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11 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Opinion of the Justices to the Senategreen2 sentences2011See Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1209, 1211 (1992). 1994You are to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty based solely on the evidence that has been presented to you in this particular case.” On May 12, 1992, the Justices of this court submitted to the Senate of the Commonwealth an answer to the following question: “Would the provisions of Senate No. 717 which permits a defendant’s failure or refusal to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath to be admissible as evidence in a criminal proceeding violate the self-incrimination clause of Article XII of Part the First of the Constitution of the Commonwealth in that the defend | 2 | 2 |
Watts v. Indianagreen2 sentences2019See also Watts v. Indiana , 338 U.S. 49 , 59, 69 S.Ct. 1347 , 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances"). 2019See also Watts v. Indiana , 338 U.S. 49 , 59, 69 S.Ct. 1347 , 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances"). | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Turcogreen2 sentences2018Such a claim would not be foreclosed by the dictum in Butler v. Turco , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 80 , 87 n.13, 99 N.E.3d 341 (2018), in which a review of the briefs reveals the plaintiff did not raise or even mention before us a self-incrimination claim under either the State or Federal Constitution. 2018Such a claim would not be foreclosed by the dictum in Butler v. Turco , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 80 , 87 n.13, 99 N.E.3d 341 (2018), in which a review of the briefs reveals the plaintiff did not raise or even mention before us a self-incrimination claim under either the State or Federal Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Smileygreen1 sentence2016Compare Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 481 (2000) (counsel not ineffective where he appropriately advised defendant of consequences of making statement to police and of waiving privilege against incrimination). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hubbellgreen1 sentence2005In so holding, the Court concluded that the self-incrimination clause “limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to those that are ‘testimonial’ in character,” id. at 637 , quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000), that the right against self-incrimination contained therein is adequately protected by suppressing the unwarned statement alone, and that the self-incrimination clause “cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary [even though unwarned] statements.” Patane, supra at 637 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Zevitasgreen1 sentence1995This instruction was later held in Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677, 683 (1994), to violate the self-incrimination clause of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. | 1 | 1 |
Williford v. Stategreen1 sentence1994The Justices reasoned that “[i]n the ordinary case a prosecutor would seek to introduce refusal evidence to show, and would argue if permitted, that a defendant’s refusal is the equivalent of his statement, T have had so much to drink that I know or at least suspect that I am unable to pass the test.’ See Williford v. State, 653 P.2d 339, 342-343 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).” Id. at 1209. | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences1992We recognize that courts of other jurisdictions, both before and since South Dakota v. Neville, supra, have considered the issue under the Fifth Amendment or analogous sections of their respective State Constitutions. 2 There is no unanimity in their conclusions or their analytical approach to the issue. 1992L. c. 90, § 24 (1) O) (1990 ed.), by striking out the second and third sentences and inserting in place thereof the following sentence: “Evidence that the defendant failed or refused to consent to such a test or analysis shall not be admissible in a civil proceeding but shall be admissible in a criminal proceeding, and shall be admissible in any action by the registrar under paragraph (/).” The order presents to us the following question: “Would the provisions of Senate No. 717 which permits a defendant’s failure or refusal to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath to be admissibl | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jenkins v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2024In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-239 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's prearrest silence may be used to impeach his credibility without violating the self-incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, or the fundamental fairness guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2024Nonetheless, the Court left it to the States to "formulate [their] own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative." Id. at 239 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Celester
green
2 sentences2019Although the defendant's statements to police were exculpatory in nature, Solomon's conduct of allowing police to interview the defendant without fully understanding the allegations against his client and without informing his client of his Miranda rights caused the defendant to give his statement to police. 9 See Celester , 473 Mass. at 571 & n.23, 45 N.E.3d 539 ("before affirmatively advising **868 a client to speak about the case to the police, it is necessary for counsel to undertake some investigation of the charge and the government's evidence"; counsel has "obligation at the very least 2019Although the defendant's statements to police were exculpatory in nature, Solomon's conduct of allowing police to interview the defendant without fully understanding the allegations against his client and without informing his client of his Miranda rights caused the defendant to give his statement to police. 9 See Celester , 473 Mass. at 571 & n.23, 45 N.E.3d 539 ("before affirmatively advising **868 a client to speak about the case to the police, it is necessary for counsel to undertake some investigation of the charge and the government's evidence"; counsel has "obligation at the very least | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Curley
green
1 sentence2016The court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted because consent vitiated the defendant’s self-incrimination claim, and the jury could have inferred that the defendant “was trying to avoid giving a sample while appearing to try to take the test.” Id. at 168 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Patane
green
2 sentences2005The core protection afforded by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to be a “witness against himself.” 3 Similarly, one of the core protections of art. 12 is a prohibition on compelling any person to “furnish evidence against himself.” 4 “[I]n Miranda , the Court concluded that the possibility of coercion inherent in custodial interrogations unacceptably raises the risk that a suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination might be violated.” Patane, supra at 639 . 2005In so holding, the Court concluded that the self-incrimination clause “limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to those that are ‘testimonial’ in character,” id. at 637 , quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000), that the right against self-incrimination contained therein is adequately protected by suppressing the unwarned statement alone, and that the self-incrimination clause “cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary [even though unwarned] statements.” Patane, supra at 637 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Allen v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1977Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.