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8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ellen Jones, Leo P. Portnoy, Applicant-In-Intervention-Appellant v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, and Robert Lee Sanchezgreen2 sentences2007Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 325 (3d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of discovery in part because the objector had the opportunity to examine discovery of the parties but failed to do so); Jones, 741 F.2d at 325 ("The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process."); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that discovery and cross-examination were properly denied when objectors 2007Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 325 (3d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of discovery in part because the objector had the opportunity to examine discovery of the parties but failed to do so); Jones, 741 F.2d at 325 (“The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process.”); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that discovery and cross-examination were properly denied when objectors | 3 | 3 |
Rille v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPgreen2 sentences2025There is no language expressing 10 the intent of the Legislature to restrict the relator’s proceeds to a preinvestigatory or 11 pre-alternate-remedy state.10 The retroactive application of Bledsoe ignores the 10 The Court of Appeals quotes the Eighth Circuit’s discussion in Rille that recovery under the FCA is limited to “‘the proceeds of the settlement of the claim brought by the [qui tam plaintiffs], and only that claim.’” Galloway, A-1-CA-38974, mem. op. ¶ 24 (quoting Rille, 803 F.3d at 374 ). 2025The relator’s right to proceed means they may 10The Court of Appeals quotes the Eighth Circuit’s discussion in Rille that recovery under the FCA is limited to “‘the proceeds of the settlement of the claim brought by the [qui tam plaintiffs], and only that claim.’” Galloway, A-1-CA-38974, mem. op. ¶ 24 (quoting Rille, 803 F.3d at 374 ). | 2 | 2 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,755, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,074 William B. Weinberger v. James C. Kendrick, Charles M. Coynegreen2 sentences2007Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 325 (3d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of discovery in part because the objector had the opportunity to examine discovery of the parties but failed to do so); Jones, 741 F.2d at 325 ("The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process."); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that discovery and cross-examination were properly denied when objectors 2007Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 325 (3d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of discovery in part because the objector had the opportunity to examine discovery of the parties but failed to do so); Jones, 741 F.2d at 325 (“The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process.”); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that discovery and cross-examination were properly denied when objectors | 2 | 2 |
In Re: The Prudential Insurance Company Of America Sales Practices Litigationgreen2 sentences2007Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 325 (3d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of discovery in part because the objector had the opportunity to examine discovery of the parties but failed to do so); Jones, 741 F.2d at 325 ("The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process."); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that discovery and cross-examination were properly denied when objectors 2007Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 325 (3d Cir.1998) (upholding denial of discovery in part because the objector had the opportunity to examine discovery of the parties but failed to do so); Jones, 741 F.2d at 325 (“The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process.”); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that discovery and cross-examination were properly denied when objectors | 2 | 2 |
Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc.green2 sentences2007Co., 559 F.2d 426, 429-30 (5th Cir.1977) (concluding sufficient notice was given when "[t]here were almost four weeks between the mailing . . . and the settlement hearing"); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.1977) (concluding notice was "more than adequate" when there were twenty-six days between the mailing and the deadline for opting out). {19} Second, Appellants complain that the notice of settlement had a chilling effect on objections by requiring represented class members to successfully move for intervention before objecting at the fairness hearing. 