mortgage clause in Kansas

1975(Insurance Co. v. Coverdale, 48 Kan. 446 , 29 Pac. 682 ; Stamey v. Assurance Co., 93 Kan. 707 , 150 Pac. 227 .) It should be noted that although the Fanchers were not named in the standard mortgage clause it was their interest for whioh protection was sought.

1975(Insurance Co. v. Coverdale, 48 Kan. 446 , 29 Pac. 682 ; Stamey v. Assurance Co., 93 Kan. 707 , 150 Pac. 227 .) It should be noted that although the Fanchers were not named in the standard mortgage clause it was their interest for whioh protection was sought.

1975(Insurance Co. v. Coverdale, 48 Kan. 446 , 29 Pac. 682 ; Stamey v. Assurance Co., 93 Kan. 707 , 150 Pac. 227 .) It should be noted that although the Fanchers were not named in the standard mortgage clause it was their interest for whioh protection was sought.

1924It 3.) In Roper v. Insurance Co., 161 N. C. 151 , the court had before it several insurance policies, some of which had the mortgage clause in the form spoken of as the New York and New Jersey standard mortgage clause (which is the same as the union mortgage clause mentioned in Insurance Co. v. Coverdale, 48 Kan. 446 , 29 Pac. 682 ).

1927In the case of Bank v. Insurance Co., 91 Kan. 18 , 137 Pac. 78 , the court permitted recovery on a policy providing for forfeiture on commencement of foreclosure by a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage clause making loss payable to the mortgagee as his interest might appear, "subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy.” The decision is not in harmony with the general doctrine which was applied later in the case of Burns v. Insurance Co., 103 Kan. 803 , 176 Pac. 985 .

1927In the case of Bank v. Insurance Co., 91 Kan. 18 , 137 Pac. 78 , the court permitted recovery on a policy providing for forfeiture on commencement of foreclosure by a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage clause making loss payable to the mortgagee as his interest might appear, "subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy.” The decision is not in harmony with the general doctrine which was applied later in the case of Burns v. Insurance Co., 103 Kan. 803 , 176 Pac. 985 .

1920Co., 4 Kan.

1913Co., 4 Kan.

2007Co., 17 Kan.

1993App. 2d 457, 463 , 839 P.2d 64 (1992), involved the liability of an insurance company for its failure to pay the proceeds in the manner required under the loss payable provisions of the policy, where Judge Lewis succinctly summarized the relevant law in the following manner: “It is the law of Kansas and most other states that the standard mortgage clause operates as a separate and distinct contract between the insurer and the mortgagee.

1937(Stamey v. Assurance Co., 93 Kan. 707 , 150 Pac. 227 ; Motor Co. v. Indemnity Co., 116 Kan. 109, 115 , 225 Pac. 1056 .)” (p. 46.) Paraphrasing this language and applying it to the case at bar, the provisions of the mortgage clause in this fire insurance policy constitute a contract between this defendant and this plaintiff.

1937(Stamey v. Assurance Co., 93 Kan. 707 , 150 Pac. 227 ; Motor Co. v. Indemnity Co., 116 Kan. 109, 115 , 225 Pac. 1056 .)” (p. 46.) Paraphrasing this language and applying it to the case at bar, the provisions of the mortgage clause in this fire insurance policy constitute a contract between this defendant and this plaintiff.

1927In the case of Bank v. Insurance Co., 91 Kan. 18 , 137 Pac. 78 , the court permitted recovery on a policy providing for forfeiture on commencement of foreclosure by a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage clause making loss payable to the mortgagee as his interest might appear, "subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy.” The decision is not in harmony with the general doctrine which was applied later in the case of Burns v. Insurance Co., 103 Kan. 803 , 176 Pac. 985 .

1927In the case of Bank v. Insurance Co., 91 Kan. 18 , 137 Pac. 78 , the court permitted recovery on a policy providing for forfeiture on commencement of foreclosure by a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage clause making loss payable to the mortgagee as his interest might appear, "subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy.” The decision is not in harmony with the general doctrine which was applied later in the case of Burns v. Insurance Co., 103 Kan. 803 , 176 Pac. 985 .

2012The Martinez court relied primarily on the language of the mortgage — language virtually identical to the Mortgage clause herein — to find that the debtor was aware of and understood tire relationship between MERS and Countrywide. 444 B.R. at 205 .

2012The Martinez court noted that MERS also provided a copy of its terms and conditions with its lenders as further evidence of the agency relationship. 444 B.R. at 205-06 .

2007Co., 248 Kan. 881, 887 , 811 P.2d 868 (1991); see also Nieses v. Solomon State Bank, 236 Kan. 767, 778 , 696 P.2d 372 (1985) (“Kansas follows the majority rule, i.e., that a standard mortgage clause operates as a distinct and separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee.”); Fancher v. Carson-Campbell, Inc., 216 Kan. 141, 144 , 530 P.2d 1225 (1975) (“We have been *837 consistent in holding that [a union mortgage clause] creates a new and independent contract which entitles the mortgagee to recover under the policy of insurance, notwithstanding the effect of any act or neglect on the

2007Co., 248 Kan. 881, 887 , 811 P.2d 868 (1991); see also Nieses v. Solomon State Bank, 236 Kan. 767, 778 , 696 P.2d 372 (1985) (“Kansas follows the majority rule, i.e., that a standard mortgage clause operates as a distinct and separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee.”); Fancher v. Carson-Campbell, Inc., 216 Kan. 141, 144 , 530 P.2d 1225 (1975) (“We have been *837 consistent in holding that [a union mortgage clause] creates a new and independent contract which entitles the mortgagee to recover under the policy of insurance, notwithstanding the effect of any act or neglect on the

1993Kramer Grocery Co., Inc. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 497 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying Arkansas law); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Charles S. Martin Dist.

1991The mortgage clause stated that “[A]ll the covenants and conditions herein contained, and contained in the bond accompanying this mortgage, shall be construed and interpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of New York.” 17 N.J.

1985The Neises mistakenly base their argument on Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 48 Kan. 235 , 29 Pac. 161 (1892).

1985Co., 131 Kan. 628 , 293 Pac. 402 (1930), the court held that under the “union mortgage clause,” where it appears that the insurance company is not liable to the mortgagor and owner to whom the policy was issued, but is liable to the mortgagee, the insurance company upon payment of the amount of its policy is entitled to be fully subrogated to the security held by the mortgagee to the extent of the amount paid by it in accordance with the subrogation clause set forth in the mortgage clause attached to its policy.

1985Co., 131 Kan. 628 , 293 Pac. 402 (1930), the court held that under the “union mortgage clause,” where it appears that the insurance company is not liable to the mortgagor and owner to whom the policy was issued, but is liable to the mortgagee, the insurance company upon payment of the amount of its policy is entitled to be fully subrogated to the security held by the mortgagee to the extent of the amount paid by it in accordance with the subrogation clause set forth in the mortgage clause attached to its policy.

1975Co., 208 Kan. 937 , 494 P. 2d 1145 .) Marysville argues that the meaning of the term “trustee” as used in the standard mortgage clause was intended to be the equivalent of “mortgagee.” In support of the position that the terms mortgagee and trustee are equivalent, Marysville cites two Pennsylvania cases which state the word “trustee,” when used in a standard mortgage clause, refers to the trustee under a deed of trust similar to and of the nature of a mortgage.

1975Co., 208 Kan. 937 , 494 P. 2d 1145 .) Marysville argues that the meaning of the term “trustee” as used in the standard mortgage clause was intended to be the equivalent of “mortgagee.” In support of the position that the terms mortgagee and trustee are equivalent, Marysville cites two Pennsylvania cases which state the word “trustee,” when used in a standard mortgage clause, refers to the trustee under a deed of trust similar to and of the nature of a mortgage.

1975(Clarke & Cohen, Appels., v. Real To Use, 105 Pa. Super. 102 , 159 A. 454 ; Gen.

1975(Clarke & Cohen, Appels., v. Real To Use, 105 Pa. Super. 102 , 159 A. 454 ; Gen.

1937The case of Funk v. Insurance Co., 82 Kan. 525 , 108 Pac. 832 , was where the owner of property insured it against loss by fire and the policy contained the usual mortgage clause, and later the owner sold the property to another and assigned the policy to the vendee, and it was held that— “. . . the original premium supported the insurance of the two interests— that of the owner and that of the mortgagee — and the policy was sustained by that consideration in the hands of the assignee. . . .” (Syl.) It is said under the heading of “Assignment of Policy,” in 26 C.

1937The case of Funk v. Insurance Co., 82 Kan. 525 , 108 Pac. 832 , was where the owner of property insured it against loss by fire and the policy contained the usual mortgage clause, and later the owner sold the property to another and assigned the policy to the vendee, and it was held that— “. . . the original premium supported the insurance of the two interests— that of the owner and that of the mortgagee — and the policy was sustained by that consideration in the hands of the assignee. . . .” (Syl.) It is said under the heading of “Assignment of Policy,” in 26 C.

1937Co., 142 Kan. 43 , 45 P. 2d 839 , where this court said: “In this state, in accord with the weight of authority, it has been held that the provisions of a mortgage clause attached to a fire insurance policy constitute a contract between the insurance company and the mortgagee.

1937Co., 142 Kan. 43 , 45 P. 2d 839 , where this court said: “In this state, in accord with the weight of authority, it has been held that the provisions of a mortgage clause attached to a fire insurance policy constitute a contract between the insurance company and the mortgagee.

1935Co. v. Livingston, 49 F. 2d 745 ; British American Assur.

