settlement claim in Washington

2015The supreme court explained the selective tender rule in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. USF Insurance Company.106 The "selective tender" rule stands for the proposition that when an insured has not tendered a claim to an insurer, the insurer is excused from its duty to contribute to a settlement of the claim.107 This rule "preserves the insured's right to invoke or not to invoke the terms of its insurance contracts," as "[a]n insured may choose not to tender a claim to its insurer for a variety of reasons."108 The supreme court relied on Casualty Indemnity Exchange Insurance Co. v. Libert

2008That rule states that where an insured has not tendered a claim to an insurer, that insurer is excused from its duty to contribute to a settlement of the claim. 8 Casualty, 902 F. Supp. at 1239 . ¶17 We agree with USF that this rule has sound policy underpinnings.

2001Sanders, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I substantially agree with the majority’s disposition of the case subject, however, to two significant exceptions: (1) I would hold, as a matter of law, an insurer who sleeps on its right to buy out a claim cannot later show it has been prejudiced by a settlement of that claim; and (2), given that the insureds have prevailed on a coverage issue, I would hold the insureds are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 117 Wn.2d 37, 52-53 , 811 P.2d 673 (1991).

2001Sanders, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I substantially agree with the majority’s disposition of the case subject, however, to two significant exceptions: (1) I would hold, as a matter of law, an insurer who sleeps on its right to buy out a claim cannot later show it has been prejudiced by a settlement of that claim; and (2), given that the insureds have prevailed on a coverage issue, I would hold the insureds are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 117 Wn.2d 37, 52-53 , 811 P.2d 673 (1991).

2026In Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. T&G Construction, Inc., 165 Wn.2d 255 , 259, 199 P.3d 376 (2008), the liability insurer believed “its insured should have prevailed on an affirmative defense,” and while the judge in the underlying case “rejected the proffered affirmative defense several times,” the insurer continued to argue that it was not required to cover a settlement where the defense “was never litigated to absolute finality.” And Stewart Title implied that the insured defendant preferred a swift, reasonable settlement over the liability insurer’s interest in pursuing a potential de

2026In Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. T&G Construction, Inc., 165 Wn.2d 255 , 259, 199 P.3d 376 (2008), the liability insurer believed “its insured should have prevailed on an affirmative defense,” and while the judge in the underlying case “rejected the proffered affirmative defense several times,” the insurer continued to argue that it was not required to cover a settlement where the defense “was never litigated to absolute finality.” And Stewart Title implied that the insured defendant preferred a swift, reasonable settlement over the liability insurer’s interest in pursuing a potential de

2026In Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. T&G Construction, Inc., 165 Wn.2d 255 , 259, 199 P.3d 376 (2008), the liability insurer believed “its insured should have prevailed on an affirmative defense,” and while the judge in the underlying case “rejected the proffered affirmative defense several times,” the insurer continued to argue that it was not required to cover a settlement where the defense “was never litigated to absolute finality.” And Stewart Title implied that the insured defendant preferred a swift, reasonable settlement over the liability insurer’s interest in pursuing a potential de

2017Chaussee, 60 Wn.

2015The supreme court explained the selective tender rule in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. USF Insurance Company.106 The "selective tender" rule stands for the proposition that when an insured has not tendered a claim to an insurer, the insurer is excused from its duty to contribute to a settlement of the claim.107 This rule "preserves the insured's right to invoke or not to invoke the terms of its insurance contracts," as "[a]n insured may choose not to tender a claim to its insurer for a variety of reasons."108 The supreme court relied on Casualty Indemnity Exchange Insurance Co. v. Libert

2014See CR 23( c); Aguirre v. AT &T Wireless Servs., 109 Wn.

2012The appeal is not “so totally devoid of merit that there was no reasonable possibility of reversal.” Streater v. White, 26 Wn.

1994App. 833, 841 , 854 P.2d 642 (1993) (noting that the settlement hearing ended in a final judgment and that Mrs. Barr was a party to the earlier proceeding).

1994App. 833, 841 , 854 P.2d 642 (1993) (noting that the settlement hearing ended in a final judgment and that Mrs. Barr was a party to the earlier proceeding).

1954Even if this release be considered as a bad bargain, we must apply the rule followed in this state that parties who are competent to contract will not be relieved from a bad bargain they make unless the consideration is so inadequate as to be constructively fraudulent (Howland v. Day, 125 Wash. 480 , 216 Pac. 864 ).

1954Even if this release be considered as a bad bargain, we must apply the rule followed in this state that parties who are competent to contract will not be relieved from a bad bargain they make unless the consideration is so inadequate as to be constructively fraudulent (Howland v. Day, 125 Wash. 480 , 216 Pac. 864 ).

1907It is not alleged in the answer, nor is it now claimed, that there was any settlement or agreement of settlement of the controversy between the parties to this action, but appellant maintains that the legal .effect of the dismissal by stipulation amounts to a settlement and bar to further prosecution, and cites Merritt v. Campbell, 47 Cal. 542 , and Phillpotts v. Blasdel, 10 Nev. 19 , in support of that contention.

1907It is not alleged in the answer, nor is it now claimed, that there was any settlement or agreement of settlement of the controversy between the parties to this action, but appellant maintains that the legal .effect of the dismissal by stipulation amounts to a settlement and bar to further prosecution, and cites Merritt v. Campbell, 47 Cal. 542 , and Phillpotts v. Blasdel, 10 Nev. 19 , in support of that contention.