self-incrimination clause in California

2021In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (1991) 500 U.S. 614 (Edmonson), Justice Kennedy held a private attorney’s use of peremptory challenges in jury selection of a civil trial “represents a unique governmental function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason of race.” (Id. at p. 627.) As rationale for finding private actor’s action constitutes “state action,” Justice Kennedy considered that “[r]ace discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as

2015The United States Supreme Court held that allowing a prosecutor to comment on, and a jury to consider, a defendant’s failure to testify violates the Fifth Amendment’s self- incrimination clause. ( Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at pp. 611-613.) “[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal justice,’ [citation], which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.

2025“The self-incrimination privilege is not applicable to matters that will subject a witness to civil liability.” (Blackburn v. Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 414, 426 .) “Whatever their response to requests for accommodation of the conflicting constitutional rights of a defendant in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings, courts have consistently refrained from recognizing any constitutional need for such accommodation.” (People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 885 , italics omitted (Coleman); see also Avant!

2012(People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 885 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ].) The self-incrimination privilege is not applicable to matters that will subject a witness to civil liability.

1993We have extended use immunity to defendants' pretrial testimony in probation revocation hearings and juvenile status hearings that occur before trial. ( People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 809, 811 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) Neither defendant nor the Attorney General provided as authority any case in which use immunity was granted for the testimony of a psychiatrist at a pretrial suppression hearing.

1993We have extended use immunity to defendants' pretrial testimony in probation revocation hearings and juvenile status hearings that occur before trial. ( People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 809, 811 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) Neither defendant nor the Attorney General provided as authority any case in which use immunity was granted for the testimony of a psychiatrist at a pretrial suppression hearing.

1993(Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]; Metalworking Machinery, Inc. v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) “ ‘There may be cases where the requirement that a criminal defendant participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates concepts of elementary fairness in view of the defendant’s position in an inter-related criminal prosecution.

1993(Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]; Metalworking Machinery, Inc. v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) “ ‘There may be cases where the requirement that a criminal defendant participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates concepts of elementary fairness in view of the defendant’s position in an inter-related criminal prosecution.

1991Moreover, petitioner's argument misinterprets the scope of the self-incrimination clause, which "protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications." ( Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 409 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 39, 55 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ], italics added.) Under cases of the Supreme Court, there are four requirements that together trigger this privilege: the information sought must be (i) "incriminating"; (ii) "personal to the defendant"; (iii) obtained by "compulsion"; and (iv) "testimonial or communicative in nature." (See United States v. Nobles

1991Moreover, petitioner's argument misinterprets the scope of the self-incrimination clause, which "protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications." ( Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 409 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 39, 55 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ], italics added.) Under cases of the Supreme Court, there are four requirements that together trigger this privilege: the information sought must be (i) "incriminating"; (ii) "personal to the defendant"; (iii) obtained by "compulsion"; and (iv) "testimonial or communicative in nature." (See United States v. Nobles

2022(People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1105 .) The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no “person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) To protect a suspect’s right against self-incrimination, the United 7 States Supreme Court held in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ], “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure

2022(People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1105 .) The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no “person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) To protect a suspect’s right against self-incrimination, the United 7 States Supreme Court held in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706 ], “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure

2014Ed. 2d 646 , 104 S.Ct. 1387 ] [same]; People v. Liberta (1984) 64 N.Y.2d 152 [ 474 N.E.2d 567, 578 , 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 ] [court can either invalidate rape statute or expand it to include spousal rape].)” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1207 .) “In choosing the proper remedy for an equal protection 8 Of course, under the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 378 U.S. at p. 6 ), a person has the constitutional right, in any proceeding, not to answer official questions that might incrimin

1971(People v. Griffin, 60 Cal.2d 182 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 24 , 383 P.2d 432 ].) The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the prosecutor’s comments and the trial court’s instructions to the' jury concerning defendant’s failure to take the stand and testify violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 653 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 ].

2022Analysis “The Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause states that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .’ (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)” (People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210 , 1222–1223.) Whether a defendant’s right to remain silent has been violated presents a mixed question of law and fact.

2015"The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause states that '[n]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .' (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)" (People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1222-1223 (Tom).) To effectuate this clause, an individual in custody "must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 11 attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so

2012(Watford v. Medeiros[, supra,] 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 ; [citation].) ' “There may be cases where the requirement that a criminal defendant participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates concepts of elementary fairness in view of the defendant’s position in an inter-related criminal prosecution.

1993(Warford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]; Metalworking Machinery, Inc. v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) “ ‘There may be cases where the requirement that a criminal defendant participate in a civil action, at peril of being denied some portion of his worldly goods, violates concepts of elementary fairness in view of the defendant’s position in an inter-related criminal prosecution.

2003Accordingly, in Albertson the United States Supreme Court set aside orders requiring people to register as Communist Party members. ( Albertson, supra, 382 U.S. 70, 81 , 86 S.Ct. 194 , 15 L.Ed.2d 165 .) In other cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that the self-incrimination privilege applies to statutes requiring disclosure of participation in illegal gambling ( Marchetti, supra, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 697 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889 ; Grosso v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 62 , 88 S.Ct. 709 , 19 L.Ed.2d 906 ), possession of an unregistered firearm ( Haynes v. United States (1968) 39

2003Accordingly, in Albertson the United States Supreme Court set aside orders requiring people to register as Communist Party members. ( Albertson, supra, 382 U.S. 70, 81 , 86 S.Ct. 194 , 15 L.Ed.2d 165 .) In other cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that the self-incrimination privilege applies to statutes requiring disclosure of participation in illegal gambling ( Marchetti, supra, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61 , 88 S.Ct. 697 , 19 L.Ed.2d 889 ; Grosso v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 62 , 88 S.Ct. 709 , 19 L.Ed.2d 906 ), possession of an unregistered firearm ( Haynes v. United States (1968) 39

