settlement claim in Oklahoma

2013Jones v. Jones, 612 P.2d 266 (Okla.1980). (6) To change the status of a litigant from that of next friend to guardian ad litem, appoint an attorney for such litigant and to impound funds that are in dispute. (7) To take action with respect to any issue collateral to a pending appeal. (8) To determine any matter ordered by the Supreme Court. (9) To determine any issue whose resolution pending appeal is explicitly authorized by law. (10) When the parties to a cause pending on appeal or on certiorari have agreed to a settlement of the claim and their agreement requires the trial court's approval,

2011Jones v. Jones, 612 P.2d 266 (Okla.1980). (6) To change the status of a litigant from that of next friend to guardian ad litem, or to appoint an attorney for such litigant and to impound funds that are in dispute. (7) To take action with respect to any issue collateral to a pending appeal. (8) To determine any matter ordered by the Supreme Court. (9) To determine any issue whose resolution pending appeal is explicitly authorized by law. (10) When the parties to a cause pending on appeal or on certiorari have agreed to a settlement of the claim and their agreement requires the trial court's app

2007The notice included a warning that class members who did not file the notice of intent to appear and object would not be allowed to contest the approval of the settlement at the hearing. 354 F.3d at 1255 .

1999The transcript does not disclose here that the claimant had ever been advised of and knowingly relinquished his right to a fee-quantum hearing. [35] For the meaning of "waiver", see supra note 23. [36] Claimant's testimony (at page nine of the settlement hearing's transcript), which shows that he "had an understanding" with his lawyer about the fee to be deducted, utterly fails to disclose that (a) he knew the precise impact of the crucial agreement in dollars and cents; (b) intentionally gave up his right to that amount and (c) was aware of his right to an adversarial post-settlement hearing

1999The transcript does not disclose here that the claimant had ever been advised of and knowingly relinquished his right to a fee-quantum hearing. [35] For the meaning of "waiver", see supra note 23. [36] Claimant's testimony (at page nine of the settlement hearing's transcript), which shows that he "had an understanding" with his lawyer about the fee to be deducted, utterly fails to disclose that (a) he knew the precise impact of the crucial agreement in dollars and cents; (b) intentionally gave up his right to that amount and (c) was aware of his right to an adversarial post-settlement hearing

1999The transcript does not disclose here that the claimant had ever been advised of and knowingly relinquished his right to a fee-quantum hearing. [35] For the meaning of "waiver", see supra note 23. [36] Claimant's testimony (at page nine of the settlement hearing's transcript), which shows that he "had an understanding" with his lawyer about the fee to be deducted, utterly fails to disclose that (a) he knew the precise impact of the crucial agreement in dollars and cents; (b) intentionally gave up his right to that amount and (c) was aware of his right to an adversarial post-settlement hearing

1999The transcript does not disclose here that the claimant had ever been advised of and knowingly relinquished his right to a fee-quantum hearing. [35] For the meaning of "waiver", see supra note 23. [36] Claimant's testimony (at page nine of the settlement hearing's transcript), which shows that he "had an understanding" with his lawyer about the fee to be deducted, utterly fails to disclose that (a) he knew the precise impact of the crucial agreement in dollars and cents; (b) intentionally gave up his right to that amount and (c) was aware of his right to an adversarial post-settlement hearing

1976Co. v. Steves, 208 Okl. 529 , 257 P.2d 836 (Okl.1953), in which we stated that: “ * * * the necessity of proof of the insurer’s liability to the insured under the terms of the policy cannot be dispensed with by reason of the garnishment proceedings.” Although garnisher Smith had made a settlement of his claim with Allstate, there was no evidence showing that the maximum coverage afforded by Allstate in the policy had been exhausted by settlement, for no information as to Allstate’s coverage limitations was introduced.

1976Co. v. Steves, 208 Okl. 529 , 257 P.2d 836 (Okl.1953), in which we stated that: “ * * * the necessity of proof of the insurer’s liability to the insured under the terms of the policy cannot be dispensed with by reason of the garnishment proceedings.” Although garnisher Smith had made a settlement of his claim with Allstate, there was no evidence showing that the maximum coverage afforded by Allstate in the policy had been exhausted by settlement, for no information as to Allstate’s coverage limitations was introduced.

