self-incrimination clause in Florida

2007It was not until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), that the Court held the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states.

2007It was not until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), that the Court held the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states.

1994See Schmerber n California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla.1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed.2d 858

1994See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) *365 (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed

1994See Schmerber n California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla.1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed.2d 858

1994See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) *365 (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed

1994See Schmerber n California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla.1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed.2d 858

1994See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) *365 (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed

1994See Schmerber n California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla.1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed.2d 858

1994See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) *365 (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed

1994See Schmerber n California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla.1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed.2d 858

1994See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) *365 (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed

1994See Schmerber n California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970) (self-inerimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla.1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed.2d 858

1994See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) *365 (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to the withdrawal of blood); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970) (self-incrimination privilege does not extend to evidence of the body even if obtained by compulsion), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 , 91 S.Ct. 1189 , 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Wilson v. State, 225 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1969) (compulsory taking of blood and use of the results at trial is not violative of the right against self-incrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 2286 , 29 L.Ed

1985The Supreme Court has determined that the "sole concern [of the self-incrimination clause] is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of `penalties affixed to criminal acts... .'" Ullmann [v. U.S.], supra, 350 U.S. 422 at 438-39 , 46 S.Ct. [497] at 507 [ 100 L.Ed. 511 ] quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 , 6 S.Ct. 524 [534], 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); accord, Kastigar [v. U.S.], supra, 406 U.S. 441 at 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 [1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 ].

1985The Supreme Court has determined that the "sole concern [of the self-incrimination clause] is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of `penalties affixed to criminal acts... .'" Ullmann [v. U.S.], supra, 350 U.S. 422 at 438-39 , 46 S.Ct. [497] at 507 [ 100 L.Ed. 511 ] quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 , 6 S.Ct. 524 [534], 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); accord, Kastigar [v. U.S.], supra, 406 U.S. 441 at 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 [1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 ].

1985In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 , 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974), the Court affirmed a rejection of a law firm partner's assertion of the fifth amendment when he was asked to produce partnership financial records.

1985In Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 , 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974), the Court affirmed a rejection of a law firm partner's assertion of the fifth amendment when he was asked to produce partnership financial records.

2005The leading case addressing the question of what constitutes the voluntariness of consent to search is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), which, in adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances test, observed that the issue should be analyzed by the same approach used for deciding the voluntariness of a defendant's confession under the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause.

2005The leading case addressing the question of what constitutes the voluntariness of consent to search is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), which, in adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances test, observed that the issue should be analyzed by the same approach used for deciding the voluntariness of a defendant's confession under the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause.

1997Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 927, n. 5 (5th Cir.1993) (compelling utterance of robber's words before jury for identification purposes did not elicit testimony); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir.1986) (compelling utterance of robber's words before jury for identification purposes does not violate self-incrimination principles), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 , 107 S.Ct. 893 , 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987). .

1997Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 927, n. 5 (5th Cir.1993) (compelling utterance of robber's words before jury for identification purposes did not elicit testimony); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir.1986) (compelling utterance of robber's words before jury for identification purposes does not violate self-incrimination principles), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 , 107 S.Ct. 893 , 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987). .

1997Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 927, n. 5 (5th Cir.1993) (compelling utterance of robber's words before jury for identification purposes did not elicit testimony); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir.1986) (compelling utterance of robber's words before jury for identification purposes does not violate self-incrimination principles), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 , 107 S.Ct. 893 , 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987). .

1990Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2348 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988).

1990Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2348 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988).

1987In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the Court said "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 , 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), when comparing a police officer's right against self-incrimination with that of an attorney, the Supreme Court agreed with the premise that "a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood." Moreover, the United States Supre

1987In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the Court said "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 , 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), when comparing a police officer's right against self-incrimination with that of an attorney, the Supreme Court agreed with the premise that "a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood." Moreover, the United States Supre

1987In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the Court said "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 , 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), when comparing a police officer's right against self-incrimination with that of an attorney, the Supreme Court agreed with the premise that "a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood." Moreover, the United States Supre

1987In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the Court said "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 , 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), when comparing a police officer's right against self-incrimination with that of an attorney, the Supreme Court agreed with the premise that "a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood." Moreover, the United States Supre

1987The Court concluded that the self-incrimination clause extends to lawyers as well as other individuals and "it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." Id. at 514 , 87 S.Ct. at 627 .

1987The Court concluded that the self-incrimination clause extends to lawyers as well as other individuals and "it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." Id. at 514 , 87 S.Ct. at 627 .

1987In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the Court said "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 , 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), when comparing a police officer's right against self-incrimination with that of an attorney, the Supreme Court agreed with the premise that "a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood." Moreover, the United States Supre

1987In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), the Court said "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer." In Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 , 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), when comparing a police officer's right against self-incrimination with that of an attorney, the Supreme Court agreed with the premise that "a lawyer could not constitutionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood." Moreover, the United States Supre

1985The Supreme Court has determined that the "sole concern [of the self-incrimination clause] is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of `penalties affixed to criminal acts... .'" Ullmann [v. U.S.], supra, 350 U.S. 422 at 438-39 , 46 S.Ct. [497] at 507 [ 100 L.Ed. 511 ] quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 , 6 S.Ct. 524 [534], 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); accord, Kastigar [v. U.S.], supra, 406 U.S. 441 at 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 [1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 ].

1985The Supreme Court has determined that the "sole concern [of the self-incrimination clause] is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of `penalties affixed to criminal acts... .'" Ullmann [v. U.S.], supra, 350 U.S. 422 at 438-39 , 46 S.Ct. [497] at 507 [ 100 L.Ed. 511 ] quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 , 6 S.Ct. 524 [534], 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); accord, Kastigar [v. U.S.], supra, 406 U.S. 441 at 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 [1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 ].

1985While the prosecutor may not prevent or discourage a defense witness from testifying, Washington v. Texas ; Morrison, the compulsory process clause does not place any affirmative obligation on either the prosecutor or the court to *395 secure testimony from a defense witness by replacing the self-incrimination privilege with a grant of use immunity. [12] Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774 .