self-incrimination privilege (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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self-incrimination privilege in Arizona

15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Taylorgreen
ariz · 1965 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1993–2022
2 sentences

2022The court compared it “to the rule that a defendant who elects to testify at trial may not invoke the self-incrimination privilege to avoid cross-examination.” Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85 , 90–91 (1965)).

2022The court ultimately held “that ordering defendant to submit to a mental examination did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination,” reasoning that “[t]o hold otherwise would deprive the state of the only adequate means to contest the conclusions of a defense psychiatric expert.” Id. at 500–01. ¶9 More recently, in Phillips v. Araneta, 208 Ariz. 280 (2004), our supreme court extended Schackart’s reasoning to the penalty phase in a capital trial.

12
In Re Andre M.green
ariz · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Unlike this case, In re Andre M. involved issues of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause and was heavily influenced by “the absence of a parent who attempted to attend the [minor’s] interrogation but was prevented from doing so by the police officers.” 207 Ariz. 482 , 485 ¶ 12, 88 P.3d 552, 555 (2004).

2013Unlike this case, In re Andre M. involved issues of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause and was heavily influenced by “the absence of a parent who attempted to attend the [minor’s] interrogation but was prevented from doing so by the police officers.” 207 Ariz. 482 , 485 ¶ 12, 88 P.3d 552, 555 (2004).

11
Kastigar v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 , 76 S.Ct. 497, 506-07 , 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956); accord Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

1994Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 , 76 S.Ct. 497, 506-07 , 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956); accord Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

11
Boyd v. United Statesred
scotus · 1886 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981These cases were based on the idea, apparently first articulated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), that the self-incrimination clause is intimately related to the search and seizure prohibition of the Fourth Amendment and creates, like the Fourth Amendment, a private enclave where an individual may lead a private life without governmental intrusion.

1981These cases were based on the idea, apparently first articulated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), that the self-incrimination clause is intimately related to the search and seizure prohibition of the Fourth Amendment and creates, like the Fourth Amendment, a private enclave where an individual may lead a private life without governmental intrusion.

11
United States v. Richard Authementgreen
ca5 · 1979 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 408 , 96 S.Ct. at 1579 ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329 (2nd Cir. 1976); Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 859-860 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, 18 Bost.Co.Ind. & Comm.L.Rev. 998, 1008-1016 (1977).

11
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings United States of America, in Re Grand Jury Proceedings Hector G. Rodriguez Martinezgreen
ca1 · 1980 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 408 , 96 S.Ct. at 1579 ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329 (2nd Cir. 1976); Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 859-860 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, 18 Bost.Co.Ind. & Comm.L.Rev. 998, 1008-1016 (1977).

11
Fisher v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981The Fisher Court, however, rejected the idea that the Fifth Amendment is based on privacy principles, holding instead that the purpose of the self-incrimination clause was not to achieve a general protection of privacy but to prevent the specific evil of compelled self-incrimination. 2 425 U.S. at 399-400 , 96 S.Ct. at 1575-1576 . *256 Compelled self-incrimination occurs when an individual is forced to make an incriminating communicative act.

1981The Fisher Court, however, rejected the idea that the Fifth Amendment is based on privacy principles, holding instead that the purpose of the self-incrimination clause was not to achieve a general protection of privacy but to prevent the specific evil of compelled self-incrimination. 2 425 U.S. at 399-400 , 96 S.Ct. at 1575-1576 . *256 Compelled self-incrimination occurs when an individual is forced to make an incriminating communicative act.

11
cluster 348794green
ca9 · 1977 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 408 , 96 S.Ct. at 1579 ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329 (2nd Cir. 1976); Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 859-860 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, 18 Bost.Co.Ind. & Comm.L.Rev. 998, 1008-1016 (1977).

11
In the Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978. Appeal of United States of Americagreen
ca3 · 1979 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 408 , 96 S.Ct. at 1579 ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329 (2nd Cir. 1976); Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 859-860 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, 18 Bost.Co.Ind. & Comm.L.Rev. 998, 1008-1016 (1977).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Schackart green
ariz · 1993
2 sentences

2023LaBianca, 254 Ariz. 206 , ¶¶ 8 -12 (quoting Schackart, 175 Ariz. at 500 ).

2022The court compared it “to the rule that a defendant who elects to testify at trial may not invoke the self-incrimination privilege to avoid cross-examination.” Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85 , 90–91 (1965)).

22022–2023
Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City green
scotus · 1956
2 sentences

1974Appellant would certainly be entitled to the relief she seeks if she had been discharged because she had exercised her rights: “ . . . as guaranteed by the free speech clause of the First Amendment, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 , Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 , 89 S.Ct. 401 , 21 L.Ed.2d 375 ; by the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.

1974Appellant would certainly be entitled to the relief she seeks if she had been discharged because she had exercised her rights: “ . . . as guaranteed by the free speech clause of the First Amendment, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 , Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 , 89 S.Ct. 401 , 21 L.Ed.2d 375 ; by the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.

21963–1974
State v. McAlvain green
ariz · 1969
2 sentences

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods for the purpose of proving guilt violates the self-incrimination privilege, citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods for the purpose of proving guilt violates the self-incrimination privilege, citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

21972–1972
State v. Villalobos green
arizctapp · 1967
2 sentences

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods for the purpose of proving guilt violates the self-incrimination privilege, citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods for the purpose of proving guilt violates the self-incrimination privilege, citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

21972–1972
United States v. Theresa Pearson green
ca6 · 1965
2 sentences

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods for the purpose of proving guilt violates the self-incrimination privilege, citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods, for the purpose of proving guilt, violates the self-incrimination privilege, correctly citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970) ; State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

21972–1972
White v. United States green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods for the purpose of proving guilt violates the self-incrimination privilege, citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

1972We also agree with the rule stated by defendant that merely introducing admissions by silence during custodial periods, for the purpose of proving guilt, violates the self-incrimination privilege, correctly citing State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445 , 454 P.2d 987 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023 , 90 S.Ct. 597 , 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970) ; State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz.App. 144 , 430 P.2d 723 (1967); United States v. Pearson, 344 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1965).

21972–1972
Phillips v. Araneta green
ariz · 2004
1 sentence

2022The court ultimately held “that ordering defendant to submit to a mental examination did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination,” reasoning that “[t]o hold otherwise would deprive the state of the only adequate means to contest the conclusions of a defense psychiatric expert.” Id. at 500–01. ¶9 More recently, in Phillips v. Araneta, 208 Ariz. 280 (2004), our supreme court extended Schackart’s reasoning to the penalty phase in a capital trial.

12022–2022
Schmerber v. California green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

1997Federal and state courts alike have held that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment “offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

1997Federal and state courts alike have held that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment “offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 , 86 S.Ct. at 1832 .

11997–1997
Ullmann v. United States green
scotus · 1956
2 sentences

1994Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 , 76 S.Ct. 497, 506-07 , 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956); accord Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

1994Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 , 76 S.Ct. 497, 506-07 , 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956); accord Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 , 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

11994–1994
State v. Lopez green
ariz · 1988
2 sentences

1990State v. Lopez, 159 Ariz. 52 , 764 P.2d 1111 (1988); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21 , 734 P.2d 563 (1987).

1990State v. Lopez, 159 Ariz. 52 , 764 P.2d 1111 (1988); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21 , 734 P.2d 563 (1987).

11990–1990
State v. LaGrand green
ariz · 1987
2 sentences

1990State v. Lopez, 159 Ariz. 52 , 764 P.2d 1111 (1988); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21 , 734 P.2d 563 (1987).

1990State v. Lopez, 159 Ariz. 52 , 764 P.2d 1111 (1988); State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21 , 734 P.2d 563 (1987).

11990–1990
Gardner v. Broderick green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

1989Because a public employee may be dismissed for refusing to answer questions on the basis of the self-incrimination privilege only if those questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relate to the performance of his official duties, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), and because off-duty criminality, though undoubtedly embarrassing to the public employer, does not meet that test, I do not believe that Williams can be discharged for his refusal to answer questions.

1989Because a public employee may be dismissed for refusing to answer questions on the basis of the self-incrimination privilege only if those questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relate to the performance of his official duties, Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 88 S.Ct. 1913 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), and because off-duty criminality, though undoubtedly embarrassing to the public employer, does not meet that test, I do not believe that Williams can be discharged for his refusal to answer questions.

11989–1989
United States of America and Donald M. Cerra, Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service v. John L. Beattie, Jr. green
ca2 · 1976
1 sentence

1981Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 408 , 96 S.Ct. at 1579 ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329 (2nd Cir. 1976); Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 859-860 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); Note, 18 Bost.Co.Ind. & Comm.L.Rev. 998, 1008-1016 (1977).

11981–1981
Commonwealth v. Rodgers green
pa · 1977
2 sentences

1979The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435 , 372 A.2d 771 (1977) examined post-conviction collateral relief and the self-incrimination privilege.

1979The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435 , 372 A.2d 771 (1977) examined post-conviction collateral relief and the self-incrimination privilege.