1935(Loan Association v. Insurance Co., 74 Kan. 272 , 86 Pac. 142 .) The present mortgage clause provides that the company shall— “To the extent of such payment be subrogated to the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right of recovery and claim upon the collateral to the mortgage debt, but without impairing the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right to sue; or it may pay the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage.” Substantially identical provisions were included in the mortgage clauses under consideration in the following cases: Wagner v. Peters, 142 Va. 412 , 128 S. E. 445 ; Imper

1935(Loan Association v. Insurance Co., 74 Kan. 272 , 86 Pac. 142 .) The present mortgage clause provides that the company shall— “To the extent of such payment be subrogated to the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right of recovery and claim upon the collateral to the mortgage debt, but without impairing the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right to sue; or it may pay the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage.” Substantially identical provisions were included in the mortgage clauses under consideration in the following cases: Wagner v. Peters, 142 Va. 412 , 128 S. E. 445 ; Imper

1935(Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 Kan. 278 , 178 Pac. 413 .) Another form provides that no subrogation shall impair the right of the mortgagee to recover the full amount of its claim.

1935(Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 Kan. 278 , 178 Pac. 413 .) Another form provides that no subrogation shall impair the right of the mortgagee to recover the full amount of its claim.

1935Co., 127 Kan. 768 , 275 Pac. 214 .) Whether the qualification should be applied in construction of a mortgage clause issued for the benefit of one who does not become a member of the company presents a situation where the reason for the qualification no longer exists, and it would appear the general rule should apply as between the company and the mortgagee.

1935Co., 127 Kan. 768 , 275 Pac. 214 .) Whether the qualification should be applied in construction of a mortgage clause issued for the benefit of one who does not become a member of the company presents a situation where the reason for the qualification no longer exists, and it would appear the general rule should apply as between the company and the mortgagee.

1935(Loan Association v. Insurance Co., 74 Kan. 272 , 86 Pac. 142 .) The present mortgage clause provides that the company shall— “To the extent of such payment be subrogated to the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right of recovery and claim upon the collateral to the mortgage debt, but without impairing the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right to sue; or it may pay the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage.” Substantially identical provisions were included in the mortgage clauses under consideration in the following cases: Wagner v. Peters, 142 Va. 412 , 128 S. E. 445 ; Imper

1935(Loan Association v. Insurance Co., 74 Kan. 272 , 86 Pac. 142 .) The present mortgage clause provides that the company shall— “To the extent of such payment be subrogated to the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right of recovery and claim upon the collateral to the mortgage debt, but without impairing the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right to sue; or it may pay the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage.” Substantially identical provisions were included in the mortgage clauses under consideration in the following cases: Wagner v. Peters, 142 Va. 412 , 128 S. E. 445 ; Imper

1933Co., 136 Kan. 551 , 16 P. 2d 956 .) Aftér the fire of September 29,1931, defendant exercised its rights under the mortgage clause and purchased the mortgage held by the Investors Loan & Abstract Co. at the time the policy was issued and sought to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.

1933Co., 136 Kan. 551 , 16 P. 2d 956 .) Aftér the fire of September 29,1931, defendant exercised its rights under the mortgage clause and purchased the mortgage held by the Investors Loan & Abstract Co. at the time the policy was issued and sought to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.

1932The question was squarely before this court in Safe Deposit Co. v. Thomas, 59 Kan. 470 , 53 Pac. 472 , where the identical language in a mortgage clause was construed to be a covenant.

1932The question was squarely before this court in Safe Deposit Co. v. Thomas, 59 Kan. 470 , 53 Pac. 472 , where the identical language in a mortgage clause was construed to be a covenant.

1932Appellant also cites in the same connection the case of Burrows v. Insurance Co., reported in 110 Kan. 458 , 207 Pac. 431 , and 111 Kan. 358 , 207 Pac. 431 , where it was held on a rehearing that a tenant was not the real party in interest as to the landlord’s two-thirds interest in a stack of wheat that had been destroyed by fire after he had insured it all when he was insuring his own undivided one-third interest therein simply because he could do so in his own name at the same minimum expense or premium.

1932Appellant also cites in the same connection the case of Burrows v. Insurance Co., reported in 110 Kan. 458 , 207 Pac. 431 , and 111 Kan. 358 , 207 Pac. 431 , where it was held on a rehearing that a tenant was not the real party in interest as to the landlord’s two-thirds interest in a stack of wheat that had been destroyed by fire after he had insured it all when he was insuring his own undivided one-third interest therein simply because he could do so in his own name at the same minimum expense or premium.

1932Appellant also cites in the same connection the case of Burrows v. Insurance Co., reported in 110 Kan. 458 , 207 Pac. 431 , and 111 Kan. 358 , 207 Pac. 431 , where it was held on a rehearing that a tenant was not the real party in interest as to the landlord’s two-thirds interest in a stack of wheat that had been destroyed by fire after he had insured it all when he was insuring his own undivided one-third interest therein simply because he could do so in his own name at the same minimum expense or premium.

1932The decision was in accord with Insurance Company v. Upton, 2 N. D. 229, 50 N. W. 702 .

1932The decision was in accord with Insurance Company v. Upton, 2 N. D. 229, 50 N. W. 702 .