2007Co., 559 F.2d 426, 429-30 (5th Cir.1977) (concluding sufficient notice was given when “[tjhere were almost four weeks between the mailing ... and the settlement hearing”); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.1977) (concluding notice was “more than adequate” when there were twenty-six days between the mailing and the deadline for opting out). {19} Second, Appellants complain that the notice of settlement had a chilling effect on objections by requiring represented class members to successfully move for intervention before objecting at the fairness hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Norman P. Miller and Kenneth Rubenstein v. Republic National Life Insurance Company v. Sy C. Sussman and Ruth L. Sussman, Movants-Appellantsgreen2 sentences2007Co., 559 F.2d 426, 429-30 (5th Cir.1977) (concluding sufficient notice was given when "[t]here were almost four weeks between the mailing . . . and the settlement hearing"); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.1977) (concluding notice was "more than adequate" when there were twenty-six days between the mailing and the deadline for opting out). {19} Second, Appellants complain that the notice of settlement had a chilling effect on objections by requiring represented class members to successfully move for intervention before objecting at the fairness hearing. 2007Co., 559 F.2d 426, 429-30 (5th Cir.1977) (concluding sufficient notice was given when “[tjhere were almost four weeks between the mailing ... and the settlement hearing”); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.1977) (concluding notice was “more than adequate” when there were twenty-six days between the mailing and the deadline for opting out). {19} Second, Appellants complain that the notice of settlement had a chilling effect on objections by requiring represented class members to successfully move for intervention before objecting at the fairness hearing. | 2 | 2 |
In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigationgreen2 sentences2007Antitrust Litig., 144 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D.Ga.1992). 2007Antitrust Litig., 144 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D.Ga.1992). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Salazar v. Torres
green
1 sentence2015Salazar II, 2007-NMSC-019, ¶ 1 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Espinosa v. United of Omaha Life Insurance
green
1 sentence2009The court also ordered Settlement to make restitution to 18 1 Espinosa’s date of death is mistyped in Espinosa I, 2006-NMCA-075, ¶ 4 , as 19 September 1, 2000. 4 1 Plaintiffs for all sums Settlement had previously collected from the annuity, and it 2 concluded that Settlement’s petition for allowance of claim filed in the probate 3 proceeding was “untimely and not well taken and should be denied.” Settlement now 4 appeals that decision, arguing that the district court lacked substantial evidence for its 5 determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to the annuity proceeds and that it erred in 6 | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Vigil
green
2 sentences2000The Court held that the worker was entitled to “receive and retain uninsured motorist benefits in excess of what he must reimburse his employer for workers’ compensation.” Draper, 116 N.M. at 778 , 867 P.2d at 1160 . {15} In Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Vigil, 1996-NMCA-062 , 121 N.M. 812 , 918 P.2d 728 , another case upon which S .E.D./USF & G relies, this Court faced a complementary issue: is the provider of an uninsured motorist policy entitled to an offset, or credit, prior to its provision of uninsured motorist benefits to an injured worker who has already received a settlement 2000The Court held that the worker was entitled to “receive and retain uninsured motorist benefits in excess of what he must reimburse his employer for workers’ compensation.” Draper, 116 N.M. at 778 , 867 P.2d at 1160 . {15} In Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Vigil, 1996-NMCA-062 , 121 N.M. 812 , 918 P.2d 728 , another case upon which S .E.D./USF & G relies, this Court faced a complementary issue: is the provider of an uninsured motorist policy entitled to an offset, or credit, prior to its provision of uninsured motorist benefits to an injured worker who has already received a settlement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Draper v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2000The Court held that the worker was entitled to “receive and retain uninsured motorist benefits in excess of what he must reimburse his employer for workers’ compensation.” Draper, 116 N.M. at 778 , 867 P.2d at 1160 . {15} In Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Vigil, 1996-NMCA-062 , 121 N.M. 812 , 918 P.2d 728 , another case upon which S .E.D./USF & G relies, this Court faced a complementary issue: is the provider of an uninsured motorist policy entitled to an offset, or credit, prior to its provision of uninsured motorist benefits to an injured worker who has already received a settlement 2000The Court held that the worker was entitled to “receive and retain uninsured motorist benefits in excess of what he must reimburse his employer for workers’ compensation.” Draper, 116 N.M. at 778 , 867 P.2d at 1160 . {15} In Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Vigil, 1996-NMCA-062 , 121 N.M. 812 , 918 P.2d 728 , another case upon which S .E.D./USF & G relies, this Court faced a complementary issue: is the provider of an uninsured motorist policy entitled to an offset, or credit, prior to its provision of uninsured motorist benefits to an injured worker who has already received a settlement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.