11979–1979
Greene v. McElroy green
scotus · 1959
2 sentences

1974Ed. 692 ; by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 , 79 S. Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 ; or by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hatton v. County Board of Education, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.); Rolfe v. County Board of Education, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.).” Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S. 943 , 92 S.Ct. 2847 , 33 L.E.2d 767 (1972).

1974Ed. 692 ; by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 , 79 S. Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 ; or by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hatton v. County Board of Education, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.); Rolfe v. County Board of Education, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.).” Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S. 943 , 92 S.Ct. 2847 , 33 L.E.2d 767 (1972).

11974–1974
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty. green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

1974Appellant would certainly be entitled to the relief she seeks if she had been discharged because she had exercised her rights: “ . . . as guaranteed by the free speech clause of the First Amendment, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 , Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 , 89 S.Ct. 401 , 21 L.Ed.2d 375 ; by the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.

1974Appellant would certainly be entitled to the relief she seeks if she had been discharged because she had exercised her rights: “ . . . as guaranteed by the free speech clause of the First Amendment, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 , Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 , 89 S.Ct. 401 , 21 L.Ed.2d 375 ; by the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.

11974–1974
cluster 279203 green
ca6 · 1968
11974–1974
Board of Trustees of Arkansas a & M College, a Body Corporate, and Dr. Homer Babin, President of Arkansas a & M College v. H. Brent Davis green
ca8 · 1968
1 sentence

1974Appellant would certainly be entitled to the relief she seeks if she had been discharged because she had exercised her rights: “ . . . as guaranteed by the free speech clause of the First Amendment, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 , Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 , 89 S.Ct. 401 , 21 L.Ed.2d 375 ; by the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.

11974–1974
Miss Florence Ella Hatton v. County Board of Education of Maury County, Tennessee green
ca6 · 1970
1 sentence

1974Ed. 692 ; by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 , 79 S. Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 ; or by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hatton v. County Board of Education, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.); Rolfe v. County Board of Education, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.).” Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S. 943 , 92 S.Ct. 2847 , 33 L.E.2d 767 (1972).

11974–1974
Thomas Justin Orr v. Raymond E. Trinter green
ca6 · 1971
1 sentence

1974Ed. 692 ; by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 , 79 S. Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 ; or by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hatton v. County Board of Education, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.); Rolfe v. County Board of Education, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.).” Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S. 943 , 92 S.Ct. 2847 , 33 L.E.2d 767 (1972).

11974–1974
Dreyfus v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center green
scotus · 1968
11974–1974
Crowder v. Federal Communications Commission green
scotus · 1968
11974–1974
Crabtree v. Board of Education green
scotus · 1972
1 sentence

1974Ed. 692 ; by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 , 79 S. Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 ; or by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hatton v. County Board of Education, 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.); Rolfe v. County Board of Education, 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.).” Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S. 943 , 92 S.Ct. 2847 , 33 L.E.2d 767 (1972).

11974–1974
Humphrey v. Palmer green
sc · 1911
1 sentence

1974Appellant would certainly be entitled to the relief she seeks if she had been discharged because she had exercised her rights: “ . . . as guaranteed by the free speech clause of the First Amendment, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 , Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 , 89 S.Ct. 401 , 21 L.Ed.2d 375 ; by the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 , 76 S.Ct. 637 , 100 L.

11974–1974
State v. Greer green
arizctapp · 1972
11973–1973
State v. Greer neutral
arizctapp · 1972
11972–1972

Where else courts name it

CA 66 (1965–2025) IL 48 (1968–2026) TX 41 (1969–2024) FL 25 (1956–2021) OH 21 (1968–2025) NY 16 (1959–2004) AZ 15 (1963–2023) IA 15 (1965–2021) MD 13 (1968–2025) GA 12 (1977–2019) MA 11 (1977–2024) IN 11 (1990–2020) OR 11 (1977–2021) PA 9 (1967–2026) MI 9 (1977–2019) CT 9 (1968–2021) VT 8 (1987–2016) VA 8 (1990–2016) LA 8 (1964–2013) MO 7 (1976–2017) TN 7 (1976–2017) NJ 7 (1968–2020) WI 7 (1989–2023) HI 6 (1980–2022) CO 5 (1978–1999) ID 4 (1975–2007) MS 4 (1973–1992) RI 4 (1991–2018) ND 4 (1967–2009) UT 4 (1969–2023) DC 4 (1976–2006) NC 3 (1968–2010) NE 3 (1987–2020) AK 3 (1970–2000) NV 3 (1970–1997) AL 3 (1980–1998) MN 3 (1986–1991) AR 3 (1978–1984) KS 2 (1999–2003) SD 2 (1985–1985) SC 2 (1977–2008) NM 2 (1978–2011) OK 2 (1974–1989) ME 2 (1974–1986) KY 2 (1972–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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