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7 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1880–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pittsburgh National Bank v. Motorists Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence1998Bank v. Motorists Mut., 621 N.E.2d 875, 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the following loss payable clause constituted a standard mortgage clause: LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSE. | 1 | 1 |
Gouldin Ex Rel. Wiley v. Inter-Ocean Insurancegreen2 sentences1959See Gouldin v. Insurance Co., 248 N.C. 161 , 102 S.E. 2d 846 ; Appleman, Insurance Law and Procedure, Volume 16, sections 9361 and 9365; 29 Am. 1959See Gouldin v. Insurance Co., 248 N.C. 161 , 102 S.E. 2d 846 ; Appleman, Insurance Law and Procedure, Volume 16, sections 9361 and 9365; 29 Am. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1982Green v. Insurance Co., 233 N.C. 321 , 64 S.E. 2d 162 (1951). 1982Green v. Insurance Co., 233 N.C. 321 , 64 S.E. 2d 162 (1951). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sun Insurance Office v. Varble
neutral
1 sentence1924Co. v. Varable , 103 Ky. 758 , a similar conclusion was reached, the Court holding the provision that the interest of the mortgagee should not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the owner or mortgagor of the property insured was limited by the stipulation that the insurer should not be liable for a greater portion of any loss or damage sustained than the sum insured bore to the whole amount of insurance on the property, "issued to or held by any party or parties having an insurable interest therein." Hence, it was held that a policy insuring the mortgagee's interest should prorate with ot | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Syndicate Ins. v. Bohn
green
1 sentence1924Co. v. Bohn, 65 Fed., 165 , the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in holding a policy void as to the mortgagor, or owner, because of misrepresentation in regard to the sole and unconditional ownership of the property, and valid as to the mortgagee, under the standard mortgage clause, speaking through Judge Sanborn, said: “Our conclusion is that the effect of the union mortgage clause, when *752 attached to a policy of insurance running to the mortgagor, is to make a new and separate contract between the mortgagee and the insurance company, and to effect a separate insurance of the inte | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Eddy v. London Assurance Corp.
green
1 sentence1924Corp., supra. But we are of opinion that the present policy should prorate with the one issued by the Atlas Company, each policy containing, as it does, a standard mortgage clause in favor of the Federal Land Bank of Columbia as its interest may appear. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Dunham v. Cincinnati, P., & CR Co.
green
1 sentence1880Pennoc v. Coe, 23 How., (U. S.) 128; Dunham v. Railway Co., 1 Wall., 254 ; Robinson v. Ezzell, 72 N. C., 231 . | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Butt v. Ellett
green
1 sentence1880In Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall., 544 , the supreme court of the United-States declared that while the mortgage clause in the instrument “could not operate as a mortgage because the crops to which it relates were not then in existence, when, the crops grew the lien attached and bound them effectually from that time.” And the doctrine has been car *79 ried so far as to hold the future acquired property of a railroad company embraced in a grant of “all present and future tobe acquired property ” of the corporation, incident to the use of the road. | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Robinson, Probate Judge v. . Ezzell, Register
neutral
1 sentence1880Pennoc v. Coe, 23 How., (U. S.) 128; Dunham v. Railway Co., 1 Wall., 254 ; Robinson v. Ezzell, 72 N. C., 231 . | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.