2003California law before June 8, 1982 Citing People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 382 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ], and People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 955 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 464 P.2d 114 ], defendant contends that under California law as it existed before the June 8, 1982, enactment of article I, section 28 of the California Constitution (prohibiting the exclusion in criminal cases of relevant evidence not required to be excluded under the federal Constitution), an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel was sufficient to invoke the California Constitution’s self-incriminatio

2003California law before June 8, 1982 Citing People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 382 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ], and People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 955 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 464 P.2d 114 ], defendant contends that under California law as it existed before the June 8, 1982, enactment of article I, section 28 of the California Constitution (prohibiting the exclusion in criminal cases of relevant evidence not required to be excluded under the federal Constitution), an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel was sufficient to invoke the California Constitution’s self-incriminatio

1991In Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ] ( Williams ), the high court upheld against a self-incrimination clause challenge *366 Florida's "notice-of-alibi" rule, which required a criminal defendant intending to rely on an alibi defense to notify the prosecution of the place where the defendant claimed to be at the time in question, and of the names and addresses of the witnesses the defendant intended to call in support of the alibi.

1991In Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ] ( Williams ), the high court upheld against a self-incrimination clause challenge *366 Florida's "notice-of-alibi" rule, which required a criminal defendant intending to rely on an alibi defense to notify the prosecution of the place where the defendant claimed to be at the time in question, and of the names and addresses of the witnesses the defendant intended to call in support of the alibi.

1991Moreover, petitioner's argument misinterprets the scope of the self-incrimination clause, which "protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications." ( Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 409 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 39, 55 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ], italics added.) Under cases of the Supreme Court, there are four requirements that together trigger this privilege: the information sought must be (i) "incriminating"; (ii) "personal to the defendant"; (iii) obtained by "compulsion"; and (iv) "testimonial or communicative in nature." (See United States v. Nobles

1991Moreover, petitioner's argument misinterprets the scope of the self-incrimination clause, which "protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications." ( Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 409 [ 48 L.Ed.2d 39, 55 , 96 S.Ct. 1569 ], italics added.) Under cases of the Supreme Court, there are four requirements that together trigger this privilege: the information sought must be (i) "incriminating"; (ii) "personal to the defendant"; (iii) obtained by "compulsion"; and (iv) "testimonial or communicative in nature." (See United States v. Nobles

1986Recently, in Winston v. Lee (1985) 470 U.S. 753, 761 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 662, 669 , 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1617 ], the court pointed out that: “A crucial factor in analyzing the magnitude of the intrusion in Schmerber is the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual.” The California Supreme Court in People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 55 , footnote 7 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 , 23 A.L.R.4th 776 ], stated: “Although we refrain from establishing discovery rules related to testimonial evidence, we leave intact the firmly established precedents that hold the se

1986Recently, in Winston v. Lee (1985) 470 U.S. 753, 761 [ 84 L.Ed.2d 662, 669 , 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1617 ], the court pointed out that: “A crucial factor in analyzing the magnitude of the intrusion in Schmerber is the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual.” The California Supreme Court in People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 55 , footnote 7 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 , 23 A.L.R.4th 776 ], stated: “Although we refrain from establishing discovery rules related to testimonial evidence, we leave intact the firmly established precedents that hold the se

1985(See People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 69 [dis. opn. by Richardson, J.].) As Justice Clark observed in his dissenting opinion in Allen, supra, the majority’s reliance upon the “independent state ground” of the state Constitution’s self-incrimination privilege seems based on nothing more than a personal aversion to a perceived increasing conservatism in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. ( 18 Cal.3d at p. 537 .) Certainly, reliance upon the state Constitution is not based upon any elaborate or reasoned analysis of the policies underlying the self-incrimination privilege.

1985(See People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 69 [dis. opn. by Richardson, J.].) As Justice Clark observed in his dissenting opinion in Allen, supra, the majority's reliance upon the "independent state ground" of the state Constitution's self-incrimination privilege seems based on nothing more than a personal aversion to a perceived increasing conservatism in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. ( 18 Cal.3d at p. 537 .) Certainly, reliance upon the state Constitution is not based upon any elaborate or reasoned analysis of the policies underlying the self-incrimination privilege.

2025Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 882 [“It is clear . . . that staying a civil discovery process to await the outcome of a related criminal case does not implicate constitutional issues, even when the defendant raising the question 21 is an individual defendant . . . .”].) In some circumstances, a defendant in a civil proceeding “may be required either to waive the [Fifth Amendment] privilege or accept the civil consequences of silence if he or she does exercise it.” (Alvarez v. Sanchez (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 709, 712 .) “[T]he fact that a man is indicted cannot give him a blan

2023(Id. at p. 116.) In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (11th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 1335 , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held: “Where the location, existence, and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not used against him [or her], and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.” (Id. at p. 1344, fn. omitted.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the foregone conclusion doctrine “allows for circumvention of the self-incrimination privilege if the government alre

2023(D.D.C. 2018) 317 F.Supp.3d 523, 535 [no Fifth Amendment violation because “the compelled use of the Subject’s biometric features is far more akin to the surrender of a safe’s key than its combination” (fn. omitted)]; In the Matter of the Search Warrant Application for [Redacted] (N.D.Ill. 2017) 279 F.Supp.3d 800 , 801 [“requiring the application of the fingerprints to the sensor does not run afoul of the self-incrimination privilege because that act does not qualify as a testimonial communication”]; Commonwealth v. Baust (Va.Cir.Ct., Oct. 28, 2014, No. CR14-1439), 2014 Va.Cir.