self-incrimination clause in Louisiana

1983Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

1983Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

1983Even without this statute, however, a prosecutor would not be free to comment upon the defendant's failure to take the stand, for the United States Supreme Court recognized in 1965 that such remarks violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , *453 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

1983Even without this statute, however, a prosecutor would not be free to comment upon the defendant's failure to take the stand, for the United States Supreme Court recognized in 1965 that such remarks violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , *453 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

1973NOTES [1] In Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 . 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), the United States Supreme Court stated: "In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643], at 646-647, 657, 81 S.Ct. [1684], at 1686-1687, 1692-1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , we followed Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Four

1973NOTES [1] In Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 . 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), the United States Supreme Court stated: "In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643], at 646-647, 657, 81 S.Ct. [1684], at 1686-1687, 1692-1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , we followed Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Four

1973NOTES [1] In Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 . 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), the United States Supreme Court stated: "In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643], at 646-647, 657, 81 S.Ct. [1684], at 1686-1687, 1692-1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , we followed Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Four

1973NOTES [1] In Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 . 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), the United States Supreme Court stated: "In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643], at 646-647, 657, 81 S.Ct. [1684], at 1686-1687, 1692-1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , we followed Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Four

1973NOTES [1] In Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 . 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), the United States Supreme Court stated: "In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643], at 646-647, 657, 81 S.Ct. [1684], at 1686-1687, 1692-1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , we followed Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Four

1964Initially, we state that defendants’ contention will be determined in the light of the following rule set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Ker v. State of California, (1963), 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1628 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 , to which we shall adhere: “In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. [643], at 646-647, 657, 81 S.Ct. [1684], at 1686-1687, 1692-1693, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, we followed Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, implemented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Fed

2013In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding that a procedural Miranda violation differs from a Fourth Amendment seizure violation, and therefore the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not applicable to Miranda warning violations. 3 Thereafter, in Patane , the Court found that federal constitutional law does not require the exclusion of physical evidence obtained by using information in a statement itself inadmissible because it was tainted by a violation of the Miranda requirements. 4 The Patane opinion states that,

2013In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding that a procedural Miranda violation differs from a Fourth Amendment seizure violation, and therefore the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not applicable to Miranda warning violations. 3 Thereafter, in Patane , the Court found that federal constitutional law does not require the exclusion of physical evidence obtained by using information in a statement itself inadmissible because it was tainted by a violation of the Miranda requirements. 4 The Patane opinion states that,

2013In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding that a procedural Miranda violation differs from a Fourth Amendment seizure violation, and therefore the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not applicable to Miranda warning violations. 3 Thereafter, in Patane , the Court found that federal constitutional law does not require the exclusion of physical evidence obtained by using information in a statement itself inadmissible because it was tainted by a violation of the Miranda requirements. 4 The Patane opinion states that,

2013In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding that a procedural Miranda violation differs from a Fourth Amendment seizure violation, and therefore the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not applicable to Miranda warning violations. 3 Thereafter, in Patane , the Court found that federal constitutional law does not require the exclusion of physical evidence obtained by using information in a statement itself inadmissible because it was tainted by a violation of the Miranda requirements. 4 The Patane opinion states that,

2013In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding that a procedural Miranda violation differs from a Fourth Amendment seizure violation, and therefore the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not applicable to Miranda warning violations. 3 Thereafter, in Patane , the Court found that federal constitutional law does not require the exclusion of physical evidence obtained by using information in a statement itself inadmissible because it was tainted by a violation of the Miranda requirements. 4 The Patane opinion states that,

2013In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its finding that a procedural Miranda violation differs from a Fourth Amendment seizure violation, and therefore the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not applicable to Miranda warning violations. 3 Thereafter, in Patane , the Court found that federal constitutional law does not require the exclusion of physical evidence obtained by using information in a statement itself inadmissible because it was tainted by a violation of the Miranda requirements. 4 The Patane opinion states that,

1989Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347 , 83 S.Ct. 448, 453 , 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963).

1989Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347 , 83 S.Ct. 448, 453 , 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963).

1987In State v. Mattheson, 407 So.2d 1150, 1160-1161 (La.1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 3571 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: There is no statutory authority for a Louisiana Court to grant a defense witness use immunity absent a request from the attorney general together with the district attorney for the district in which the proceeding is or may be held.

1973We specifically held in Mapp that this constitutional prohibition is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amndment. * * *" [2] In State of New Jersey v. William P. Ebron. 61 N.J. 207 , 294 A.2d 1 (1972), the Supreme Court of New Jersey pertinently stated: "* * * The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the Constitution of this State, in almost identical language, forbid unreasonable searches and seizures and direct that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause.

1973We specifically held in Mapp that this constitutional prohibition is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amndment. * * *" [2] In State of New Jersey v. William P. Ebron. 61 N.J. 207 , 294 A.2d 1 (1972), the Supreme Court of New Jersey pertinently stated: "* * * The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the Constitution of this State, in almost identical language, forbid unreasonable searches and seizures and direct that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause.