25 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
First Bank v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2020Section 49-1 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he fore- closure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof . . . .’’ Under § 49-1, ‘‘a judgment of strict fore- closure extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mort- gagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in . . . § 49-14.’’ First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368, 370 , 507 A.2d 997 (1986). 2020Section 49-1 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he fore- closure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof . . . .’’ Under § 49-1, ‘‘a judgment of strict fore- closure extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mort- gagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in . . . § 49-14.’’ First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368, 370 , 507 A.2d 997 (1986). | 1 | 5 |
North End Bank & Trust Co. v. Mandellgreen2 sentences2014See North End Bank & Trust Co. v. Mandell, 113 Conn. 241, 246 , 155 A. 80 (1931). 2014See North End Bank & Trust Co. v. Mandell, 113 Conn. 241, 246 , 155 A. 80 (1931). | 1 | 2 |
Atlas Realty Corporation v. Housegreen2 sentences1997See also Atlas Realty Corp. v. House, 120 Conn. 661 , 670 , CT Page 5325 183 A. 9 (1936) (stating, "to include within the exception [to the usury law] an action on the note alone would enable a usurer, by taking a mortgage securing his loan and then ignoring it and bringing action on the note alone, to defeat the predominant purpose of these statutes.") Despite the accuracy of the defendants' proposition that the mortgage exception to the usury statute does not apply to actions on the note itself in lieu of foreclosure, the defendants have failed to demonstrate convincingly the applicability o 1997See also Atlas Realty Corp. v. House, 120 Conn. 661 , 670 , CT Page 5325 183 A. 9 (1936) (stating, "to include within the exception [to the usury law] an action on the note alone would enable a usurer, by taking a mortgage securing his loan and then ignoring it and bringing action on the note alone, to defeat the predominant purpose of these statutes.") Despite the accuracy of the defendants' proposition that the mortgage exception to the usury statute does not apply to actions on the note itself in lieu of foreclosure, the defendants have failed to demonstrate convincingly the applicability o | 1 | 1 |
Factor v. Fallbrook, Inc.green2 sentences1994First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368 , 377 , 507 A.2d 977 (1986); see also Factor v. Fallbrook, Inc., 25 Conn. App. 159 , 163 , 593 A.2d 520 (1991). 1994First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368 , 377 , 507 A.2d 977 (1986); see also Factor v. Fallbrook, Inc., 25 Conn. App. 159 , 163 , 593 A.2d 520 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People's Bank v. Bilmor Building Corp.
green
2 sentences1996General Statutes § 49-1 provides, "[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure." However, "to the extent that 49-1 limits the mortgagee's remedies, it does so only after the entry of a judgment in foreclosure." People's Bank v. Bilmor Building Corporation , 28 Conn. App. 809 , 821 , 614 A.2d 456 (1992). 1996General Statutes § 49-1 provides, "[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure." However, "to the extent that 49-1 limits the mortgagee's remedies, it does so only after the entry of a judgment in foreclosure." People's Bank v. Bilmor Building Corporation , 28 Conn. App. 809 , 821 , 614 A.2d 456 (1992). | 3 | 1996–1998 |
Ansonia National Bank's Appeal from Commissioners
neutral
2 sentences1931Our law, General Statutes, §5080, provides: “The foreclosure of a mortgage shall be a bar to any further action upon a mortgage debt, note or obligation, unless the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof are made parties to such foreclosure.” “If the mortgagee is not willing to take the property mortgaged as full payment for his debt, he has only to make all the persons to whom he may wish to resort for further payment parties to his foreclosure suit.” Ansonia National Bank’s Appeal, 58 Conn. 257, 259 , 18 Atl. 1030 . 1931Our law, General Statutes, §5080, provides: “The foreclosure of a mortgage shall be a bar to any further action upon a mortgage debt, note or obligation, unless the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof are made parties to such foreclosure.” “If the mortgagee is not willing to take the property mortgaged as full payment for his debt, he has only to make all the persons to whom he may wish to resort for further payment parties to his foreclosure suit.” Ansonia National Bank’s Appeal, 58 Conn. 257, 259 , 18 Atl. 1030 . | 3 | 1917–1993 |
CTB Realty Ventures XXII, Inc. v. Markoski
green
2 sentences1995In CTB Realty Ventures XXII, Inc. v. Markoski, 33 Conn. App. 388 , 392 (1994), the Appellate Court stated: "`Under General Statutes [§] 49-1 , a judgment of strict foreclosure extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mortgagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in General Statutes [§] 49-14 . . . . 1995In CTB Realty Ventures XXII, Inc. v. Markoski , 33 Conn. App. 388 , 392 (1994), the Appellate Court stated: "`Under General Statutes [§] 49-1 , a judgment of strict foreclosure extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mortgagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in General Statutes [§] 49-14 . . . . | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Ral Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates
green
2 sentences2019The mortgagee's title does not become absolute, however, until all eligible parties have failed to exercise their rights to redeem the property." [Citations omitted.] ); RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates , 278 Conn. 672 , 685 n.12, 899 A.2d 586 (2006) (amended affidavit of debt filed on day that court reentered judgment of foreclosure, when it set new law days). 2019The mortgagee's title does not become absolute, however, until all eligible parties have failed to exercise their rights to redeem the property." [Citations omitted.] ); RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates , 278 Conn. 672 , 685 n.12, 899 A.2d 586 (2006) (amended affidavit of debt filed on day that court reentered judgment of foreclosure, when it set new law days). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani
green
2 sentences2018Subsection (a) of § 23-18"serve[s] as an exception to the general prohibition of hearsay evidence"; Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani , 174 Conn. App. 476 , 484, 166 A.3d 670 (2017) ; and provides: "In any action to foreclose a mortgage where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed, such debt may be proved by presenting to the judicial authority the original note and mortgage, together with the affidavit of the plaintiff or other person familiar with the indebtedness, stating what amount, including interest to the date of the hearing, is due, and that there is no setoff 2018Subsection (a) of § 23-18"serve[s] as an exception to the general prohibition of hearsay evidence"; Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani , 174 Conn. App. 476 , 484, 166 A.3d 670 (2017) ; and provides: "In any action to foreclose a mortgage where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed, such debt may be proved by presenting to the judicial authority the original note and mortgage, together with the affidavit of the plaintiff or other person familiar with the indebtedness, stating what amount, including interest to the date of the hearing, is due, and that there is no setoff | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Milazzo v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences2012In other words, it is clerical error if the judgment as recorded fails to agree with the judgment in fact rendered . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milazzo v. Schwartz, 88 Conn. App. 592, 596 , 871 A.2d 1040 (2005). 6 Practice Book § 23-18 (a) provides: “In any action to foreclose a mortgage where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed, such debt may be proved by presenting to the judicial authority the original note and mortgage, together with the affidavit of the plaintiff or other person familiar with the indebtedness, stating what amount, including inter 2012In other words, it is clerical error if the judgment as recorded fails to agree with the judgment in fact rendered . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milazzo v. Schwartz, 88 Conn. App. 592, 596 , 871 A.2d 1040 (2005). 6 Practice Book § 23-18 (a) provides: “In any action to foreclose a mortgage where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed, such debt may be proved by presenting to the judicial authority the original note and mortgage, together with the affidavit of the plaintiff or other person familiar with the indebtedness, stating what amount, including inter | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re Carissa K.
green
2 sentences2006In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 783 , 740 A.2d 896 (1999). 2006In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 783 , 740 A.2d 896 (1999). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1995We have stated, however, that “[i]n the absence of a request for a more specific statement the complaint need not detail the elements constituting the mortgage debt. ” Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 375 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981). 1995We have stated, however, that “[i]n the absence of a request for a more specific statement the complaint need not detail the elements constituting the mortgage debt. ” Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 375 , 439 A.2d 396 (1981). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Siano
green
1 sentence1994That section begins: "[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt." In the context of the present case, according to the plain language of this section, the mortgagee, by virtue of its foreclosure on the Berlin mortgage, would be precluded from enforcing its rights under the New Britain mortgage Certainly CT Page 4440 such a result was not intended by the legislature. 6 It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that "those who promulgate statutes or rules do not intend to promulgate statutes or rules that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre r | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones
green
2 sentences1994Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285 , 295 n.12, 596 A.2d 414 (1991). 1994Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285 , 295 n.12, 596 A.2d 414 (1991). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Gurliacci v. Mayer
green
2 sentences1994The plaintiff in any further action upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover only the amount of such judgment.” General Statutes § 49-1 provides in pertinent part: “The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure . . . .” Although the denial of 1994The plaintiff in any further action upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover only the amount of such judgment.” General Statutes § 49-1 provides in pertinent part: “The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure . . . .” Although the denial of | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Greengarden v. Kuhn
green
2 sentences1994The plaintiff in any further action upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover only the amount of such judgment.” General Statutes § 49-1 provides in pertinent part: “The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure . . . .” Although the denial of 1994The plaintiff in any further action upon the debt, note or obligation, shall recover only the amount of such judgment.” General Statutes § 49-1 provides in pertinent part: “The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure . . . .” Although the denial of | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Simsbury Bank & Trust Co. v. Ray Carlson Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence1994In regard to the interest due plaintiff since the judgment of strict foreclosure became final on October 6, 1993, C.G.S. § 49-1 provides that "foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further actions upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are made parties to the foreclosure." However, that section did not change the intent or provisions of C.G.S. § 49-14 , Simsbury Bank Trust Co. v. Ray Carlson Lumber Co., 154 Conn. 216 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wilcox v. Bliss
green
2 sentences1991General Statutes § 49-1 provides in pertinent part that ‘ ‘[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See General Statutes (1835 Rev.) tit. 31, c. 4; Public Acts 1878, c. 129; General Statutes (1888 Rev.) §§ 3010, 3011; Gen 1991General Statutes § 49-1 provides in pertinent part that ‘ ‘[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See General Statutes (1835 Rev.) tit. 31, c. 4; Public Acts 1878, c. 129; General Statutes (1888 Rev.) §§ 3010, 3011; Gen | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991This common law rule is now codified in General Statutes § 49-1, which provides in part that “[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure.” In Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 576-77 , 409 A.2d 1020 (1979), this court held that certain provisions of the former General Statutes § 49-14 violated due process. 1991This common law rule is now codified in General Statutes § 49-1, which provides in part that “[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure.” In Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 576-77 , 409 A.2d 1020 (1979), this court held that certain provisions of the former General Statutes § 49-14 violated due process. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Orsi v. Orsi
green
1 sentence1942Orsi v. Orsi, 125 Conn. 66, 69 , 3 Atl. (2d) 306. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.