974). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Verplanck v. . Van Buren
green
1 sentence1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Ross v. Preston
green
2 sentences1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re 1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Ross v. Preston
neutral
1 sentence1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re | 1 | 1985–1985 |
National Cellulose Corporation v. State
neutral
1 sentence1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gould v. Cayuga County National Bank
green
2 sentences1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re 1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the *75 wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree.[16]" "[16] Ross v Preston, 292 NY 433 ; 55 NE2d 490 (1944) (the court saying that in such a case the entry of a judgment is merely an incident of the fraud which has been perpetrated outside the action, and the re | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gorman v. Soble
green
2 sentences1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree. 16 ” In light of this rule, we are unable to distinguish this case from Gorman v Soble, 120 Mich App 831 ; 328 NW2d 119 (1982). 1985As stated in 37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 488, p 676: "It has been held that a judgment or decree entered in accordance with the settlement of a claim does not bar an action for damages resulting from fraud where the wrongdoer fraudulently conceals his wrong from the injured person, who agrees, in ignorance of the wrong, to the settlement and entry of the judgment or decree. 16 ” In light of this rule, we are unable to distinguish this case from Gorman v Soble, 120 Mich App 831 ; 328 NW2d 119 (1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Fink v. Peden
green
1 sentence1951If there be no survivors of the first class, the *424 right is for the benefit of those of the second class, if any, and if none, then for the benefit of those of the third class, but the right when it once accrues does not pass upon the death of those of one class of persons to the next class, since the right given is a statutory one, and the statute does not so provide.” In Fink v. Peden, 214 Ind 584 ( 17 NE2d 95 ), the supreme court of Indiana held that under its death act the funds obtained in a settlement of a claim against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company on account of the death of Ralp | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Knapp v. City of Detroit
green
1 sentence1948In Griffin v. Town of Ellenburgh , 171 App. Div. 713 ( 157 N Y Supp. 813 ), it is said: "The purpose of the notice is to fairly apprise the officers of the town of the nature and circumstances *Page 625 of the accident, so that they may investigate the same fully and intelligently and with certainty as to the place and conditions of the accident, so far as the facts are concerned, with a view to making either an appropriate settlement of the claim or an effective and intelligent defense of the action, and if the notice serves that purpose the requirement of the statute has been effectuated." S | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Hartle v. Keefer's Estate
neutral
1 sentence1933Slack v. Norton , 111 Mich. 213 ; Ashley v. Smith's Estate , 152 Mich. 197 ; In re De Spelder's Estate , 181 Mich. 153 ; In re Day's Estate , 197 Mich. 604 ; Hartle v. Keefer's Estate , 260 Mich. 188 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
West v. Laraway
green
1 sentence1933Dec. 198 ]; West v. Laraway , 28 Mich. 464 ), and she may sue and collect for personal services performed by her; and, in case such services were performed for a person who dies before the settlement of her claim, she may present in her own name a claim against the estate of such deceased person, to get pay for the services performed, independent of any claim her husband *Page 408 may have, under some circumstances, to her services. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Slack v. Norton
green
1 sentence1933Slack v. Norton , 111 Mich. 213 ; Ashley v. Smith's Estate , 152 Mich. 197 ; In re De Spelder's Estate , 181 Mich. 153 ; In re Day's Estate , 197 Mich. 604 ; Hartle v. Keefer's Estate , 260 Mich. 188 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ashley v. Smith's Estate
green
1 sentence1933Slack v. Norton , 111 Mich. 213 ; Ashley v. Smith's Estate , 152 Mich. 197 ; In re De Spelder's Estate , 181 Mich. 153 ; In re Day's Estate , 197 Mich. 604 ; Hartle v. Keefer's Estate , 260 Mich. 188 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Bolthouse v. De Spelder
green
1 sentence1933Slack v. Norton , 111 Mich. 213 ; Ashley v. Smith's Estate , 152 Mich. 197 ; In re De Spelder's Estate , 181 Mich. 153 ; In re Day's Estate , 197 Mich. 604 ; Hartle v. Keefer's Estate , 260 Mich. 188 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Eaton v. Mudge
neutral
1 sentence1933Slack v. Norton , 111 Mich. 213 ; Ashley v. Smith's Estate , 152 Mich. 197 ; In re De Spelder's Estate , 181 Mich. 153 ; In re Day's Estate , 197 Mich. 604 ; Hartle v. Keefer's Estate , 260 Mich. 188 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Christopherson v. Common Council
neutral
1 sentence1917This was the first notice that plaintiff had that defendant was insisting on any such defense.” It is also claimed Mr. Sweeney engaged the services of an attorney to assist in presenting his claim to the company, who, without knowledge of the defense upon which they were relying, negotiated with defendant company for nearly six months, seeking to adjust and obtain a settlement of the claim; that much time with considerable expense to Mr. Sweeney resulted, and all this is evidence of a waiver, citing Burnham v. Casualty Co., 117 Mich. 142, 154, 155 ( 75 N. W. 445 ); Walter v. Insurance Co., 120 | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.