1969Viersen & Cochran Drilling Company v. Ford, supra. Respondents are not entitled to receive credit, on an award entered for death benefits, for any portion of the amount paid to the injured employee during his lifetime in settlement of his claim for compensation by joint-petition settlement.

1935Co., 7 P. (2d) 65, 69 , the Kansas court, in correctly denying relief to insured under a “condition precedent” policy, observed: “It is impossible to entirely reconcile the two lines of authority. * * * In the one line of cases the courts have gone far afield to find an ambiguity in the contract, and have overlooked the fact that the contract does not pretend to insure against disability, but .merely makes disability, when coupled-with proof or notice to the company, a settlement or waiver of the premium” —which indicates that had the contract pretended to insure against disability, as does th

1928It is a well-recognized principle in the law that a debtor may be estopped by his own conduct from setting up as a defense the statute of limitations, and this rule has often been applied where the debtor has misled the creditor and induced him to refrain from bringing an action within the statutory period.” The same rule was announced by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Lessee of George N. Hunt v. Nathan Guilford. 4 Ohio, 311: ‘‘An agreement to submit a question of boundary to arbitration defeats the operation of the statute of limitations.” This court, in the case of Waugh v. Guthrie

1928It is a well-recognized principle in the law that a debtor may be estopped by his own conduct from setting up as a defense the statute of limitations, and this rule has often been applied where the debtor has misled the creditor and induced him to refrain from bringing an action within the statutory period.” The same rule was announced by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Lessee of George N. Hunt v. Nathan Guilford. 4 Ohio, 311: ‘‘An agreement to submit a question of boundary to arbitration defeats the operation of the statute of limitations.” This court, in the case of Waugh v. Guthrie

1923The law was correctly announced by Justice Sharp in Cushing v. Cummings, 72 Oklahoma, 179 Pac. 762 : "In an action by the assignee of a promissory note to foreclose a mortgage on real estate, and for money judgment on his covenant of assumption against a purchaser thereof (whose deed, according to the pleadings, provided for ‘a good title’), where it is made to appear that, in a former suit by the rightful owner in which the original mortgagee and payee of the note (prior to assignment) and the purchaser were defendants, the deed of the purchaser and the mortgage were, by a valid decree therei

1923The law was correctly announced by Justice Sharp in Cushing v. Cummings, 72 Oklahoma, 179 Pac. 762 : "In an action by the assignee of a promissory note to foreclose a mortgage on real estate, and for money judgment on his covenant of assumption against a purchaser thereof (whose deed, according to the pleadings, provided for ‘a good title’), where it is made to appear that, in a former suit by the rightful owner in which the original mortgagee and payee of the note (prior to assignment) and the purchaser were defendants, the deed of the purchaser and the mortgage were, by a valid decree therei

1923The law was correctly announced by Justice Sharp in Cushing v. Cummings, 72 Oklahoma, 179 Pac. 762 : "In an action by the assignee of a promissory note to foreclose a mortgage on real estate, and for money judgment on his covenant of assumption against a purchaser thereof (whose deed, according to the pleadings, provided for ‘a good title’), where it is made to appear that, in a former suit by the rightful owner in which the original mortgagee and payee of the note (prior to assignment) and the purchaser were defendants, the deed of the purchaser and the mortgage were, by a valid decree therei

1923The law was correctly announced by Justice Sharp in Cushing v. Cummings, 72 Oklahoma, 179 Pac. 762 : "In an action by the assignee of a promissory note to foreclose a mortgage on real estate, and for money judgment on his covenant of assumption against a purchaser thereof (whose deed, according to the pleadings, provided for ‘a good title’), where it is made to appear that, in a former suit by the rightful owner in which the original mortgagee and payee of the note (prior to assignment) and the purchaser were defendants, the deed of the purchaser and the mortgage were, by a valid decree therei

1923The law was correctly announced by Justice Sharp in Cushing v. Cummings, 72 Oklahoma, 179 Pac. 762 : "In an action by the assignee of a promissory note to foreclose a mortgage on real estate, and for money judgment on his covenant of assumption against a purchaser thereof (whose deed, according to the pleadings, provided for ‘a good title’), where it is made to appear that, in a former suit by the rightful owner in which the original mortgagee and payee of the note (prior to assignment) and the purchaser were defendants, the deed of the purchaser and the mortgage were, by a valid decree therei